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Abbreviations of Boethius’ Works
(1) Mathematical Works
Arithmetica — De Institutione Arithmetica (Principles of Arithmetic)
Musica — De Institutione Musica (Principles of Music)
(2) Logical Works
C.Topica — In Ciceronis Topica (Commentary on Cicero’s Topics)
Divisio — De Divisione (On Division)
In Categorias — In Categorias Aristotelis (Commentary on Aristotle’s
Categories)
1InInter., 2InInter. — In Aristotelis De Interpretatione (editio prima and
editio secunda) (Commentaries on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, 1 and 2)
1InIsag., 2InIsag. — In Isagogen Porphyrii Commenta (editio prima and
editio secunda) (Commentaries on Isagoge, 1 and 2)
I.S.Categorico — Introductio ad Syllogismos Categorico (Introduction to
Categorical Syllogisms)
S.Categorico — De Syllogismo Categorico (On the Categorical Syllogisms)
S.Hypothetico — De Syllogismo Hypothetico (On Hypothetical Syllogisms)
TopicisD. — De Topicis Differentiis (On Topical Differentiae)
(3) Theological Works
De trinitate — De Trinitate (The Trinity is One God not Three Gods)
Utrum pater — Utrum Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus de Divinitate
Substantialiter Praedicentur (Whether Father, Son, and Holy Spirit may be
Substantially Predicated of the Divinity)
Quomodo substantiae — Quomodo Substantiae in eo Quod Sint Bonae Sint
cum non Sint Substantialia Bona (How Substances can be Good in Virtue of
Their Existence without Being Absolute Goods)
De fide — De Fide Catholica (On the Catholic Faith)
Contra Eutychen et Nestorium — Contra Eutychen et Nestorium (A Treatise
Against Eutyches and Nestorius)
(4) Last Work





Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (480-525 A.D.) is regarded as a
great thinker of the early Middle Ages. Indeed, Boethius is a man of
immense erudition and his works touch upon many philosophical fields,
including mathematics, logic and theology. In Boethius’ classification
system, mathematics and theology belong to speculative philosophy, and
logic is both a part of philosophy and an instrument of philosophy.1 In his
short life2, he wrote some monographs and commentaries, which can be
classified into four main groups: his works on mathematical disciplines
including arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy3; his translations,
commentaries, and monographs on Aristotelian logic and areas of rhetoric
closely related to logic4; his five short theological treatises; and his last but
most famous work, Consolatio Philosophiae5.
Despite writing these works, Boethius is not regarded as an original
thinker. Instead, his mathematical works and most of his logical works are
regarded as translations, and even his monographs on logic are also
considered to be little more than translation. His theological tractates and
Consolatio Philosophiae are thought to patch up Neoplatonic materials. It
seems that Boethius was nothing less than a transmitter of ancient thoughts
to the Middle Ages. However, I will argue a different perspective on the
issue of Boethius as an original thinker.
There are many translations and commentaries of Boethius’ works
1 Boethius discusses the division of philosophy both in his theological treatise on the
Trinity and his commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge. Cf. De trinitate, II.5-21 and 2InIsag.,
74C-D.
2 On Boethius’ life, cf. Coster (1968); Matthews (1981), “Anicius Manlius Severinus
Boethius,” and Kirkby (1981), “The Scholar and His Public,” in Gibson (ed.), pp. 15-43
and pp. 44-69; Kaylor (2012), “Introduction: The Times, Life, and Work of Boethius,” in
Kaylor and Phillips (eds.), pp. 1-46; Marenbon (2003), pp. 7-16; Moorhead (2009),
“Boethius’ Life and the World of Late Antique Philosophy,” in Marenbon (ed.), pp. 13-33;
Morton (1981); Patch (1947); Stewart (1974), pp. 15-54.
3 Cf. Section I.2.2.
4 Cf. Section I.2.3.
5 Cf. Section I.2.4.
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(especially Consolatio Philosophiae6) in different languages, as well as
several studies on Boethius. Nonetheless, Boethius could not be studied as a
whole7. Boethius is learned, grasping knowledge of various subjects.
However, scholars from different fields, such as historians, philosophers,
theologians, and literary scholars, tend to focus only on the part of Boethius’
thoughts that relate to their own disciplines.8 The result is a lack of
understanding Boethius as a whole. However, there are few scholars
researching the relationship between Boethius’ mathematics and logic or
applications of them in his theology and Consolatio Philosophiae.9 My
dissertation will focus on such analysis.
In my dissertation, I will reassess Boethius’ mathematics and logic, and
their roles in philosophy, and on the basis of these, I will explore the
6 Godden and Irvine (2009) edit two volumes of the old English versions of Consolatio. On
translations and commentaries of Consolatio, cf. Brancato (2012), “Readers and
Interpreters of the Consolatio in Italy, 1300–1500,” and Johnson (2012), “Making the
Consolatio in Middle English,” in Kaylor and Phillips (eds.), pp. 357-412 and pp. 413-446;
Cally (1996); Jefferson (1917); Kaylor (1992 and 2007). And Donato (2013a) reinterprets
Consolatio in a striking new way. Donato investigates how the study of Consolatio can
profit from the knowledge of Boethius’ cultural, political and social background that is
available today.
7 Cf. Marenbon (2009), “Introduction: Reading Boethius Whole,” in Marenbon (ed.). In
that introduction, Marenbon gives two main reasons why Boethius is usually not read as a
whole. The first one has nothing to do with Boethius, but points to the limitations of
academic specialization; the second one is that Boethius is seen as an almost entirely
unoriginal thinker, or regarded mainly as a sort of a conduit to the Middle Ages.
8 On Boethius’ logic, cf. De Rijk (1964a, 1964b, and 1988); Dürr (1951); Green-Pedersen
(1984); Magee (1989, 1998, and 2010); Shiel (1957, 1958, 1974, and 1982); Stump (1974,
1978, 1981a, 1981b, 1987, and 1988). On Boethius’ music, cf. Bower (1978, 1981, 1984,
and 1989). On Boethius’ Liberal Arts, cf. Masi (1979, 1981a, and 1981b). On commentaries
on Boethius, cf. Häring (1966 and 1971); Scott (1993). On Boethius’ literary, cf. Lerer
(1985). On a concordance of Boethius, cf. Cooper (1928). On comparisons of Boethius
with other people, cf. Arber (1942); Coster and Patch (1948); Ford (1968); Merlan (1968);
Shiel (1957 and 1974). And Barrett (1940), Chadwick (1981b), Gibson (1981), and
Marenbon (2003) give a full description of Boethius and his thoughts, but they, too,
introduce Boethius according to separate fields without discussing the connections between
these fields.
9 Chamberlain wrote an article on music in Boethius’ Consolatio from the perspective of
literature; cf. Chamberlain (1970). Kijewska points out some connections between
Boethius’ mathematics and theology, especially De trinitate and Consolatio without
detailed explanations; cf. Kijewska (2003), pp. 632-637. Schrade wrote an article on music
in Boethius’ philosophy; cf. Schrade (1947).
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connections between mathematics and logic in Boethius and their
applications to theological or philosophical topics. However, I will not focus
on the applications of all his mathematical and logical knowledge but only
on his basic ideas of arithmetic and music, and basic logic including
knowledge of categories, theories of division and definition.10
Scholars have investigated the chronology of Boethius’ work according
to various methods. Although they have reached different conclusions on the
chronology11, they agree on a general order. Boethius first finished works on
mathematics among which only works on arithmetic and music are extant.12
After the study on mathematics, he started studying logic. Then he applied
theories or examples of mathematics and theories of basic logic to his
investigations into theological issues and in his Consolatio Philosophiae.
Boethius studied Aristotle’s categories, and using categorical logic, he
discussed the Nature and Person of God. He usually defined a concept first
and then put it to use in theology. He also focused explicitly on the
arguments and reasoning that serve his discussions, which is particularly
helpful in the interlocution with Lady Philosophy in the Consolatio
Philosophiae.
My dissertation has three main parts. The first part (Chapter II) focuses
on Boethius’ elementary disciplines, logic and mathematics. I will give a
short introduction to these two disciplines and their roles in Boethius’ whole
knowledge; then I will point out applications of each one to the other. The
second and third parts (Chapter III and Chapter IV) trace applications of
mathematics and basic logic in Boethius’ theological treatises and in the
Consolatio Philosophiae respectively. Before the three main chapters, the
background of Boethius will be introduced first. In this chapter, I will give a
description of the curriculum before Boethius and an introduction to
Boethius’ curriculum on mathematics, logic, theology, and his Consolatio
Philosophiae.
10 Cf. Section II.1.2, Section II.2.1.3, and Section II.2.2.3.
11 Cf. Suto (2012), Chart 2; De Rijk (1964a and 1964b); McKinlay (1907); Phillips (2012),
“Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius: A Chronology and Selected Annotated
Bibliography,” in Kaylor and Phillips (eds.), pp. 551-590.
12 Cf. Section I.2.2.
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I.1. The Curriculum Before Boethius
The first work of Boethius focuses on arithmetic, De Institutione
Arithmetica. The preface of this works is a letter to Symmachus13 in which
Boethius sets forth his plans. Boethius says that it was at Symmachus’
request that he took it upon himself to make Latin readers acquainted with
the riches of Greek culture, which may refer to Symmachus’ long-term plan
to bring over Greek writings to the Roman language.14
At the beginning of his work on arithmetic, Boethius says that he plans
to finish works on arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy. Boethius
gives the name “quadrivium” (“the four ways” or “a place where four roads
meet”) to these four mathematical disciplines. The quadrivium is regarded
as a part of the study of Liberal Arts, and the other part is the trivium which
was given the name in imitation of the quadrivium in the Carolingian era,
including grammar, logic, and rhetoric. As a matter of fact, the disciplines in
Liberal Arts changed many times before the Middle Ages.
Artes liberales (Liberal Arts) used by the Romans stemmed from the
Greek term enkuklios paideia or enkuklia mathemata. The Greeks used
enkuklios paideia or enkuklia mathemata for the subjects that should be
learnt for three years after the age of fourteen (from this age, the education
should be changed from primary to secondary).15 The Liberal Arts were
taken over from Greek ideas of education with very little change. Greek
ideas of education were referred to those subjects, which in classical
antiquity were considered essential for a free citizen to study. The persons
who were most interested in the full span of subjects were philosophers.
Therefore, the curriculum of Liberal Arts was taught only by philosophers,
which is demonstrated in the educational programs of Greek philosophers
13 Quintus Aurelius Memmius Symmachus (died 526 A.D.) was a 6th-century Roman
aristocrat and a historian. He was a patron of secular learning and became the consul for the
year 485. He supported Pope Symmachus (cf. the preface to Chapter III in my dissertation)
in the schism over the Popes’ election and was executed with his son-in-law Boethius after
being charged with treason. Cf. McGeachy (1942).
14 Cf. Arithmetica, preface; Reiss (1982), p. 12.
15 Cf. Clarke (1971), p. 2.
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Pythagoras (fl. 530 B.C.), Isocrates (436-338 B.C.), and Plato (429-347
B.C.).
Among Liberal Arts, four mathematical disciplines had first been taught
first by the Pythagoreans16. Pythagoras found the mathematical proportion
between intervals, which he used to establish the mathematical foundation
for music, and he classified music as one of mathematical disciplines. It is
Pythagoras, Proclus (about 411-485 A.D.) believes, who “transformed
mathematical philosophy into a scheme of liberal education.”17 And a
Pythagorean mathematician Archytas (428-347 B.C.) concludes, at the
beginning of his Harmonics, that “indeed concerning geometry and
arithmetic and sphaeric they handed down to us a clear set of distinctions
and not least also concerning music. For these sciences seem to be akin.”18
Thus, he believed that these four sciences had been derived from
mathematicians, or, in other words, that these four sciences were
subcategories of mathematics. Strictly speaking, because of Pythagoras,
mathematics became an intellectual study and had its place among the
Liberal Arts. Therefore, Pythagoras should be regarded as the founder of the
quadrivium. The real founder of the trivium in Liberal Arts should be the
Sophists. During about 460 B.C. to 380 B.C., Sophists began the study of
dialectic, grammar, and the technical study of language, of the etymology
and usage of words.
In Antiquity, the importance of mathematics was believed to rest on its
usefulness. This view came from Isocrates, who says that “rather it seems to
me both that those who hold, that this training is of no use in practical life
are right and that those who speak in praise of it have truth on their side.”19
He regarded mathematics as “a gymnastic of the mind and a preparation for
philosophy.”20 Isocrates taught mathematics, physical science, history, and
16 On Pythagoreans, cf. Kahn (2001); O’Meara (1989); Zhmud (2012). On Iamblichus’
Platonic curriculum, cf. O’Meara (2003), pp. 62-65.
17 Proclus, A Commentary on the First Book of Euclid’s Elements, II.iv.65; Morrow (1970).
Cf. Heath (1956), pp. 65-117 on Pythagorean achievements in arithmetic; and pp. 141-169
on Pythagorean geometry.
18 Archytas, Harmonics; Huffman (2005), p. 109. Cf. Huffman (2005), pp. 126-127 are on
Archytas and the sciences.
19 Isocrates, Antidosis, 263-264; Norlin (1929).
20 Isocrates, Antidosis, 266; Norlin (1929).
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other disciplines, but all of such disciplines are considered as preliminary
elementary knowledge, and the final purpose is the study of rhetoric and the
participation in ruling the state.21 Not unlike Isocrates, Plato advises in his
Republic that the rulers of the city-state must receive the education of
physical exercise and poetry when they are young, and after they grow up to
be adults, trainee philosopher kings should learn arithmetic, geometry, solid
geometry, astronomy, and harmonics to surpass the sensible world and enter
the abstract intelligible world.22 We can see the connection between the
Liberal Arts and his program of education.
However, the content of Liberal Arts was not fixed. Later, Marcus
Terentius Varro (116-27 B.C.), an ancient Roman scholar and writer,
added medicine and architecture which were expounded in his
Disciplinarum Libri IX, so Liberal Arts included nine disciplines. The
earliest one who had a clear idea about seven Liberal Arts is Martianus
Capella (fl. 5th century A.D.), who wrote a work, De Nuptiis Philologiae et
Mercurii (On the Marriage of Philology and Mercury)23. As a matter of fact,
between Varro and Capella, there is no evidence that any handbook of these
seven Liberal Arts was written, until Capella’s contemporary Augustine of
Hippo (354-430 A.D.) started one. Later in Roman history, the seven Liberal
Arts took a more permanent shape, and included grammar, dialectic (or
logic), rhetoric, arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy. Augustine
planned to write works on all these seven Liberal Arts, but in the end he
only finished the works on grammar, rhetoric, dialectic, some works on
geometry, and six books on music. Augustine believed the number seven is
related to the Holy Spirit. Thanks to the authority of Augustine and the
mystery of the number seven, “seven Liberal Arts” were inherited and
developed. “Seven” became the standard number of Liberal Arts. A century
later, in the second part of Institutiones Divinarum et Saecularium
Litterarum (Institutes of Divine and Secular Learning)24, Cassiodorus (about
485-580 A.D.) introduces grammar, rhetoric, dialectic, arithmetic, music,
geometry, and astronomy. He believed the Liberal Arts as secular learning
21 Cf. Isocrates, Antidosis, 261-268; Norlin (1929).
22 Cf. Plato, Republic, 521e-531d; Waterfield (1993).
23 Cf. Stahl, Johnson, and Burge (1971 and 1971-1977); Sharples (1991).
24 Cf. Cassiodorus, An Introduction to Divine and Human Readings; Jones (1946).
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were not opposed to divine learning, and that the disciplines of the Liberal
Arts were part of the content of the Bible. Therefore, Cassiodorus
encouraged studying the seven Liberal Arts. Because of him, the seven
Liberal Arts received a sacred and unshakable authoritative position.
So in the Middle Ages, “Liberal Arts” referred to seven arts, i.e.
arithmetic, geometry, music, and astronomy, which are called the
quadrivium; and Grammar, Rhetoric, and Logic, which are called the
trivium. The initial medieval university curriculum was constituted of the
trivium which dealt with language, and the quadrivium which dealt with
mathematical disciplines. In the Middle Ages, these seven Liberal Arts
became the preparatory curriculum and the necessary way to the higher
wisdom (philosophy and theology) and were taught in the schools. Before
the Renaissance, most Greek works were seldom known by people, and
Western Europe could get only limited knowledge about ancient civilization.
Hence the seven Liberal Arts were regarded as the sum total of all human
secular knowledge.
I.2. Boethius’ Curriculum
In Boethius’ curriculum25, the seven Liberal Arts are all involved. For
example, he wrote works on four mathematical disciplines, and he also
wrote, interpreted, or commented on logic, also in its relation to rhetoric.
However, Boethius devoted most of his time on logic and four mathematical
disciplines. The intellectual environment in which Boethius lived influenced
the subjects on which he focused.
I.2.1. Intellectual Environment in Boethius’ Times
During the centuries before Theodoric the Great26, the number of
disciplines in Liberal Arts was fixed at seven, including grammar, rhetoric,
dialectic, arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy. Among them, the
25 Cf. Reiss (1982, pp. 9-14) discusses a program of education about Boethius.
26 Theodoric (454-526 A.D.) was king of the Germanic Ostrogoths (471-526 A.D.), ruler of




principal one was rhetoric. In Athens and in Rome, rhetoric was essential to
men who wanted to pursue political careers. The needs of law and
government dominated largely in the cultural tradition of Rome, and
rhetoric could provide men with the skills relevant to speaking in law courts
and in political assemblies. Thus, it was necessary for those men who
wanted a political career to learn rhetoric. Subordinate to rhetoric was
grammar, which was preparatory to rhetoric. Other disciplines in Liberal
Arts tended to be pushed out.
Although in the Greek-speaking world the Liberal Arts continued to
play their role in education, the situation in the Latin-speaking West was
different.27 The Latin world possessed good guides in grammar and in
rhetoric but was less well served in the other Liberal Arts. A typical example
is Augustine. There were many books on grammar and rhetoric, but no
books on other Liberal Arts. The absence of textbooks suggests an absence
of teacher; as a result, Augustine had to acquire his knowledge of other
Liberal Arts, such as logic and mathematics without the help of any
teacher.28 The example of Augustine suggests that among these seven
Liberal Arts, rhetoric and grammar were paid most attention, and were
taught by teachers. It is true that the other Liberal Arts, i.e. logic and
mathematics, passed to Rome from the Hellenistic world and were still
recognized as part of education. However, they were almost neglected in
practice.
As a philosopher, Boethius regarded it as part of his vocation to share
the richness of Greek thoughts with the Latin speakers. And the weakness of
the mathematical disciplines and logic in the Latin world stimulated
Boethius’ interest, so he dedicated himself to arithmetic, music, geometry,
astronomy and the higher studies of philosophical logic.
There is an order in Boethius’ curriculum on mathematics and logic,
which is affected by the philosophical situation at his time. In other words,
the study order of Boethius is in line with that of the Neoplatonic schools.
Ammonius Saccas (3rd century A.D.) tried to harmonize the doctrines of
27 Cf. Clarke (1971), p. 7.
28 Augustine, Confessions, IV.16.30; Schaff (1886).
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Plato and Aristotle, and from his time, the Platonic school tended to absorb
Aristotelian doctrine, and it also absorbed the Pythagoreans. Later, a
significant development of philosophy happened with the pioneers, Plotinus
(about 205-270 A.D.) and his pupil Porphyry (234-305 A.D.). To modern
scholars, this movement was known as Neoplatonism, although people of
the time referred to its exponents simply as Platonists. In the Neoplatonic
tradition, thinkers focused on reworking Plato’s ideas, but they began their
curriculum of teaching with explanations of some of Aristotle’s works.29
Influenced by Porphyry30 and other Neoplatonists, Boethius made a great
plan to harmonize Plato and Aristotle. At the beginning of Book 2 of the
second commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, Boethius gives a clear
exposition of his purpose.
“It is my fixed purpose, if the favour of the godhead should
approve more firmly, to translate into the Roman style and write
commentaries on the whole Aristotelian corpus that has come into
my hands. ... And so anything written by Aristotle which results
from his subtlety in logic, serious mindedness in moral experience
and sharp-wittedness in natural truth, all of this I will translate in
proper order and illuminate, too, with what light a commentary
affords. And by translating all the dialogues of Plato and also
commenting on them I will bring them into a Latin form. When this
is achieved I would not shrink from somehow bringing the ideas of
Plato and Aristotle into a single harmony and proving that they do
not disagree in everything as most think but that they agree in most
things and in the most important philosophical issues. ... When this
is achieved I would not shrink from somehow bringing the ideas of
Plato and Aristotle into a single harmony and proving that they do
not disagree in everything as most think but that they agree in most
things and in the most important philosophical issues.” (2InInter.,
58)
Although Boethius did not finish his great plan, he carried on the ideas of
29 Cf. Moorhead (2009), “Boethius’ Life and the World of Late Antique Philosophy,” in
Marenbon (ed.), p. 25.
30 Cf. Section I.2.3.
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his plan in his works. Boethius chose to follow Porphyry and accepted his
approach to the interpretation of Aristotelian logic. In his point of view, the
subject matters of Aristotle and Plato are different, and there is no conflict
between them.31 For example, in his theological treatise against Eutyches
and Nestorius, his treatment of the word “person” varies according to the
degree to which Aristotelian language about primary or individual substance
is enfolded within a Platonic metaphysic of universals.32 In his consolation,
he also tries to harmonize Aristotle and Plato, which is demonstrated in his
definition of man as the combination of the definitions of Aristotle and
Plato.33
In Plotinus’ point of view, the philosopher “must be given mathematical
studies to train him in philosophical thought and accustom him to firm
confidence in the existence of the immaterial,” which means that the first
stage of education should be the mathematical disciplines. And after
mathematics, the mind must acquire skill in dialectical methods.34
Accordingly, Boethius started his project with four mathematical disciplines,
i.e. arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy, and then the study on logic.
I.2.2. Boethius on Mathematics
Among four works on mathematics, only two works on arithmetic and
music are extant,35 which are De Institutione Arithmetica (Principles of
31 Cf. Marenbon (2003), p. 41.
32 Cf. Section III.2.1.2.
33 Cf. Section IV.2.2.2.
34 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads, I.3; Armstrong (1966).
35 According to Cassiodorus, Boethius completed his work on geometry, which is the
translation of Euclid’ work; cf. Cassiodorus, An Introduction to Divine and Human
Readings, II.vi.3; Jones (1946). From the letter of “Theoderic to the Illustrious Patrician
Boethius”, Cassiodorus suggests that Boethius finished his works on quadrivium. “For it is
in your translations that Pythagoras the musician and Ptolemy the astronomer are read as
Italians; that Nicomachus on arithmetic and Euclid on geometry are heard as Ausonians
[Italians]; that Plato debates on metaphysics and Aristotle on logic in the Roman tongue;
you have rendered Archimedes the engineer to his native Sicilians in Latin dress.
(Cassiodorus, Variae, I.45.4; Barnish, 1992/2006)” Cf. Chadwick (1981b), p. 103; Stahl
(1962), pp. 196-197. On Boethius’ works on quadrivium and their influence, cf. Chadwick
(1981b), pp. 102-107; Caldwell (1981), “The De Institutione Arithmetica and the De
Institutione Musica,” and Pingree (1981), “Boethius’ Geometry and Astronomy,” and White
(1981), “Boethius in the Medieval Quadrivium,” in Gibson (ed.), pp. 135-154, and pp.
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Arithmetic)36 and De Institutione Musica (Principles of Music)37. The
principal person related to these two works is Nicomachus of Gerasa
(60-120 A.D.).
Nicomachus is regarded as a Pythagorean, and Pythagoreanism to him
is not simply a mathematically based philosophy. He believes that there is
an apparent harmony in the cosmos, and he synthesizes mathematical
theories with this belief, which he considers as binding together human soul
and human body.38 Only two works of Nicomachus are extant, viz.
Introduction to Arithmetic and Manual of Harmonics, which have important
influences on Boethius’ thoughts.
Introduction to Arithmetic is Nicomachus’ most famous work, which is
of much use to introducing the discipline of arithmetic, as its name suggests.
This work is significant for arithmetic to become an independent discipline.
Kline gives a proper evaluation of this work.
“The Introductio had value because it was a systematic, orderly,
clear, and comprehensive presentation of the arithmetic of integers
and ratios of integers freed of geometry. It was not original as far as
ideas were concerned, but was a very useful compilation. It also
incorporated speculative, aesthetic, mystical, and moral properties
of numbers, but no practical applications. The Introductio was the
standard text in arithmetic for a thousand years. At Alexandria,
from the time of Nicomachus, arithmetic rather than geometry
became the favorite study.”39
155-161, and pp. 162-205; Evans (1975 and 1981); Guillaumin (2012), “Boethius’s De
institutione arithmetica and its Influence on Posterity,” and McCluskey (2012), “Boethius’s
Astronomy and Cosmology,” and Moyer (2012), “The Quadrivium and the Decline of
Boethian Influence,” and Rimple (2012), “The Enduring Legacy of Boethian Harmony,” in
Kaylor and Phillips (eds.), pp. 135-162, and pp. 47-74, and pp. 479-518, and pp. 447-478;
Masi (1979, 1981a, and 1981b); Reiss (1982), pp. 14-27.
36 In the following chapters, I will use Arithmetica as the short name of Boethius’ work on
arithmetic. The translations of Arithmetica I cite in my dissertation are Masi’s (1983).
37 In the following chapters, I will use Musica as the short name of Boethius’ work on
music. The translations ofMusica I cite in my dissertation are Bower’s (1989).
38 To Nicomachus, this is a synthesis of science and religion which has merit. Cf.
Chadwick (1981b), p. 72.
39 Kline (1972), p. 138.
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Manual of Harmonics is a brief work that can be considered as a
minimal introduction to Pythagorean musical thoughts. In this work, he
promises that when he has leisure time and a rest from his journey, he would
compose “a longer and more detailed” musical treatise, Introduction to
Music.40 As it is, we do not have the Introduction to Music, either because
Nicomachus did not finish it, or because it was not preserved.
At the beginning of his Introduction to Arithmetic, Nicomachus states
the standard Neopythagorean order of four mathematical disciplines —
arithmetic, music, geometry, and astronomy — which he called methodoi,
meaning paths or methods for proceeding upwards in a steady progress
towards higher knowledge and wisdom. At the beginning of his Arithmetica
Boethius gives an exposition about why the first discipline to be learned is
arithmetic, next music, then geometry, and last astronomy — following
Nicomachus. The word “quadrivium41” that Boethius has coined, has a
similar meaning to methodoi, and throughout the Middle Ages,
“quadrivium” was the name for the four mathematical disciplines.
It is easy for people to understand that arithmetic and geometry are
mathematical disciplines, which is also the modern idea on mathematics. In
Antiquity, arithmetic was a discipline that dealt with the theory of number,
which means it studies multitude in itself. Geometry, after the day of Euclid
(fl. 300 B.C.), would follow in Euclid’s footsteps: it began with definitions,
then set out certain postulates and axioms, and finally proceeded to prove a
series of theorems; geometry studies immovable magnitude. Unlike
arithmetic and geometry, astronomy might seem to be different, but
essentially they are similar, for astronomy studies movable magnitude. It is
not hard to include these three disciplines in mathematics, but it is a little
harder to understand that music belongs to mathematical disciplines. The
learning of music included two aspects: theoretical and practical. Aristotle
stressed musical education which is concerned with the practical aspect of
music. When regarding music as one of Liberal Arts, however, one
considers theoretical aspects of music. Music, according to the ancient
theorists, had two sides. One side of music is rhythm (including metric),
40 Nicomachus, Manual of Harmonics, I; Levin (1994).
41 Cf. Section I.1.
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which was taken over for teaching aims by grammarians in later antiquity.
The second side of music is melody, and in later antiquity, this side was left
to the musicians who discussed notes, intervals, scales, and the
characteristics of the different modes.42 And all of these subjects in music
were studied together with an introduction in arithmetic, especially the
proportional principles which were the essential for understanding musical
theories. This relation shows that the study of music in Antiquity depended
on number theory, or in other words, music became one of mathematical
disciplines.
The mathematical disciplines play a vital role in Boethius’ philosophy,
which derives from the Platonic tradition on mathematics. Plato believes
that pure numbers can elevate the soul to understand its own nature. The
four mathematical disciplines which all involve the study of number can
train the mind to understand truth and reality and then make the mind
transcend the physical world of sense-perception.43 In this way Plato
regards mathematics as preparatory to, or forming part of philosophy.
In Boethius’ point of view, the quadrivium is an indispensable
preliminary to both the investigation of the physical world and the
purification of the human soul that is necessary to comprehend the divine.
Therefore, by the quadrivium a superior mind is brought from knowledge of
things in the world offered by the senses, to the more certain things of the
intellect, and is prepared for abstract reasoning. He also summarizes
Nicomachus’ quotation from Republic, 527d-e44 that “There are various
steps and certain dimensions of progressing by which the mind is able to
ascend so that by means of the eye of the mind, which (as Plato says) is
composed of many corporeal eyes and is of higher dignity than they, truth
42 Cf. Clarke (1971), p. 54.
43 Plato, Republic, 524e-531d; Waterfield (1993).
44 Cf. Nicomachus, Introduction to Arithmetic, I.III.7; D’Ooge (1938). The original passage
of Plato reads: “You amuse me: You’re like someone who’s afraid that the majority will
think he is prescribing useless subjects. It is no easy task — indeed it is very difficult — to
realize that in every soul there is an instrument that is purified and rekindled by such
subjects when it has been blinded and destroyed by other ways of life, an instrument that it
is more important to preserve than ten thousand eyes, since only with it can the truth be
seen. (Plato, Republic, 527d-e; Cooper, 1997)” Cf. Theon of Smyrna quotes the same
passage in Mathematics Useful for Understanding Plato, I.1; Lawlor (1979).
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can be investigated and beheld. This eye, I say, submerged and surrounded
by the corporal senses, is in turn illuminated by the disciplines of the
quadrivium.” (Arithmetica, I.1) Boethius clearly expresses that if anyone
wants to reach the highest perfection of the disciplines of philosophy, he
must dwell on the nobility of such wisdom in the quadrivium, which will
hardly be hidden from those properly respectful of expertise. If someone
lacks knowledge of the quadrivium, he cannot find the truth, so on this
conception of the quadrivium, truth cannot be rightly known without it.
Boethius believes the quadrivium is the path to wisdom; philosophy is the
love of wisdom, so he who spurns the quadrivium shows contempt for
philosophy (Arithmetica, I.1).
An illustration of the importance of mathematics to man comes from
Boethius work on division, in which the relationship between man and
mathematics is taken as an example to explain what the meaning of
“conceptually inseparable” is.45 Boethius shows that mathematics is not
inherent in man and does not belong to the class of differentiae; for it is not
the ability to do mathematics, but still it cannot be separated from man. Man
can use mathematics, and “if this capacity should be removed from man,
then man himself no longer remains” (Divisio, 881c). Therefore, we can see
how vital mathematics is to man.
Mathematical works constitute the first of Boethius’ works. His works
on the quadrivium focus on “numbers”, “propositions”, and “harmony”
which are close to the research of philosophy and theology. Of these
mathematical works, only the Arithmetica and an incomplete Musica
survive.46 Arithmetica deals with pure mathematics; Musica and the works
on geometry and astronomy touch upon the applied theory of numbers. By
the study on numbers, Boethius learned the intrinsic harmony, which served
a purpose in philosophy and theology, that is to say, what he focused on is
not the mathematical meaning of numbers, but their symbolical or
philosophical meaning.
45 Cf. Section II.1.1.2.a.
46 Because only these two survive, in my dissertation when I discuss applications of




I.2.3. Boethius on Logic
As I said in Section I.2.1, Boethius devoted himself to two disciplines
in his curriculum: mathematics and logic. Logic, in the Platonic tradition, is
originally called “dialectic”, and the difference between “logical” and
“dialectical” reasoning was not marked by the Neoplatonists of Athens and
Alexandria, nor by Boethius.47 The modern sense of “logic” derives from
the Peripatetic Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. 200 A.D.).48
Concerning the question what logic itself should be, there are two main
opinions: according to one logic is an instrument of philosophy; according
to the other logic is a part of philosophy.49 The important persons holding
the first opinion are the Aristotelians, who follow Aristotle’s Topics,
163b9-1150, in regarding logic as a practical instrument for the discovery of
fallacies in argument on any subject, and as an indispensable tool for every
department of human inquiry. Hence they called logic an instrument
(organon). Alexander of Aphrodisias denies the view that logic is a part of
philosophy by saying that logic differs from theoretical philosophy and
practical philosophy in subject-matter, and in its end and purpose. Alexander
draws an analogy between logic and a hammer and anvil to show that logic
is an instrument.51 Important representatives of the second opinion are the
Stoics. In their point of view, logic was a part and an independent branch of
philosophy.52
Boethius states these two kinds of view in his second commentary on
Porphyry’s Isagoge. And after listing these two opinions, Boethius comes to
47 Cf. Chadwick (1981b), p. 108.
48 Cf. Kneale (1984), p. 7.
49 Cf. Chadwick (1981b), pp. 108-111; Sorabji (2004b), pp. 32-36. Also cf. Ierodiakonou
(1997); Mueller (1969).
50 Aristotle says that “to take and to have taken in at a glance the results of each of two
hypotheses is no mean instrument for the cultivation of knowledge and philosophic
wisdom.” Cf. Aristotle, Topica, 163b9-11; Forster (1938).
51 Cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, On Aristotle Prior Analytics I.1-7, 1.7-3.29; Barnes [etc.]
(1991). Also see in Olympiodorus’ commentary on Aristotle’s Categories: like Alexander,
Olympiodorus claims that logic has neither the same subject matter nor the same purpose as
philosophy, so logic is not a part of philosophy, but an instrument; cf. Sorabji (2004b), p.
35.
52 Cf. Sorabji (2004b), p. 32.
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his conclusion about the role of logic in philosophy.
“The same logic form serves at the same time the function of part
and of instrument. For since it retains its own end, and this end is
considered by philosophy only, it must be asserted to be a part of
philosophy, but since that end of logic, which philosophy alone
contemplates, promises its aid to the other parts of philosophy, we
do not deny that it is the instrument of philosophy; but the end of
logic is the discovery and judgment of reasons.” (2InIsag., 74C-D)53
Boethius regards logic as a significant discipline in his philosophy. In
his second commentary of Porphyry’s Isagoge, Boethius stresses that reason
can show the right way according to which the incorrupt truth of reality
cannot be found, and logic is the discipline which can discern truth from
falsity, therefore, those who reject logic are bound to make mistakes
(2InIsag., 73A). This means that logic is so important that it should not be
neglected.
Boethius gives priority to logic and tries to write double commentaries
on Aristotle’s logical works while also writing monographs on logic.54 The
principal source of his logical works is the Neoplatonist Porphyry.55 The
most well-known work of Porphyry is the Isagoge which discusses five key
terms: genus, species, differentia, property and accident. Porphyry intended
it to throw light on Aristotle’s categories and on definition, division and
demonstration. His Isagoge is designed as an introduction to Aristotle’s
Categories, and the five predicables discussed in Isagoge are the more
general types of predicate. After the introductory work, Porphyry also wrote
two commentaries on Categories. One of Porphyry’s commentaries is a
short one, which survives in part, and the other is a long one, which survives
only in fragments. The influence of Porphyry penetrates in Boethius’ works.
53 In his commentary on Aristotle’s Prior Analytics, Ammonius states that Plato uses logic
as both a part and an instrument; cf. Sorabji (2004b), p. 35. And Plotinus maintains that
dialectic is “the precious part of philosophy.” In The Enneads, Plotinus says that “We must
not think of it as the mere tool of the metaphysician: Dialectic does not consist of bare
theories and rules: it deals with verities.” Cf. Plotinus, The Enneads, I.3.5; MacKenna
(1991).
54 Cf. Barnes (1981), “Boethius and the Study of Logic,” in Gibson (ed.), pp. 73-89.
55 Cf. Chadwick (1981b), pp. 120-127.
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The most complete one is Boethius’ commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge.
In Boethius’ other logical works, he refers to Porphyry more than once. At
the beginning of his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories, Boethius points
out that he proposes to follow Porphyry’s commentary on the Categories.
And in his second commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, Boethius
again says that “We have arranged our explication of this work in Latin
following Porphyry as far as possible, although we have included material
from others too. For Porphyry, our guide, seems pre-eminent in intellectual
sharpness and ability to marshal in his ideas.” (2InInter., 7.5-8)
In the trivium, Boethius focuses on the study of logic. He regards logic
as the leader of the procession of the trivium. He believes that logic is more
basic than grammar and rhetoric. The untenable things in logic are far from
grammar and rhetoric. However, it does not mean that he thinks little of
grammar and rhetoric; on the contrary, people generally admit that Boethius’
works are more literary than Cicero’s. Boethius’ logical works can be
divided into three parts: the first part consists of the translations of the
works of Aristotle and Porphyry, which are not preserved; the second part
consists of the commentaries on logical works, including In Isagogen
Porphyrii Commenta (editio prima and editio secunda), In Categorias
Aristotelis, In Aristotelis De Interpretatione (editio prima and editio
secunda), and In Ciceronis Topica; the third part consists of his independent
works in which he adopts and develops the logic of his predecessors. These
works include De Divisione, Introductio ad Syllogismos Categorico, De
Syllogismo Categorico, De Syllogismo Hypothetico, and De Topicis
Differentiis.56
Logic and mathematics are regarded as elementary disciplines for
Boethius, which are preparatory for the study of philosophy. Thus, among
56 The English titles of these logical works are: Commentaries on Isagoge (1 and 2)
(“1InIsag.” and “2InIsag.” for short); Commentary on Airstotle’s Categories (“In
Categorias” for short); Commentaries on On Interpretation (1 and 2) (“1InInter.” and
“2InInter.” for short); Commentary on Cicero’s Topics (“C.Topica” for short); On Division
(“Divisio” for short); Introduction to Categorical Syllogisms (“I.S.Categorico” for short);
On the Categorical Syllogism (“S.Categorico” for short); On Hypothetical Syllogisms
(“S.Hypothetico” for short); On Topical Differentiae (“TopicisD.” for short). On the
translations of these works I cite in my dissertation, cf. Section II.1.
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Boethius’ curriculum, I will first introduce his logic and mathematics, which
will be discussed in Chapter II.
I.2.4. Boethius’ Theological Treatises and Consolatio Philosophiae57
In addition to works on mathematics and logic, Boethius also wrote five
theological treatises, viz. De trinitate, Utrum pater et filius et spiritus
sanctus de divinitate substantialiter praedicentur, Quomodo substantiae in
eo quod sint bonae sint cum non sint substantialia bona, De fide catholica,
and Contra Eutychen et Nestorium. Nevertheless, he is not a theologian58,
and the reason he devotes himself to Christian doctrine is related to the
political situation in his day, which will be discussed in Chapter III. As a
philosopher, Boethius composed his theological tractates, like his
mathematical and logical works, from the perspective of philosophy.
However, since mathematics and logic are regarded as elementary
disciplines, we may expect there to be applications of elementary
mathematics and basic logic in his theological treatises, into which I will
investigate in Chapter III. Applications of elementary mathematics and basic
logic can also be found in his last and most famous work, the Consolatio
Philosophiae, which I will discuss in Chapter IV.
57 The English titles of these five treatises are: The Trinity is One God not Three Gods;
Whether Father, Son, and Holy Spirit may be Substantially Predicated of the Divinity; How
Substances can be Good in Virtue of Their Existence without Being Absolute Goods; On the
Catholic Faith; A Treatise Against Eutyches and Nestorius. In later chapters, I will use short
Latin names for each work, viz. “De trinitate”, “Utrum pater”, “Quomodo substantiae”,
“De fide”, and “Contra Eutychen et Nestorium”. And in later chapters, I will use Consolatio
for short of Consolatio Philosophiae. The translations of the five treatises and the
Consolatio I cite in my dissertation are Stewart’s (1926).
58 On the reason why Boethius is not a theologian, see Section III.5.
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II. Logic and Mathematics in Boethius’
Curriculum
As I introduced in the first chapter, in the Latin speaking world, logic
and mathematics were not well taught,59 but Boethius regards both of them
as elementary disciplines in his curriculum, which are important to
philosophy. Therefore, he dedicated most of his time to these two disciplines.
He began his curriculum plan with four mathematical disciplines. Boethius
believes that quadrivium is the real beginning of learning philosophy.60 At
the same time, he is familiar with Aristotle’s logic. I will not focus on the
applications of all Boethius’ logical knowledge in my dissertation. The
theories, such as rules of syllogism and other topics, are useful for proper
arguments which permeate Boethius’ discussions, but it is not necessary to
point out this kind of application of logic in detail. Instead, I will focus on
what I call basic logic, which includes knowledge such as division,
definition, and categories. This kind of basic logic can already be found in
Boethius’ works on the quadrivium. Again, in his logical works there are
some applications of mathematics, but most of them are just mathematical
examples. In other words, as two elementary disciplines, mathematics and
logic are not totally independent, but they influence each other, which can
be seen in the works on logic and mathematics. Together they become basic
knowledge for Boethius’ philosophy, which will be introduced in Chapter III
and Chapter IV.
In this chapter, I will introduce Boethius’ works on logic and
mathematics, and I focus on some important ideas61 which will be
employed in his theological treatises and his Consolatio. I will also
demonstrate the mutual influence of mathematics and logic, that is to say,
how mathematical theories and examples are used in his logical works, and
how basic logical theories are applied in his mathematical works. It is easy
59 Cf. Section I.2.1.
60 Cf. Section I.2.2.
61 Cf. Section II.1.2, Section II.2.1.3, and Section II.2.2.3.
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to understand applications of mathematics to logic, since most of the
applications are the use of mathematical examples to support or demonstrate
logical notions. Unlike these, the applications of basic logic to Boethius’
mathematical works make use of logical knowledge to make the abstract
mathematical concepts clearer. In order to understand applications of basic
logic in Boethius’ mathematical works more easily, I will introduce
Boethius’ logic first.
II.1. Boethius’ Logic
In the second commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, Boethius defines the
role of logic as both the part and the instrument of philosophy, which
implies the essential role of logic in philosophy. Logic is one of the
elementary disciplines necessary to learn philosophy. Boethius’ extant
logical works can be divided into two large parts. The first part consists of
the commentaries on works written by Aristotle, Porphyry, and Cicero and
the second part comprises his monographs on the subjects of division,
syllogism, and topics.62
As two elementary disciplines, mathematics and logic are relatively
independent. Still, there are applications of mathematics in Boethius’ logical
works, though they are very few. In Section II.1.1, I will introduce Boethius’
logical works in general and applications of mathematics (especially as
mathematical examples) in these works. At the end of this section, I will
focus on the basic logical knowledge — including knowledge of categories,
division and definition — which will be employed in Boethius’ other
philosophical works.
II.1.1. Boethius’ Logical Works and Applications of Mathematics in
Them
In order to discuss the applications of mathematics in Boethius’ logical
works, I will discuss his logical works63 in three parts concerning: (1)
62 Cf. Section I.2.3.
63 On the discussion on Boethius’ logical works and their influence, cf. Casey (2012),
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Boethius’ commentaries on works in the Aristotelian corpus (Section
II.1.1.1); (2) his monographs on division and syllogism (Section II.1.1.2); (3)
his works on topics (Section II.1.1.3). I will introduce these three parts of
Boethius’ logical works and applications of mathematics in them one by
one.
II.1.1.1. Boethius’ Commentaries on Works in the Aristotelian Corpus
In Boethius’ extant logical works, there are commentaries on works in
the Aristotelian corpus,64 which are two commentaries on Porphyry’s
Isagoge, one commentary on Aristotle’s Categories and two commentaries
on Aristotle’s On Interpretation. In these works, most applications of
mathematics follow the original works of Aristotle and Porphyry, and
Boethius only adds a few mathematical examples or ideas.
II.1.1.1.a. Commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge65
Boethius’ first logical work is his commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge.66
From this commentary, Boethius started his great plan of translating all of
Aristotle’s works.67 Boethius writes two commentaries on the Isagoge. The
first one is shorter with two books, written in the form of a dialogue
between Boethius as a teacher and Fabius as a student. Boethius’ first
commentary is based on Victorinus’ translation, but he thought that
Victorinus’ translation was not satisfactory. Boethius points out the errors in
Victorinus’ translation more than once, saying that Victorinus seems to
“Boethius’s Works on Logic in the Middle Ages,” in Kaylor and Phillips (eds.), pp. 193-220;
Martin (2009), “The Logical Textbooks and Their Influence,” in Marenbon (ed.), pp. 56-84;
Lewry (1981), “Boethian Logic in the Medieval West,” in Gibson (ed.), pp. 90-134. Kneale
claims that in the Middle Ages Boethius’ logical writings were “better known than those of
Aristotle and his reputation as high.” Cf. Kneale (1984), pp. 189-198.
64 Cf. Cameron (2009), “Boethius on Utterances, Understanding and Reality,” and Ebbesen
(2009), “The Aristotelian Commentator,” in Marenbon (ed.), pp. 85-102 and pp. 34-55;
Chadwick (1981b), pp. 133-141; Marenbon (2003), pp. 19-42; Reiss (1982), pp. 37-54;
Shiel (1958); Solmsen (1944).
65 The translations of the first book of 2InIsag. I cite are McKeon’s (1957-1958). The
translations of other books are mine from the Latin version. On Porphyry’s Isagoge and
Boethius’ commentaries on it, cf. Gracia (1981); Evangeliou (1985).
66 Cf. Chadwick (1981b), pp. 131-133; Marenbon (2003), pp. 23-32; Reiss (1982), pp.
28-37.
67 On Boethius’ project, cf. Marenbon (2003), pp. 17-18. Also cf. Section I.2.1.
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understand Porphyry less clearly, and that his translation is obscure (1InIsag.,
53B). The whole style of the first commentary is the same as that of
Porphyry’s, and there is no application of mathematics in it.
Later, Boethius wrote the second commentary in five books, based on
his own translation. In the second commentary, before dealing with
Porphyry’s five predicables which include genus, species, difference,
property, and accident, Boethius devotes most of the first book to the
discussion of the utility of studying logic, and the remaining parts are
concerned with a penetrating discussion of the problem of the universal.
Applications of mathematics to his second commentary on Isagoge are not
many. At the beginning of this commentary, Boethius clarifies his
programme of translation. He says that in order to accomplish the purpose
of seeking knowledge, he should translate the Greek books of philosophy
into the Latin language without missing anything. In Boethius’ point of view,
“the most excellent good of philosophy has been related with human souls”
(2InIsag., 71A). He believes that if he wants to translate the Greek books of
philosophy in which the uncorrupted truth is expressed into the Latin
language, then he must begin his exposition with the powers of human soul.
Therefore, he begins his second commentary on Isagoge with the discussion
on the triple power of the soul.
“There is a triple power of the soul to be found in animated bodies.
Of these, one power supports the life for the body that it may arise
by birth and subsist by nourishment; another lends judgment to
perception; the third is the foundation for the strength of the mind
and for reason.” (2InIsag., 71B)
In Musica, Boethius warns people not to grant all judgment to the senses,
which is the second power of the soul. For the sense is just something
obedient like a servant. The ultimate perfection should be composed by
reason, because reason “holds itself to fixed rules” and “does not falter by
any error”. This shows that reason, the highest power of soul, “is a judge
and carries authority” (Musica, I.9.196). Not all judgment ought to be given
to the senses, but reason ought to be trusted more, so we should pursue the
use of reason. Just like mathematics can help people to arrive at abstract
concepts from visual images, the powers of the soul can give people not
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only the life to exist or the capacity to feel but also the ability to ascend
from the known to the unknown. This is why Boethius begins his
commentary on Isagoge with the statement of powers of the soul.
The influential discussion in Boethius’ second commentary on Isagoge
is the solution to three questions Porphyry raises at the beginning of his
Isagoge.
“For example, about genera and species — whether they subsist,
whether they actually depend on bare thoughts alone, whether if
they actually subsist they are bodies or incorporeal and whether
they are separable or are in perceptible items and subsist about
them — these matters I shall decline to discuss, such a subject
being very deep and demanding another and a larger
investigation.”68
These three questions regard the possible existence of genera and species
outside our mind; and also concerning the nature of genera and species,
corporeal or incorporeal; and their relations to sensible objects. Porphyry
refuses to discuss them, but Boethius gives solutions to them.69
In order to answer those three questions, Boethius gives two examples
from mathematics, among which one is concerned with the nature of
numbers in arithmetic, and the other is concerned with the nature of a line in
geometry. First, as for numbers, when any number comes out in computing
the digits, there must be no doubt that it eventuates in sensible objects itself.
And then in the case of a line, human beings can grasp a line using their
mind, and make this line an object of thinking, which seems that a line
subsists outside our mind. However, it is just the concept of a line that
subsists outside sensible objects. No one can perceive a line which is
separable from its form. In agreement with these two mathematical
examples, Boethius says,
“For genera and species subsist in one manner, but are understood
in another; and they are incorporeal, but they subsist in sensible
68 Porphyry, Isagoge, 1.10-15; Barnes (2003).
69 Porphyry’s three unanswered questions are about universals. On Boethius’ discussions
on universals, cf. Cross (2012); Spade (1994).
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things joined to sensible things. They are understood, to be sure, as
subsisting through themselves and not as having their being in
others.” (2InIsag., 86A)
Mathematical examples thus help Boethius solve the three important
questions, and his statements on genera and species lead to the discussion of
Nominalism and Realism70 in the Middle Ages.
II.1.1.1.b. Commentaries on Aristotle’s Categories71
Porphyry’s Isagoge is the introduction to Aristotle’s Categories, and the
five predicables discussed in Isagoge are the more general types of predicate.
After the introductory work, Porphyry also wrote two commentaries on
Categories. Proposing to follow Porphyry’s commentary on the Categories,
Boethius writes a commentary in four books on Aristotle’s Categories. He
opens the commentary with the intention of Aristotle’s work on the
categories. The intention of Aristotle’s Categories, Boethius says, is to
examine the words, not significations (In Categorias, 159A-D). In
Categories, Aristotle uses some mathematical examples, and as a
commentator, Boethius follows Aristotle and employs mathematical
examples in his commentary.
It was regarded as unclear what the purpose is of the first chapter of the
Categories. Porphyry, in his extant commentary, points out that there are
five possible ways to connect names, definitions, and things:
“When things share the same name but have entirely different
accounts, they are called homonyms. When they share both an
account and a name, they are referred to as synonyms, since
together with (sun-) the name they also have the same account.
When things share the same account but not the same name, they
70 Nominalism arose in reaction to the problem of universals. Nominalism is a
metaphysical view in philosophy according to which general or abstract terms and
predicates exist, while universals or abstract objects, which are sometimes thought to
correspond to these terms, do not exist. Opposed to nominalism, the view of realism is that
universals do exist over and above particulars. Cf. Armstrong (1978 and 1989).
71 The translations of In Categorias are mine from the Latin version. On the discussions of
Boethius’ commentary on Categories, cf. Asztalos (1993 and 2003); Chadwick (1981b), pp.
141-152; Marenbon (2003), pp. 20-23.
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are called polyonyms, and when they have in common neither a
name nor an account, they are called heteronyms. ... When certain
things come to be from other things, participating in a way in both
the name and the account of the things from whence they come,
differing however in grammatical form. These are called
paronyms.”72
However, of these five ways Aristotle just mentions three, that is,
homonyms, synonyms, and paronyms. Why does Aristotle do this? To
answer this question, Porphyry simply attributes it to Aristotle’s subsequent
discussion: because Aristotle only needs these three ways for his subsequent
discussion, and those that he does not need, he does not mention.73 Boethius
answers that question with the help of analogy to geometry in the preface of
Book I. Why did Aristotle explain equivocal, univocal, and derivative terms
first before discussing the ten categories? Boethius draws analogies with
geometry. He says that, “in geometry, the first thing given is the termini, and
then the theorematum ordo can be discussed.” (In Categorias, 163B-C) This
means that before a series of theorems is set out in detail, their principles
should be given first. Similarly, in order to discuss the ten categories, first of
all, their principles should be explained. This is the relation of the first
chapter to what follows.
Among the ten categories, substance, quantity, quality, and relative are
closely related to mathematics, so applications of mathematical examples
are mainly found in the discussions of these four categories. I will point
them out in the following parts of this section.
The category of substance has a number of characteristics, among
which one seems to be contrary to what Aristotle says in the early part of the
chapter on “substance”. This characteristic is “Substance, it seems, does not
admit of a more and a less.”74 Earlier in this chapter with regard to the
secondary substances, Aristotle says that, “Of the secondary substances the
species is more a substance than the genus, since it is nearer to the primary
72 Porphyry, In Categorias, 60.26-33; Strange (1992).
73 Porphyry, In Categorias, 61.1-5; Strange (1992).
74 Aristotle, Categories, 3b33; Ackrill (1963).
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substance.”75 Commenting on this apparent contradiction, Porphyry
interprets this “not to be understood in an unrestricted sense, but with a
distinction”76. Following Porphyry, Boethius begins his commentary on this
characteristic with similar explanation; that is to say, this is not simply said
to be a characteristic but a further distinction is added (In Categorias, 197A).
Then, unlike Porphyry, Boethius inserts some mathematical examples from
other chapters of the Categories to explain that this characteristic does not
apply to the category of substance solely. For instance, the geometrical
figure circle will not be more a circle or less a circle either than itself or than
another circle77. In addition, he takes some relatives for examples. Double is
not more double than another, thus it does not admit “more or less”78 (In
Categorias, 197D).
Among the ten categories, “quantity” is most closely related to
mathematics, which will be exhibited in Section II.2.1.2.a of this chapter.
When introducing quantity, Boethius, following Aristotle, applies more
mathematics to his commentary on this part. Quantity can be divided into
two kinds, that is, discrete quantity and continuous quantity. And numbers
which are studied by arithmetic falls in the discrete quantity, and lines,
surfaces, and the like which are the essential objects of geometry falls into
the continuous quantity. In his commentary, Boethius enumerates some
numbers to show what discrete quantity is. Using lines, surfaces, and bodies
as examples, Boethius explains the continuous quantity and how they have a
common boundary at which their parts join together (In Categorias,
203B-205A).
The second category that has closely relation with mathematics is
“relative”. One nature of relatives is that usually relatives come into being
together, which means that not all relatives are simultaneous by nature. In
Aristotle’s point of view, “the knowable would seem to be prior to
knowledge”79. When commenting on this idea, Boethius admits that the first
thing related to this idea coming to us is the discipline of mathematics (In
75 Aristotle, Categories, 2b7-22; Ackrill (1963).
76 Porphyry, In Categorias, 97.6-10; Strange (1992).
77 Cf. Aristotle, Categories, 11a5-12; Ackrill (1963).
78 Cf. Aristotle, Categories, 6b24-27; Ackrill (1963).
79 Aristotle, Categories, 7b23-24; Ackrill (1963).
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Categorias, 229A). Boethius takes triangles for example. We all know that
there are three interior angles in a triangle and then these three interior
angles equal to two right angles. Hence, it is necessary that the knowable
should exist first, and then the knowledge of it may be acquired (In
Categorias, 229B). In Categories, Aristotle takes “the squaring of the
circle” as an example to show that “Knowledge of it does not yet exist but
the knowable itself exists.”80 Boethius considers this example most obscure
(In Categorias, 230C), and elaborates a different argument showing that it is
possible to draw a triangle equal to a spatium with four sides. And similarly,
he admits that the knowledge of “the squaring of the circle” also exists, but
explains that the reason why Aristotle says it does not exist is that at
Aristotle’s times the square sought after had not been discovered (In
Categorias, 230D-231C).
To understand the characteristics of relatives, two terms need to be
explained in more detail, namely “simultaneous” and “prior”. It is likely that
in order to keep the integrity of the discussion on relatives, Aristotle leaves
the exposition of these two terms to later chapters. However, in his
commentary, Porphyry gives the explanation of “prior” in his comments on
the chapter on relatives. Unlike Porphyry, Boethius chooses to follow
Aristotle’s order. After commenting on the ten categories, Boethius comes to
five senses of “prior” in his last book. There are five senses of “prior”: (1)
whenever we use the term ‘prior’ in its proper and primary sense, it is time
that we have in our minds; (2) ‘prior’ may be used, when the order of being
is fixed and incapable of being reversed; (3) we use the term ‘prior’ in
regard to any order whatever; (4) naturally prior; (5) where in the case of
two things the existence of either implies or necessitates that of the other,
that thing which is somehow the cause may, in consequence, fairly be
considered as naturally prior to the other.81
To illustrate the second meaning of prior, Boethius, following Aristotle,
takes “one is prior to two” as example, but he gives a more detailed
exposition, which could more easily be understood if we refer to his
arithmetical work. In Boethius’ work on arithmetic, the notion that “unity
80 Aristotle, Categories, 7b30; Ackrill (1963).
81 Aristotle, Categories, 21a34-22a13; Ackrill (1963).
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(or one) is the first number” is the starting-point. The definition of “number”
is also based on this notion, that is to say, “A number is a collection of
unities, or a big mass of quantity issuing from unities.” (Arithmetica, I.2) In
addition, the primary nature of unity is that “it constitutes the primary unit
of all numbers which are in the natural order and is rightly recognized as the
generator of the total extended plurality of number.” (Arithmetica, I.7) Thus,
if someone proposes the number two, then it definitely follows there is one,
for two is the collection of two unities. However, if someone lays down the
number one, it is not necessary for it to be multiplied to two (In Categorias,
284C-D). As a result, it is clear that between the number one and two, the
order is fixed and incapable to be reversed, in other words, one is prior to
two, which is the second sense of “prior”.
Another characteristic of the relatives is that “if someone knows any
relative definitely he will also know definitely that in relation to which it is
spoken of.”82 In other words, it is impossible to know that a thing is relative
unless its correlative is known. This view is especially related to ratio in
arithmetic. Boethius follows Aristotle and takes double as example, but he
extends this explanation. As we all know, the number four and the number
two have a certain relationship, that is to say “double”. It could not be
possible to know that the number four is a double without knowing that it is
twice the number two. If you definitely know the number four of being
“double”, then at once will you definitely know to which number the
number four stands in relation, that is the number two (In Categorias,
235D-236B).
The third category which is close to mathematics is “quality”, or more
specifically, “the fourth kind of quality”. There are four kinds of “quality”,
including (1) habits and dispositions, (2) capacities, (3) affective qualities
and affections, (4) shape, figure and so on. Among these qualities, the fourth
kind of quality is close to mathematics, and especially related to geometry,
for shape, figure and the like are the subjects focused on by geometry.
Boethius lists some geometrical figures, such as a triangle and a square,
which belong to the fourth kind of quality. However, there may be some
confusion between the fourth kind of quality and continuous quantity, for in
82 Aristotle, Categories, 8a35; Ackrill (1963).
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the Categories geometrical objects are listed under both headings. Aristotle
does not explain this, but following Porphyry, Boethius introduces the
following distinction in his commentary. He says that the surface itself is a
quantity; however, the shaping of the surface belongs to a quality.
Geometrically, the surface bounded by lines is defined by its length and
breadth, which is a quantity. For example, a triangle is a particular area
produced by three lines which are placed in a certain way to form three
angles, so a triangle is called a quantity. However, it is named after a quality
in virtue of its certain sort of shaping. It is the same with a line: “it is said to
be a quantity due to its length without breadth; and insofar as it is straight, a
straight line belongs to quality.” (In Categorias, 251A-B)
Two characteristics of quality are that most qualities have contraries and
admit of degrees. It is helpful to take triangles and other figures that belong
to the fourth kind of quality as examples to show that some qualities have
no contraries and do not admit of degree. Here, as Aristotle already saw, the
introduction of mathematical examples will make arguments easier to be
grasped, and more persuasive.
II.1.1.1.c. Commentaries on Aristotle’s On Interpretation83
The purpose of Categories is stated again in Boethius’ commentaries on
Aristotle’s On Interpretation. The number of significant spoken sounds is
divided into ten categories by Aristotle, and the spoken sounds, signifying
thought, can also be divided into two parts, name and verb, which are two
primary parts to the communication. The former division is discussed in
Categories, and the latter one is the central topic in On Interpretation.
Boethius writes two commentaries on Aristotle’s On Interpretation: the first
one is shorter than the second one. Both Boethius’ commentaries on
Aristotle’s On Interpretation contain 12 chapters. The difference between
two editions is that the first and short one comprises only two books, while
the second and larger one comprises six books. There are only a few
applications of mathematics in them. In this section, I focus on applications
of mathematics to the second commentary.
83 The translations of 2InInter. I cite in my dissertation are Smith’s (2010 and 2011). On
Boethius’ commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, cf. Chadwick (1981b), pp. 152-163;
De Rijk (2003); Magee (1989); Marenbon (2003), pp. 32-41; Suto (2012).
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At the beginning of Chapter 1, Book I of 2InInter., Boethius first
discusses the definition of “spoken sound (vox)”. The reason why he begins
with it is that, as Boethius says, spoken sound is “obviously and clearly the
theme of this whole book.”84 Then he gives two definitions of vox. The first
definition is that “Spoken sound is the striking of the air by the tongue,
produced by an animal by means of certain parts of the throat called
windpipes.” The second possible definition is that “spoken sound is a sound
which appears to signify.” (2InInter., 4.17-28)85 Strictly speaking, the first
definition is the meaning of simply sound (sonus), thus Boethius gives a
second possible definition. The second definition differs from the use of vox
in Boethius works on music86, but it is the one he needs in his commentary
on On Interpretation.
And in On Interpretation, Aristotle says “spoken sounds are symbols of
affection in the soul”87. When commenting on this view, Boethius claims:
“these affections in souls are produced from the similarity of the things [to
the affections].” (2InInter., 35.1) Geometrical figures serve to explain this.
Boethius takes sphere, square, or other geometrical figures as examples. He
points out that, when a person sees a geometrical figure in things, he
considers its likeness in the intelligence of his mind, and “when his soul has
been affected by the image, he knows the thing by whose image he has been
affected”. Therefore, the similarity of the figure in things to the affections
causes the affection in souls to occur. (2InInter., 35.1-10)
When commenting on the relation of actuality and potentiality, Boethius
says there is something in which there is only potentiality and never
actuality by taking numbers as an example.
“For number can increase to infinity and whatever number has been
mentioned, a hundred, a thousand, ten thousand and the rest, must
84 “This whole book” refers to Aristotle’s On Interpretation.
85 The paragraphs of Boethius’ second commentary on On Interpretation 53ff are closely
paralleled in Ammonius 30.1-16, and the discussion of Boethius 4.18-6.5 overlaps with
Ammonius 30.2-7. Cf. Ammonius, On Aristotle On Interpretation 1-8, 30.1-16; Blank
(1996).
86 In Boethius’ work on music, vox has a wide spectrum of meaning, for it can mean the
human voice, sound in general, or musical pitch.
87 Aristotle, On Interpretation, 16a3; Ackrill (1963).
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be finite. Thus an actual number is never infinite because it can
increase to infinity. And for this reason infinite number is only
potential.” (2InInter., 463.8-17)
The last example of applications of mathematics that I want to point out
is in the last chapter, Book 6 of On Interpretation. At 23b33-24a3 of On
Interpretation, when speaking of the contrary of a statement, Aristotle uses
four propositions to argue that every statement has a contrary. The four
propositions are: PI. About the good that it is good; PII. About the good that
it is not good; PIII. About the not good that it is not good; PIV. About the
not good that it is good. When commenting on this, Boethius compares the
argument of Aristotle with a ratio, for he believes, “Ratio is in fact the
mutual similarity of things to each other.” (2InInter., 490.15-19) Boethius
chooses the ratio 2:4=6:12, and according to the numerical relations of this
ratio it is also true that 2:6=4:12. Then Boethius transfers the numerical ratio
to the force and nature of propositions.88 He puts PI and PII first, of which
PI precedes and PII follows, and then puts PIII and PIV, of which PIII
precedes and PIV follows in the same way, and makes there be a similarity.
PI PII
About the good that it is good About the good that it is not good
PIII PIV
About the not good that it is not good About the not good that it is good
The similar ratio between these four propositions is PI:PII=PIII:PIV, which
means that just as PI is true, but PII is false, so too PIII is true, but PIV is
false. In other words, the left of the ratio is “a true proposition : a false
proposition” and the right of the ratio is the same, so the left equals the right.
If we change the places of these four propositions in the way of 2:4=6:12,
that is 2:6=4:12, then we can get PI:PIII=PII:PIV. In this new ratio, the left
is that PI is true and PIII is true, and the right is that PII is false and PIV is
false, so the force of these propositions can also be explained by the ratio.
All in all, any statement A, B, C, or D, if A:B=C:D is true, then A:C=B:D is
also true, and this correct rule for identifying contraries is the same for all
types of statements. Boethius’ application of the numerical relation of ratios
88 Cf. Chadwick (1981b), p. 154.
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makes for an easier and more concise way to understand the argument.
II.1.1.2. Boethius’ Monographs on Division and Syllogism89
II.1.1.2.a. Division90
In his work on division, Boethius studies different kinds of division,
distinguishes one from another, and points out the logical relations between
whatever is being divided (or analysed, or classified) and its dividing
elements. There are some uses of mathematics in discussions on division.
The central part of Divisio is on the division of genus into species,
which is one of the four kinds of division. During the operation of this
division style, “differentia” is an essential concept. A differentia is that “in
respect of which we indicate that one thing differs from another (Divisio,
880b)”. There are many kinds of differentiae, and not all of them are suited
to the division of genus. “Some differentiae are per se, others per accidens,
and of the latter some are consequent, others regularly departing.” Boethius
gives some examples to explain which sort of differentiae is suited to the
division of genus, one of which is about mathematics and man.
“Again, there is another thing, which is conceptually inseparable,
the separation of which brings destruction of the species, e.g. when
we say that it is inherent in man that he alone can use numbers or
learn geometry. And if this capacity should be removed from man,
then man himself no longer remains; and yet such things do not
automatically belong to the class of differentiae that inhere in the
substance, for it is not the ability to use numbers and do geometry
that accounts for man, but rather being rational and mortal. Hence
those differentiae on account of which the species consists are
precisely the ones that are placed both in the division of a species
and in the division of the genus that contains the species.” (Divisio,
881b-d)
That Boethius takes this example here also implies that although
89 Cf. Chadwick (1981b), pp. 163-166.
90 The translations of Divisio I cite in my dissertation are Magee’s (1998). On Boethius’
Divisio, cf. Marenbon (2003), pp. 44-46.
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mathematics (numbers and geometry) does not inhere in man, it still cannot
be separated from man. The reason is that if mathematics should be
removed from man, “then man himself no longer remains”. Therefore, we
can see how vital the mathematics is in man.91
With regards to affirmation and negation, Boethius takes mathematics
as examples. When he discusses the negation used in constructing a species,
he gives examples: “Of odd numbers some are prime (e.g. three, five, or
seven) others not-prime (e.g. nine);” or again, “Of figures some are
rectilinear, others non-rectilinear.” (Divisio, 882b-c) That is to say when we
want to use a simple name to assign a species to something that is not
picked out by any word (such as there is no single name applied for
not-prime numbers), it is often necessary to use negation in constructing a
species (the negation word “not” with the species “prime”). However, it is
our need, not nature, that sometimes requires this. Further, when a section is
made by negation, the affirmation or simple name should be stated first. So
when we divide numbers, first of all, the affirmation “some numbers are
prime” is stated, and then the negation “other numbers are not-prime”
follows. The relationship between affirmation and negation is that
“Affirmation is prior and negation posterior.” This can be explained by
arithmetical theory, “the equal is prior to the unequal” which will be
introduced in Section II.2.2 later. In Chapter 32, Book I of his arithmetical
work, Boethius gives a demonstration of “how every inequality proceeds
from equality”, and in Chapter 1, Book II, Boethius continues to discuss
“How every inequality is reduced to equality”. The equality is more finite
than the inequality. “It is always necessary that finite things be prior to
non-finite things.” And the equality is prior to the inequality. “All the things
that are expressed by a part of speech that is definite or by an affirmation are
more finite than a name with a negative particle or a complete negation.”
(Divisio, 882d) Therefore, “affirmation is prior and negation posterior.”
The division of one and the same genus occurs in more than one way.
To illustrate the multiple divisions, Boethius gives the division of numbers
in arithmetic and the division of triangles in geometry as examples.
According to different divisions, numbers could be divided into even and
91 Cf. Section I.2.2.
Chapter II. Logic and Mathematics in Boethius’ Curriculum
- 34 -
odd, and alternatively, numbers can also be classified as prime numbers and
non-prime numbers. It is the same with triangles. Triangles can be divided
into equilateral triangles, triangles with only two equal sides, and triangles
with all sides unequal. Another way to divide triangles is that some triangles
have a right angle, others have three acute angels, and others have an obtuse
one (Divisio, 885c). As a result of this, Boethius comes to the conclusion
that division of one and the same genus can be made in many ways. In spite
of multiple divisions, every division would be split into pairs, if there were
names for the species and differentiae. Take geometrical figures with three
sides for an example. Three-sided figures can be divided into three species:
the figures with equilateral sides, others with two equal sides, and others
with unequal sides throughout. Since there are names for the species and
differentiae of three-sided figures, the tripartite division of the three-sided
figures can change into bipartite division. Those figures with three sides can
be divided into figures with equal sides, and figures with unequal sides; of
the figures with unequal sides, some have only two equal sides, others have
three unequal sides. Therefore, in the same way, “every division would be
bipartite if the species and differentiae did not lack names.” (Divisio, 884a)
The introduction of mathematical examples in Divisio makes the points
more easily to be understood.
II.1.1.2.b. Syllogism92
In Boethius’ point of view, syllogism is concerning the statements
which are either categorical or hypothetical. Theory of categorical
syllogisms is the logic of names and theory of hypothetical syllogisms is
propositional logic. Thus his monographs on syllogism are divided into two
parts: one is the works on categorical statements including Introductio ad
syllogismos categoricos and De syllogismo categorico93; and the other is the
work on hypothetical statements called De hypotheticis syllogismis94. The
first concerns categorical statements in which something is predicated of
92 On Boethius’ syllogism, cf. Chadwick (1981b), pp. 166-173; Dürr (1951); Marenbon
(2003), pp. 46-56; Speca (2001).
93 Concerning the relation between the twin monographs on the categorical syllogism, cf.
Chadwick (1981b), pp. 165-170.
94 Cf. Bobzien (2002).
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another thing in the form “A is B”. As regards the hypothetical statements,
Boethius gives four characterizations as follows: (1) hypothetical statements
express that something is, if something else is; (2) hypothetical statements
consist of categorical statements, while categorical statements are simple; (3)
hypothetical statements have their own proper force that differs from the
force of categorical statements, in that it rests on a hypothesis rather than on
a predication, even with regard to the same terms; (4) hypothetical
statements express that something is or is not, if something else is or is
not.95
All of these monographs refer to how to give proper arguments, and in
all Boethius’ arguments, he pays attention to the rules of syllogism.
Applications of mathematics could not be found in these three monographs,
so I will move on to the other logical works.
II.1.1.3. Applications of Mathematics in Boethius’ Works on Topics
Boethius wrote two works on topics.96 One is a commentary on
Cicero’s Topics, and the other is a monograph named De Topicis Differentiis.
In this section I will introduce both works briefly and list mathematical
examples used in both works.
II.1.1.3.a. In Ciceronis Topica97
In Ciceronis Topica is Boethius’ commentary on Cicero’s Topics, which
follows the text in Cicero’s work continuously. However, because Cicero’s
work contained a paragraph 100, and Boethius’ commentary ends in the
comments on Cicero’s paragraph 76, one could say that Boethius’
commentary on Cicero’s Topics is either preserved incompletely or was
never finished by him.
According to Boethius, two different sorts of things are Topics: a Topic
is both a maximal proposition and the differentia of a maximal proposition.
Therefore, “maximal proposition” is a vital concept of Topics. In Book I of
95 Cf. Speca (2001), pp. 78-80.
96 On Boethius’ theory of Topics and its influence, cf. Marenbon (2003), pp. 56-65; Stump
(1981a, 1974, and 1981b).
97 The translations of In Ciceronis Topica I cite in my dissertation are Stump’s (1988). On
Boethius’ commentary on Cicero’s Topics, cf. Stump (1987).
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In Ciceronis Topica, when Boethius states the nature of Topics, he gives the
definition of maximal proposition: “We call highest and maximal
propositions those propositions that are universal and known and manifest
to such an extent that they need no proof but rather themselves provide
proof for things that are in doubt, for those propositions that are uncertain.”
(C.Topica, 280/1051) In order to elucidate this concept, he takes examples
from mathematical theory. The first example he gives of this sort of
propositions is that “Every number is either even or odd”. This proposition
from arithmetic is universal and there is no need to prove it, for if number is
divided from this perspective, it must be that there are two kinds: one is
even number and the other is odd number. There is no the third kind of
number in this division of number, which suggests that the proposition
“Every number is either even or odd” illustrates what it means to be
manifest and universal. The second example is “If equals are subtracted
from equals, equals remain”. This also proves itself by itself which means it
is universal and manifest. Therefore, these two propositions from arithmetic
are both called “maximal propositions”. And from these two arithmetical
examples, we can easily understand what “maximal proposition” is and
what the characteristics of this proposition are.
At the introduction of Book II, Boethius refutes various biting censures
on the discipline of logic. Everyone wants to appear very skilled at
discourse. In order to bring and to refute charges, people would all rush
together to the knowledge of the discipline of logic. Then Boethius raises
two questions: “But now can anything more absurd be imagined than their
trying to argue that the study of dialectic is useless for arguments that are
even in their own view readily believable? For what sense does it make to
subvert the art of discourse by engaging in discourse, so that you despise the
truth of the vary art in which you seek a reputation?” (C.Topica, 292/1063)
To answer these questions easily, Boethius uses an analogy between a
musician and himself. “As that musician directed his disciple to make music
for himself and for the Muses, so I too could also have sung for myself and
for you, who are not a Muse but a protector of the Muses.” (C.Topica,
292/1063)
Book II focuses on the nature of related things and their kinds:
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conjugates, genus, species, similars, differentiae, contraries, associated
things, antecedents, consequents, and incompatibles, cause and effect,
comparison of greater, lesser, and equal things. All these are connected to
one another and some of them “have not only a linguistic connection to one
another but also a certain harmony of nature, although they are not identical
with one another (C.Topica, 295/1066)”. In order to understand the last part
of this notion, we need to refer to a conception in Boethius’ work on music.
In his work on music, Boethius gives a definition of consonance: “a mixture
of high and low sound falling pleasantly and uniformly on the ears (Musica,
I.8.195)”. The sounds composing the consonance are not identical with one
another, but their mixture can form a pleasant and uniform sound, that is, the
consonance. This is the same with the parts of related things. That is why
Boethius says, in spite of the difference between the parts, that they could
have a certain harmony of nature.
II.1.1.3.b. De Topicis Differentiis98
At the beginning of Boethius’ De topicis differentiis, he states the aim
of this work. He will show “what the topics are, what their differentiae are
and which are suited for which syllogisms.” (TopicisD., 1173C.9-10)
The first concept to be discussed is “proposition”. Boethius states
different ways to divide propositions. The last division is to distinguish
some propositions known per se from all the rest.
“Some propositions are known per se, and no proof can be found
for these. Others, although the mind of the hearer approves them
and assents to them, can nevertheless be proved by other, more
fundamental propositions. Those for which there is no proof are
called maximal and principal, because it is necessary that these
prove those which do not deny that they can be demonstrated.”
(TopicisD., 1176C.18-24)
Boethius inserts the same mathematical proposition as an example that was
also used in In Ciceronis Topica: “If you take equals from equals, the
remainders are equal.” This mathematical proposition produces appropriate
98 The translations of De Topicis Differentiis I cite in my dissertation are Stump’s (1978).
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belief in itself by nature, so it is known per se, and it is indemonstrable,
maximal, and principal.
The fourth concept Boethius discusses is “argument” which is a reason
producing belief regarding something that is in doubt. “Of all arguments,
some are readily believable (probabilia) and necessary, some readily
believable and not necessary, some necessary but not readily believable, and
some neither readily believable nor necessary.” (TopicisD., 1180C.24-27)
But someone may reckon that things which are necessary only and not also
readily believable are not arguments. Boethius gives a refutation of this.
This kind of idea, he says, is not based on a correct understanding of
“readily believable.”
“Those things are readily believable to which agreement is
spontaneously and willingly given, so that they are agreed to as
soon as they are heard. However, those things that are necessary
and not readily believable are demonstrated before by other things
that are necessary and readily believable; and, known and believed,
they produce belief regarding something else which is in doubt.”
(TopicisD., 1181B.33-39)
Boethius continues to illustrate this by the nature of geometrical theory.
“The theories (theorems) which are considered in geometry are of
this sort. For the things presented there are not such that the mind
of the student agrees to them spontaneously; but since they are
demonstrated by other arguments and so are known and understood,
they produce belief regarding other theories. So those things that
are not readily believable per se but are necessary cannot be
arguments to confirm something else for hearers to whom they
have not yet been demonstrated. However, to those hearers who by
prior reasons have come to believe those things which they [once]
did not agree to, they can be invoked as arguments if [the hearers]
are in doubt about something.” (TopicisD., 1181B.40-1181C.11)
Book III concerns the comparison of divisions between Themistius and
Cicero. Boethius believes it is normal that the people of an attentive nature
treat the differentiae of Topics variously and in different ways. The reason is
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that any one thing can often be divided diversely. Here Boethius also shows
some divisions in mathematics as examples. “For example, we collect
sometimes these differentiae of number: some [numbers] are even and
others odd; but sometimes these: some [numbers] are prime and
incomposite and others are secondary and composite. The discipline of
geometry shows that triangles also may be divided in many ways, though in
all cases one should watch that nothing is left out in any form of division
and nothing superfluous and beyond what is necessary is added.” (TopicisD.,
1195B.7-1195C.15)
II.1.2. Boethius’ Basic Logic
In logic, the syllogism is used for the statement of knowledge, and
topics are used to generate arguments. Syllogisms and topics pervade
Boethius’ works, so I will neither specially point out where knowledge of
the syllogism is used nor how it is used. When I discuss applications of
logic in my dissertation, I refer to the basic logic including knowledge of
categories and theories of division and definition that will be applied in
Boethius’ works on mathematics (Section II.2.1.2 and Section II.2.2.2),
theology (Chapter III), and Consolatio (Section IV.2.1 and Section IV.3). In
this section, I will give a short introduction to Boethius’ basic logic.
II.1.2.1. Categories
Among the ten categories, Aristotle pays more attention to four of them,
that is, substance, quantity, relation, and quality, and he puts other categories
in one chapter. Similarly to Aristotle, Boethius also stresses substance,
quantity, relation, and quality, which he also applies in his other works.
These four main categories are applied in his works on arithmetic and music,
which I will discuss in Section II.2.1.2.a and Section II.2.2.2.a. And in his
theological treatise on the Trinity, Boethius applies the ten categories to God,
and, finally, he finds that only the category of relation can explain the
diversity in God, which will be shown in Section III.3.2.
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II.1.2.2. Division and Definition
The most important part of the theory of division is the distinction of
types of division. In his Divisio, Boethius distinguishes two large parts of
division, among which there are three types (see Diagram I below).
Diagram I: Boethius’ System of Division
Division
A. Division per se B. Division per accidens
Division of a genus into its species Division of a subject into accidents
Division of a whole into its parts Division of an accident into its subjects
Division of an utterance into its significations Division of an accident into accidents
From these six types of division, I will single out the three types of division
per se99, because they are important in Boethius’ other works.
There are differences between division of a genus into its species and
division of a whole into its parts, although these two types are similar. There
are three main differences between them. The first difference is “the
division of a whole is made in respect of quantity” and “the distribution of a
genus is accomplished in respect of quality” (Divisio, 879b). The second
difference is that “Every genus is by nature prior to its proper species
whereas a whole is posterior to its proper parts” (Divisio, 879b). The
“prior100“ here is not used in the sense of time, because it means that the
destruction of the genus could result in the perishment of the species
immediately, but not vice versa. If a species is destroyed, its genus would
remain inviolate in its nature. Unlike the relation between the genus and its
species, its proper parts are prior to the whole, for if a part of the whole
perishes then that of which one part has been destroyed will not be the
whole, whereas if the whole perishes parts remain, in separation. The last
difference is concerning the similarities and differences between the original
one and its divisions. The species is composed of its genus and differentia,
in which the genus is the matter of species, and the differentia is the form.
The species is always the same as its genus, and only due to adding a
99 Concerning the other three types of division per accidens, cf. Section II.2.2.2.b.
100 On five senses of “prior”, cf. Section II.1.1.1.b.
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differentia, a species differs from its genus. However, it is not the same case
with the whole and its parts. It is obvious that a whole consists of parts, and
in this case the plurality of parts is the matter, and the composition of those
same parts is the form, which is the difference between a whole and its
every part. These two types of division will be applied in Boethius’
Consolatio, which will be discussed below in Section IV.2.2.2 and Section
IV.3.1.
Another type of division Boethius employs is the division of an
utterance into its signification. When a single spoken sound that signifies
many things is opened up and the plurality of its significations is disclosed,
we need a division of an utterance into its proper significations. This type of
division is used by Boethius in his theological treatise on Christology,
Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, to give a proper definition of the word
“person”, which will be introduced in Section III.2.1.2.
There is a piece of vital knowledge related to theory of division, which
is knowledge of definition. Boethius talks about “definition” in at least three
logical works: one is Divisio, another is his commentary on Cicero’s Topics,
and the last one is his commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge. I will give a short
introduction here. In his monograph on division, Boethius points out that
“we may pretty well say that division and definition are in essence
concerned with the same thing, since a unified definition is a
conglomeration of linked division (Divisio, 880c),” which shows the
relationship between division and definition. It can be said that division is
necessary for full definitions of species, and definition is also necessary for
division, for through the use of definition it can be collected together that
whatever is equivocal and whatever is univocal. In his commentary on
Cicero’s Topica, Boethius devotes Book III to the discussion of definition,
including the nature of definition, kinds of definition, and the method for
making definitions. Here I want to introduce two ideas about definition.
The first one is the method for making definitions, which is important
in Boethius’ other works, such as mathematical works, theological works,
and his Consolatio, which will be discussed one by one later.101 For
101 Cf. Section II.2.1.2.b, Section II.2.2.2.b, Chapter III, and Chapter IV.
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division is necessary for full definitions of species, and the method of
making definitions rests on division. When defining a species, first of all,
this species should be of the sort that it both has a genus and is predicated of
subsequent things. For definitions encompass neither higher genera nor the
lower things, both of which are excluded from the definition. So it is only
“the intermediate things, those that have genera and that are predicated of
the others — of genera, of species, or of individuals — that can fall under
definition.” (Divisio, 886a)
The next thing that one should do is to take up the genus of that species,
divide the differentiae of that genus, join a differentia to the genus, and see
if the differentia joined to the genus is equal to the species which needs to
be defined. If so, this is the definition of the species; if not, distribute
differentiae under differentiae as often as possible until all of them joined to
the genus describe the species in a definition that is equal to it (Divisio,
886a).
The second topic I wish to introduce is the division of types of
definition. There are four kinds of definition (C.Topica, 323/1096).
(1) When a definition is constructed of genus and differentiae, we
unfold substantial parts. This is called “definition” in the strict
sense of the name.
(2) There is the sort of definition where accidents are gathered
together into one thing and one thing is produced from them; it is a
sort of enumeration of parts located not in substance but in a
gathering together of accidents. This sort of definition is called a
description.
(3) If we are talking not about the accidents of a thing but rather
about certain members from which a thing is composed and
conjoined, and we attempt to make a definition from such members.
This is called a definition by means of enumeration of parts.
(4) If someone makes a definition by presenting species rather than
members in the definition, it is called a definition from the division
of species.
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These four kinds of definition will be applied to Boethius’ treatise against
Eutyches and Nestorius, and they help him to find a correct definition of
nature, which will be discussed in Section III.2.1.1.
By looking through Boethius’ extant logical works, applications of
mathematics can be found in these works. Most of applications of
mathematics to logic are as examples to support arguments or notions in
logic, which makes logic be understood more easily. In Boethius’
mathematical works, there are also applications of logic. In Section II.2, I
will introduce Boethius’ mathematics and show how logical theories play a
role in his mathematical works.
II.2. Boethius’ Mathematics
As I introduced in Section I.2.2, there are only two extant mathematical
works of Boethius, and both of them are not considered to be original ones
with him. As a matter of fact, Boethius composes the works on arithmetic
and music according to his purpose of making the Latin-speaking world
familiar with the classical Greek knowledge. Thus, in compiling these works
Boethius’ remains true to his purpose. Here I want to discuss some
applications of basic logic in his mathematical works. These are not
numerous but can be enough to indicate how Boethius distinguishes himself
from his sources.
In the following sections, I will introduce Boethius’ arithmetic and
music and show how basic logic elements (including division, definition and
categories) are applied to them.
II.2.1. Boethius on Arithmetic
II.2.1.1. De Institutione Arithmetica and Its Sources
Boethius’ Arithmetica102 is the interpretation of Nicomachus’ Greek
102 Cf. Masi (1979) discusses Gerardus Ruffus’ commentary on Arithmetica; Kibre (1981),
“The Boethian De Institutione Arithmetica and the Quadrivium in the Thirteen Century
University Milieu at Paris,” and Masi (1981a), “The Influence of Boethius De Arithmetica
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Introduction to Arithmetic.103 The following Table I lists the corresponding
chapters between Boethius’ Arithmetica and Nicomachus’ work on
arithmetic.
Table I (PS: Nico. is short for Nicomachus, Boe. is short for Boethius)
Nico. Boe. Nico. Boe.
I.1-5 I.1 II.1-2 II.1
I.6 I.2 II.3-4 II.2
I.7 I.3-6 II.5 II.3
I.8 I.7-9 II.6-7 II.4-6
I.9 I.10 II.8 II.7-9
I.10 I.11-12 II.9 II.10-12
I.11-12 I.13-15 II.10 II.13-14
I.13 I.16-18 II.11 II.15-16
I.14-15 I.19 II.12 II.17-19
I.16 I.20 II.13-14 II.20-24
I.17 1.21-23 II.15-16 II.25
I.18 I.23 II.17 II.26-30
I.19 I.24-27 II.18 II.31-32
I.20-21 I.28 II.19 II.33-34
I.22 I.29-30 II.20 II.35-39










From the above table we can see that like Nicomachus, Boethius also
divides his Arithmetica into two books, but Boethius’ first book contains 32
chapters (nine chapters longer than Nicomachus’ work) and his second book
has 54 chapters (twenty-five chapters longer than Nicomachus’ work). The
on Late Medieval Mathematics,” in Masi (ed.), pp. 67-80 and pp. 81-95; Masi (1981b).
103 According to Cassiodorus, Apuleius of Madaura also translated Nicomachus’
Introduction to Arithmetic, but nothing of this translation remains. In the Greek-speaking
part of the world, the extant commentaries on Nicomachus’ Introduction to Arithmetic are
those of Iamblichus, Asclepius, and Philoponus. Cf. Tarán (1969), pp. 5-7.
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first book focuses on the numbers (the substance of number, different
divisions of number and their definitions, productions, and properties, and
the relation between numbers); and the second book concerns figure
numbers and proportion.
As for the relation between Boethius and his source Nicomachus of
Gerasa, Martin Luther D’Ooge gives the following evaluation of Boethius’
translation of Nicomachus’ works.
“In the composition of his treatise Boethius more often expands
than condenses. His method is to intersperse between sections
literally translated, or closely paraphrased, others in which the
general principles stated by Nicomachus are furnished with
exhaustive explanation and copious numerical examples. Nothing
is left to the reader to supply. Almost any chapter, compared with
the original one, will prove to be of this character. Boethius also
supplies data in tabular form to a far greater extent than did
Nicomachus. The order of the original is preserved for the most
part, but occasionally a rearrangement is found.”104
D’Ooge claims that these peculiarities are of minor importance and it is
rather the omissions that have to be considered. He regards those omissions
as the special difficulty that Boethius had with the logical terminology of
Nicomachus.
I do not agree with the evaluation by D’Ooge. Boethius’ translation
style is due to his purpose, as he says in the preface of his Arithmetica: “I do
not restrict myself slavishly to traditions of others, but with a well formed
rule of translation, having wandered a bit freely, I set upon a different path,
not the same footsteps.” (Arithmetica, preface)
Boethius makes two kinds of changes to Nicomachus’ composition. The
first one is to add extra exposition or use formulae and diagrams to make
some ideas clearer and easier to comprehend. For instance, when
introducing the second division of even number, “the even times odd
number”, Boethius adds more explanation to tell the difference between the
104 D’Ooge (1938), p. 133.
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second division of even number and the first division of even number, “the
even times even number”. This extra exposition makes the reader
understand the division of even number more clearly. In another case, in
order to show that “the principle of plane straight-line figures is a triangle”,
Boethius adds four diagrams105 to illustrate how a square, a pentagon,
hexagon, and even a triangle can be divided into triangles, which gives the
readers a visualized picture.
The second kind of changes consists in the reproduction of diffuse
discussions in a concise style. One case of this kind is vital to tell the
difference between Boethius and Nicomachus. Nicomachus believes that
what is true of numbers is also true of the universe. As the discipline
studying numbers, arithmetic was preexistent as a cosmic pattern in the
mind of God, the creator, and according to this model the material world
was formed. This is expressed by Nicomachus in I.4.2 and I.6.1 of his work
on arithmetic. Nicomachus refers to the universe more than once. I list two
citations from Nicomachus’ work, which are completely left out of
Boethius’ corresponding chapters (see Table I).
Arithmetic “existed before all the others in the mind of the creating
God like some universal and exemplary plan, relying upon which
as a design and archetypal example the creator of the universe sets
in order his material creations and makes them attain to their proper
ends.”106
“All that has by nature with systematic method been arranged in the
universe seems both in part and as a whole to have been determined
and ordered in accordance with number, by the forethought and the
mind of him that created all things.”107
In addition, there should be two kinds of numbers, the divine number and
the scientific number. From Nicomachus’ point of view, the divine number
is a wholly conceptual and immaterial number and this kind of number
preexisted in God’s mind and was the basis of creation; while the scientific
105 Cf. Arithmetica, II.16.
106 Nicomachus, Introduction to Arithmetic, I.4.2; D’Ooge (1938).
107 Nicomachus, Introduction to Arithmetic, I.6.1; D’Ooge (1938).
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number is constantly found in connection with material things and measures
them, their arrangements and their movements.108 In I.6 of his work,
Nicomachus makes a statement to distinguish the scientific number which
he uses in his arithmetic from the divine number. Boethius condenses the
contents on the divine number, and he does not discuss the difference
between the divine number and the scientific number. Throughout Boethius’
work on arithmetic, there is no such term “scientific number”. Unlike
Nicomachus, Boethius only uses the word “number” instead of the term
“scientific number”.
Nevertheless, in Boethius’ work, when he states the substance of
number, he also gives a short introduction saying that “Number was the
principal exemplar in the mind of the creator.” (Arithmetica, I.2) Therefore,
Boethius shares the same idea with Nicomachus about the relation between
number and universe, but in his Arithmetica, Boethius does not intend to
give his readers the impression that his arithmetic gives the information
about the idea of universe but only leads his reader to the arithmetic per se
as an elementary discipline in the background of philosophy. In order to
emphasize that his work on arithmetic is an elementary introduction for
beginners, Boethius confines himself to elementary ideas of arithmetic.
Nicomachus’ arithmetic could be seen as his theory of cosmogony,
while Boethius regards arithmetic as basic knowledge for the other three
mathematical disciplines which together become the preparatory way to the
serious study of philosophy.
“Arithmetic considers that multitude which exists of itself as an
integral whole; the measures of musical modulation understand that
multitude which exists in relation to some other; geometry offers
the notion of stable magnitude; the skill of astronomical discipline
explains the science of moveable magnitude.” (Arithmetica, I.1)
Accordingly, it is not accurate to regard Boethius’ work on arithmetic is the
translation of Nicomachus’, but it should say that Boethius interprets or
paraphrases Nicomachus’ Greek work on arithmetic in his own way.
108 Cf. D’Ooge (1938), p. 98.
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II.2.1.2. Applications of Basic Logic in Arithmetica
In interpreting Nicomachus, Boethius employs basic logical knowledge.
The main theories of logic used in arithmetic involve knowledge of
categories and definition.
II.2.1.2.a. Categories in Arithmetica
Among all logical theories, knowledge of categories relates to
arithmetic most closely.109 Of the ten categories, those that have an obvious
relationship with arithmetic are quantities and relations.
The division of mathematics begins with the division of the proper
objects of mathematical knowledge (incorporeal essentiae), which may be
compared to the division of quantities. For in Categories, Aristotle divides
quantities into two kinds. One is discrete quantity, which includes number;
and the other kind is continuous quantity, including lines, surfaces, bodies
which are the objects geometry and astronomy study. Similar to this division,
of the four mathematical disciplines arithmetic and music concern the genus
of discrete essentiae, namely multitude; and geometry and astronomy
concern the genus of continuous essentiae, called magnitude. These two
terms, multitude and magnitude, are used here both abstractly and concretely.
Abstractly, the two terms refer to the quality; concretely, the two terms refer
to the objects of such natures.
One kind of discrete quantity is number, and arithmetic studies number
per se, therefore, arithmetic focuses on a discrete quantity, which shows
how closely the category of quantity and arithmetic are related. Additionally,
a characteristic peculiar to a quantity is its being called both equal and
unequal, both of which are the vital terms in arithmetical study. Boethius
divides I.17 of Nicomachus’ work into two chapters: one is concerning a
quantity related to another; and the other is relating to the types of major
and minor quantity. Boethius believes that, “Any given thing in comparison
to another is either equal or unequal with it.” (Arithmetica, I.21) Thus, the
quantity is first divided into equal quantity and unequal quantity. Then of
the unequal quantity, some are larger and some are smaller. Finally, the
109 Cf. Section II.1.1.1.b.
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major inequalities and the minor inequality are divided into five types110
respectively. For example, major inequalities include multiplex,
superparticular, superpartient, multiplex superparticular, and multiplex
superpartient, and the terms used here are adapted from Boethius’
translation, which are important in mathematics.
It is obvious that the category of quantity is intimate to arithmetic. And
it also shows another category that is close to arithmetic, which is the
category of relation. In Categories, Aristotle defines “relatives” as “all such
things as are said to be just what they are, of or than other things, or in some
other way in relation to something else.”111 This definition of relatives is
just the basis of relative quantities in arithmetic. For every relative has a
correlative, and in most cases, they come into being together, so Boethius
says that, “Any given thing which has a quantity compared to it is not
known except by the other term to which it is compared.” (Arithmetica, I.21)
It could be said that without the category of relation, there would be no
relative quantities, or there would be no proportion in arithmetic. And what
is worse, without the category of relation another mathematical discipline,
music, would lose its theoretical basis. Because music in Boethius’
quadrivium depends on number theory, it must be built on proportional
principles.
Of course, the relationship between categories and mathematics is
neither original in Boethius nor in Nicomachus, for its history traces back to
Aristotle and the Pythagoreans, as we have seen. However, from the
arguments in Boethius’ work on arithmetic, we find that this relationship is
clear in his mind.
II.2.1.2.b. Theory of Definition in Arithmetica
Theory of definition112 is so important in Boethius’ logic that he states
it in more than one of his logical works, especially in his monograph on
division and in his commentary on Cicero’s Topics. In Boethius’ point of
110 If “m”, “n”, and “k” are integers, then “multiples” are as mn:n; “superparticulars” are as
(n+1):n; “superpartients” are as (n+k):n, k>1; “multiple superparticulars” are as (mn+1):n,
m>1; and “multiple superpartients” are as (mn+k):n, both m and k being greater than 1.
111 Aristotle, Categories, 6a36; Ackrill (1963).
112 Cf. Section II.1.2.2.
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view, “the definition shows what the thing defined is; that is, it shows its
substance. A definition that consists in a genus and differentiae, however,
does lay out a substance.” (C.Topica, 319/1091) Application of definition is
in line with Boethius’ goal that his arithmetic is written for the beginners.
Therefore, when he discusses one subject, he must, as Nicomachus does,
give the definitions of the main terms of that subject, and he also adds a
definition which is not found in Nicomachus’ work on arithmetic, such as
the definition of cyclical or spherical numbers.
II.2.1.3. Basic Ideas of Arithmetic Used in Boethius’ OtherWorks
Applications of logic to Boethius’ arithmetic are not many, but they are
sufficient to show what Boethius’ own approach. Arithmetic is so
elementary that in Boethius’ other works he employs many ideas of
arithmetic. The basis ideas of arithmetic which will be used by Boethius
include theory of equality, unity, number and the divine, and number and
politics.
II.2.1.3.a. Theory of Equality
At the end of the first book and the beginning of the second book
Boethius introduces an important theory that equality is prior to inequality,
and inequality can be reduced to equality. In his work on arithmetic,
Boethius emphasizes the importance of equality. He states that equality is
like a matrix and takes the force of a root, so “it gives depth to the types and
orders of inequality” (Arithmetica, I.32). Then Boethius follows
Nicomachus in presenting the theory of the “three rules”, according to
which other sets of three in different ratios may be derived from three equal
terms (Arithmetica, I.32), and by the reversal of which any proportion in
three terms may be reduced to the original equality (Arithmetica, II.1).
These rules are: (1) to make the first number equal to the first; (2) to put
down a number equal to the first and the second; (3) to do the sum of one
equal to the first, twice the second, and the third. (Arithmetica, I.32) Unlike
Nicomachus, Boethius draws some diagrams to illustrate the process of
generating, from three equal terms 1:1:1, another set of three in a different
ratio 1:2:4. According to Boethius’ descriptions and his diagrams, I draw a
diagram to give a picture of how he uses three rules (see Diagram II).
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Diagram II: How to Use three Rules




Therefore: 1 2 4
The same three rules: 1 3 (3=1+2) 9 (9=1+2×2+4)
From the illustration, it is obvious that “equality is the principle of all
inequalities, and then from inequality all other things are derived.”
(Arithmetica, I.32) Every species of inequality can be resolved into equality.
In other words, equality is the mother of any quantity related to any other
things and from it comes the first procreation of a relationship and to it
again is its final resolution. The notion on the nature of equality becomes
one basis for his argument in Boethius’ Consolatio, which will be discussed
in Chapter IV, especially in Section IV.2.
As a Pythagorean, Nicomachus believes that what is true of numbers is
also true of the universe, and the significance of “equality” is equal to that
of “sameness”, that is to say, they are elements and principles of the
universe. “Sameness” and “otherness” are the principles of the universe, as
Nicomachus says in Introduction to Arithmetic.114 For example,
Nicomachus states that “The physical philosopher, however, and those that
take their start with mathematics, call ‘the same’ and ‘the other’ the
principles of the universe.”115 When “sameness” enters into the composition
of things, it makes things persist in the same fashion, preserving their
identity, while when “otherness” goes into the composition of things, it
causes things to change from their original forms and assumes others.116
Unlike Nicomachus, Boethius regards his work on arithmetic as the
elementary discipline, thus he tries to avoid referring “equality” to universe
directly, and he does not mention “sameness” at all. Nevertheless, he has the
same ideas in mind and employs them to his Consolatio and his theological
113 In order to distinguish “1” in different position, I add “a”, “b”, “c” to “1”.
114 Cf. Nicomachus, Introduction to Arithmetic, II.17.1, 18.1 and 4, 19.1 and 20.2; D’Ooge
(1938).
115 Nicomachus, Introduction to Arithmetic, II.18.1; D’Ooge (1938).
116 Cf. D’Ooge (1938), p. 99.
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treatises, especially De Trinitate. When Boethius discusses the unity of the
Trinity, he begins with a brief analysis of sameness and otherness, and then
he invokes Aristotle’s point of view on sameness, which will be given in
detail in Chapter III.
Nicomachus’ equality and inequality are also related to virtue and vice.
When discussing division of even numbers into perfect, imperfect, and
superabundant, Nicomachus makes a comparison of inequality to vices, ill
health and the like.117 While in Chapter 19, Book I of Boethius’ arithmetic,
he omits Nicomachus’ comparison, but adds analogies to vividly describe
the extreme kinds of numbers.
“And so this number whose parts added together exceed the sum of
the same number is called superfluous.”... “That number is called
diminished whose parts, when put together in the same way, are
exceeded by the multitude of the whole term.”... The perfect
number is that number the sum of whose parts is “not more than the
total nor does it suffer from a lack in comparison with the total.”
(Arithmetica, I.19)118
Boethius thinks highly of perfect number. He regards the superfluous and
diminished numbers as two elements unequal and intemperate, and between
them, holding the middle place between the extremes like one who seeks
virtue,119 is the perfect number. In addition, in Chapter 32 of Book I,
Boethius omits Nicomachus’ I.23.5 which is a reference to the ethical
117 Nicomachus, Introduction to Arithmetic, I.14.2; D’Ooge (1938).
118 For example, the number 12 is a superfluous number, because half of 12 is 6, a third
part is 4, a fourth part is 3, and a sixth part is 2, a twelfth part is 1, and the total sum
[6+4+3+2+1] amounts to 16 which surpassed the total of the entire body, that is 12. In the
same way, the number 14 is a diminished number, because the total sum [7+2+1] amounts
to 10 which is smaller than the original term, that is 14. Similarly, the number 28 is a
perfect number, because the total sum [14+7+4+2+1] is 28 which is equal to the original
number that is 28.
119 Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1108b11-14; Barnes (1984b): “There are three kinds
of disposition, then, two of them vices, involving excess and deficiency respectively, and
one a virtue, viz. mean.” The word “mean” used by Aristotle does not refer to the
mathematical mean, and in this sense the middle place Boethius uses is not a point exactly
in the middle, but a stretch of the continuum around the middle. This meaning is also used
by Boethius in his treatise against Eutyches and Nestorius; cf. Section III.2.3.
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virtues. Though they both mention virtue and number, in Chapter 20 of
Boethius’ Book I which corresponds to Chapter 16 of Nicomachus’ Book I,
Boethius just uses one sentence to mention this relationship generally, “there
is in these a great similarity to the virtues and vices.” This similarity is also
applied to the theological discussions. In his theological tractate called
Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, Boethius believes the Catholic faith is the
middle way, or just like virtue, it is the perfect way, and the other two faiths
of Eutyches and Nestorius are the extremes like vice. I will discuss this in
more detail in Section III.2.
II.2.1.3.b. Unity
Another important aspect of arithmetic is the knowledge of “unity”. In
the natural arrangement of numbers, every number, except unity, has next to
it two terms and half of these two terms which come before and after it.
Take the number 7 for example. Two terms next to it can be 6 and 8, or 5
and 9, or 4 and 10, and 7 is just half of 6 and 8, or 5 and 9, or 4 and 10.
However, unity only has the number 2 next to it and it is half of 2. For this
reason, unity has a special role. “It is rightly recognized as the generator of
the total extended plurality of numbers.” (Arithmetica, I.7) And Boethius
stresses the elementary role of unity, that is to say, “unity is the substance
and principle of any constant quantity” (Arithmetica, II.1). The theory of
“unity” also becomes one basis for his argument in Boethius’ Consolatio,
which will be discussed in Chapter III and Chapter IV.
II.2.1.3.c. Number and Divinity
Boethius mentions number and divinity several times, which is vital to
understand the Consolatio of Boethius. When discussing how to produce the
even-times even number, he says that “the basic ordering of numbers has
come about through careful consideration and through the great constancy
of divinity.” (Arithmetica, I.9) In Chapter 27 of Book I, he also says that
“Such is the divine nature of things in this disposition that all the angles are
tetragons.”120 In Chapter 2 of Book II, when he discusses the discovery in
each number of how many terms of the same proportions are able to precede
120 Boethius here apparently limits the term “tetragon” to indicate square numbers; cf. Masi (1983),
p. 107.
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it, Boethius stresses “This must always occur as by a certain divine, not
human devising”. The relationship between number and divinity will be
helpful to understand Boethius’ Consolatio, which will be shown in Section
IV.2.2.
II.2.1.3.d. Number and Politics
The last relevant point of arithmetic I want to point out concerns
politics, which is nowhere to be found in Nicomachus’ work. In Chapter 45
of Book II, Boethius discusses “which medial proportions are compared to
what things in the state of public affairs”. The whole chapter has only one
paragraph which contains much information.
Boethius compares three types of medial proportions to kinds of state.
These three ones are the arithmetic proportion, the musical or harmonic
proportion, and the geometric proportion. In the arithmetic proportion of
three or any number of stated terms the same and equal difference is found
between all terms.121 For example, in the disposition of 1, 2, 3, there is an
equal difference of terms according to an arithmetic interval, that is, 2-1=3-2.
There are four properties of the arithmetic proportion, one of them is
important, that is, “there is a major proportion found in the smaller terms
and a minor proportion in the larger terms.” (Arithmetica, II.43) This means
that in the arithmetic proportion 1, 2, 3, the smaller terms are 1 and 2 of
which two to one is a duplex, and the larger terms are 2 and 3 of which three
to two is a sesquialter. For 2>2/3, the proportion of a duplex is larger than a
sesquialter, in other words, the proportion found in the smaller terms 2 and 1
is a major proportion, but the proportion found in the larger terms 3 to 2 is a
minor one. According to this property, the arithmetic proportion may be
compared to a kind of state known as Authoritarian Government now, which
is ruled by a small group with a greater power. The second proportion is the
musical or harmonic proportion122, “in which as the highest term is when
compared to the smallest term, so the difference of the larger two is when
compared to the difference of the middle term and the smallest (Arithmetica,
121 If there are three numbers a, b, c (c>b>a), and c-b=b-a, then they form an arithmetic
proportion.
122 Concerning the reason why it is called a harmonic proportion, please see Arithmetica,
II.48. I will not explain it here.
Chapter II. Logic and Mathematics in Boethius’ Curriculum
- 55 -
II.47)”.123 For instance, in the disposition of 3, 4, 6, there is an equation,
that is 6/3=(6-4)/(4-3), so 3, 4, 6 forms a harmonic proportion. Contrary to
that important property of the arithmetic proportion, in a harmonic
proportion, the smaller terms have minor proportions, and the larger terms
have a major proportion, such as in 3, 4, 6, the proportion of the smaller
terms is 4/3, and the proportion of the larger terms is 6/4, and 4/3<6/4, so in
the smaller terms a minor proportion is found, and in the larger terms there
is a major proportion. The harmonic proportion is compared to the state
which is called Democratic Government today. This kind of state is regarded
as the very best, in which there is a proportionality in the larger term, viz.
the major power is owned by the larger proportions of the population. The
last kind of medial proportion is the geometric proportion, in which “an
equal ration is always kept and the quantity and multitude of number is
regularly ignored (Arithmetica, II.44)”.124 Take 2, 4, 8 for example. In the
disposition of 2, 4, 8, in the smaller terms there is 4/2=2 which is duplex,
and in the larger terms there is 8/4=2 which is also the duplex. Unlike the
property of the arithmetic proportion and the harmonic proportion, the
geometric proportion provides the middle position, in which either larger or
smaller terms maintains equal quantities of numbers in proportionality. The
geometric proportion is compared to the state which is “of the people, as it
were, and of a balanced citizenry. For in either larger or in smaller, the
whole is put together with an equal proportionality of all, and there is an
equality between all; there is a certain equal right balance in preserving
proportions.” (Arithmetica, II.45)
By using this analogy, Boethius makes his readers vividly grasp the
characteristics of three kinds of proportions, and have better ideas on the
state, such as what is the state in general, what is the state of the very best,
and what is the state of the people. It may seem strange in this work to add a
paragraph on number and politics, for Boethius tries to write his arithmetical
work as a basic one. However, this chapter implies that Boethius is
interested in state affairs, which is also shown by his motivation to write
123 If there are three numbers a, b, c (c>b>a), and c/b=(c-b)/(b-a), then they form an
musical or harmonic proportion.
124 If there are three numbers a, b, c (c>b>a), and c/b=b/a, then they form a geometric
proportion.
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theological treatises125.
II.2.2. Boethius on Music
II.2.2.1. De Institutione Musica and Its Sources
The extant edition of Boethius’ Musica includes five books and the
whole work ends with Chapter 19 of Book V.126 Unlike his work on
arithmetic, the sources of his Musica are complicated. Many citations of
authors occur in Boethius’ Musica. Among these authors, there are two
important ones, Nicomachus and Ptolemy (90-168 A.D.).
Nicomachus is the person cited most often in the first four books. As I
said in the earlier section about Nicomachus127, only two of his works are
preserved to us in their entirety, namely Introduction to Arithmetic and
Manual of Harmonics. The first four books, especially Book I-III of
Boethius’ Musica show clearly a development from and dependence on
Nicomachus’ two works. After comparing Boethius’ music with that of
Nicomachus, Calvin Bower has reached the conclusion that the extant and
the more extended musical work promised by Nicomachus served as the
principal source of Boethius’ first four books ofMusica.128
The first book of Boethius’ Musica is the general introduction to music.
In the prologue of Book I (including Chapter 1 and Chapter 2), Boethius
introduces the nature of music, the role of music, and the division of music.
In Chapter 33 of Book I, Boethius sums up the first book, “how the things
thus far said are to be taken” and promises that “all these will be proved
both through mathematical reasoning and aural judgment.” Book II and III
involve the technical theories on numerical proportions to fulfill the
expectation of logical demonstrations of the theories presented as dogma,
125 Cf. the preface to Chapter III of my dissertation.
126 Cf. Bower (1981), “The Role of Boethius’ De Institutione Musica in the Speculative
Tradition of Western Musical Thought,” and Hoolloway (1981), “ ‘The Asse to the Harpe’:
Boethian Music in Chaucer,” and Pizzani (1981), “The Influence of the De Institutione
Musica of Boethius up to Gerbert D’Aurillac: A Tentative Contribution,” in Masi (ed.), pp.
157-174, pp. 97-156, and pp. 175-186.
127 Cf. Section I.2.2.
128 Cf. Bower (1978).
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which are introduced in Book I with little comment. The content of these
two books is related to Nicomachus’ work on arithmetic, including the
mathematical theories which are applied to the monochord in Book IV.
There are two main parts in Book IV: one is the division of the monochord,
and the other is the theory of modes, which seems unrelated. From the
whole structure, no matter how loose it is, the first four books can be put
together as treating instrumental music, throughout which only one
dissenting voice is allowed. This voice is from Ptolemy. And later in Book V,
Ptolemy assumes the leading role. Book V continues to deal with
instrumental music but develops in new directions. Boethius picks out the
first chapter of Ptolemy’s Harmonics as the source for Book V to complete
his Latin record of Greek musical thoughts.
It is a pity that Boethius’ extant work on music is not preserved in its
entirety. On the one hand, it is obvious that his extant work ends abruptly,
leaving eleven chapter titles without content. On the other hand, he
dedicates one chapter of the first book to the general introduction to three
kinds of music, which are cosmic music, human music, and instrumental
music, but in his extant five books there is only knowledge of instrumental
music without any further exposition on cosmic music129 and human music.
There are two possibilities. The first one is that Boethius did finish
translating Ptolemy’s work, but those parts have not been preserved. The
second one is that he did not finish interpreting Ptolemy’s Harmonics. No
matter which possibility it is, one thing is sure: if the whole Harmonics had
been interpreted by Boethius, he would have completed his thoughts on the
three kinds of music.
II.2.2.2. Applications of Basic Logic toMusica
In his extant work, when interpreting his sources, Boethius applies a
few basic logical theories to make his expression clearer, viz. the theory of
categories, division and definition.
129 Boethius does say a few words on cosmic music in his extant work on music. In I.27 of
Musica, Boethius discusses “to what heavenly bodies the strings are compared”, but this
comparison of strings to the disposition of the heavenly spheres is hardly enough to fulfill
his promises to discuss cosmic music “later more studiously”; cf. Musica, I.2.188.
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II.2.2.2.a. Categories inMusica
Music considers the relationship between numbers, so sound should be
known through numbers which are related through proportions. That is to
say, sound is regarded as quantity. Music studies the multitude, the discrete
quantities. Of quantities, some are equal and others are unequal, thus of
sounds, “some sounds are also equal, while others stand at an interval from
each other by virtue of an inequality (Musica, I.3.191)”. Except the category
of quantity, sound is also related to another category of action. If there is no
motion, there will no sound. Sound is “a percussion of air remaining
undissolved all the way to the hearing (Musica, I.3.189)”. The frequency of
motion causes different sounds. The slow and less frequent motion of the
string will produce low sounds, so by contrast, the fast and more frequent
motion of the string will produce high sounds. In other words, high sounds
consist of more motions than low sounds. According to the property of
discrete quantity, low sounds and high sounds should preserve the nature of
consonance which is a vital concept in music. “In those pitches which do
not harmonize through any inequality, there is no consonance at all. For
consonance is the concord of mutually dissimilar pitches brought together
into one.” (Musica, I.3.191) By the help of theory of categories, sound,
which is a basic but abstract term in music, can be understood easily.
II.2.2.2.b. Theories of Division and Definition inMusica
Other important applications of logic to music are theories of definition
and division.130 As a matter of fact, division and definition are necessary
requisites for each other, in other words, division is necessary for full
definitions of species, since a unified definition is made up of divisions
joined together; and definition is necessary for division, since by means of
definition, it could be determined what is equivocal and what is univocal
(Divisio, 880c-880d). It could be said that division and definition are close
sisters, or more specifically, division of a genus into its species is most
intimate with definition. This could be demonstrated from what Boethius
describes in Divisio.
“When I have been given a species of the sort that both has a genus
130 Cf. Section II.1.2.2.
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and is predicated of subsequent things, I first take up its genus, I
divide the differentiae of that genus, I join a differentia to the genus,
and I see whether that differentia joined to the genus can be equal
to the species I have undertaken to circumscribe with a
definition. .... Finally, we distribute differentiae under differentiae
as often as we must until all of them joined to the genus describe
the species in a definition that is equal to it.” (Divisio, 886a)
Just due to this knowledge about division and definition, Boethius makes
changes to the conception of some musical terms, which makes himself
distinct from his sources.
The most obvious example is the definition of consonant and dissonant
sounds. These two terms appear in Boethius’ Book IV, the introduction of
which derives from parts of Euclid’s Sectio Canonis. In Sectio Canonis,
Euclid gives defines the term “consonant sounds” as two sounds which
mingle, and similar to this simple way, the term “dissonant sounds” is
defined as two sounds which do not mingle. Boethius was not satisfied with
definitions of these two terms. Obviously, as the names of two terms show,
consonant sounds and dissonant sounds are two species of the genus sound.
When defining them, the first thing to be taken up is, of course, their genus,
the sound. Then the significant thing is to add the differentiae. And the
reason why Boethius changes the definition is likely that he thinks the
differentia “which mingle” joined to the genus sounds could not be equal to
the species of “consonant sounds”, or in other words, could not be equal to
the definition of “consonant sounds”. And it is the same with the definition
of “dissonant sounds”. Thus, Boethius joins the differentia “when struck at
the same time” to the genus. And it is still not enough, so he adds as the last
differentia “pleasant and intermingled”. So far, in Boethius’ point of view,
the description of the species “consonant sounds” is integral and equal to the
definition of this term. Accordingly, in the introduction of Book IV of his
work, Boethius defines, “Consonant pitches are those which when struck at
the same time sound pleasant and intermingled with each other; dissonant
pitches are those which when struck at the same time do not yield
intermingled sound.” (Musica, IV.1.302)
The theory of division is also employed by Boethius in his work on
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music. There are a few divisions in musical theories, and because of
Boethius’ familiarity with the theory of division, his expositions of musical
divisions are clear and easy to be grasped.
The first division I want to discuss is a famous division of people whose
jobs are related to music. In Chapter 34 of Book I, Boethius distinguishes
musicians from performers and composers. This division is different from
the divisions I described in Section II.1.2.2. Division of a genus into its
species, division of a whole into its parts, and division of a spoken sound
into its significations are divisions per se. Except those three divisions, there
is another one, division per accidens. There are three types of division per
accidens, which are the division of a subject into its accidents, division of an
accident into its subjects, and division of an accident into accidents. Here
the division of people whose jobs are related to music belongs to division of
a subject into its accidents. The same subject is men who are engaged in the
musical art, and its accidents include what they do, and how they deal with
music. The first kind of man performs on instruments, but they make no use
of reason, acting as slaves, so they are excluded from comprehension of
musical knowledge. The second kind of man is like the poet, and when they
are composing songs, they take advantage of a certain natural instinct but
not so much by thought and reason. Therefore, the first kind of man who is
related to music is called performer, and the second is named composer,
both of which are not musicians in the proper sense. Unlike the former two
classes, the third class of man makes full use of his reason and thought to
“exhibit the faculty of forming judgments according to speculation or reason
relative and appropriate to music concerning modes and rhythms, the genera
of songs, consonances, and all the things which are to be explained
subsequently, as well as concerning the songs of the poets (Musica,
I.34.225)”. The last kind of man who is related to music can be esteemed as
musician. Thus, by applications of theory of division, Boethius defines what
the musician in the proper sense is.
In Chapter 21 of Book I, Boethius introduces three genera of melodies:
diatonic, chromatic, and enharmonic. The heart of Book IV is the division of
the monochord, comprising Chapters 5-13. A monochord division is truly
exceptional in ancient musical theory, and began from the Pythagorean
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diatonic genus. These are called the division of genus into its species.
Similar to these divisions, division of notes also belongs to division of genus.
It is common in all classical Greek musical theory that the notes are
classified as either fixed or movable. However, here Boethius adds
intermediate ones, “Of all these pitches, some sound completely fixed, some
completely movable, whereas others sound neither completely fixed nor
completely movable.” (Musica, IV.13.335) This division is identical with
Nicomachus’ theory, which is found in no other author of antiquity.
Nicomachus gives the definition of the category of sound which is neither
completely fixed nor completely movable as one that does not move
between the diatonic and chromatic but move in the enharmonic, which is
unique to Nicomachus.131 Boethius’ division of notes is a little different
from those above, for it is not division of genus into its species, but into to
differentiae. “A genus is divided sometimes into species, sometimes into
differentiae, if the species by which the genus ought rightly to be divided
lack names.” (Divisio, 880b) “Fixed” and “movable” are not the species but
the differentiae. Since there is no single name of the species “fixed notes”,
the differentia is put in place of the species and connected to the higher
genus. “For every differentia produces a species when it comes into
conjunction with its proper genus.” (Divisio, 880b)
The threefold division of notes is the same with twofold division of
notes. “That with the imposition of names division is always into two terms
is made clear when one on one’s own initiative imposes a name for a genus
or differentia that has none.” (Divisio, 883d-884a) This means that the
tripartite division, “of notes some are completely fixed, some completely
movable, and others are neither completely fixed nor completely movable,”
could be made bipartite if expressed in this way: “Of notes that some are
fixed, others movable; of the movable ones some are completely movable,
others partly movable.” Therefore, although Boethius chooses to follow
Nicomachus’ theory, he does not disprove the mainstream of Greek musical
theory; on the contrary, he coincides with that.
The last division but the most important one is the three-fold kinds of
music. Bower thinks highly of Boethius’ dividing the kinds of music:
131 Cf. Bower (1978), p. 26.
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“Just as Boethius seems to have coined the concept of quadruvium
in the introduction to De institutione arithmetica, a concept not
found in Nicomachus’ treatise, so Boethius may have conceived the
three-fold concept of music placed in certain instruments, music of
the human being, and music of the universe in the proemium of De
institutione musica.”132
As we know, the source of the first four books is Nicomachus’ works on
arithmetic and music. In the first four books, human music and cosmic
music are not dealt with, and in Nicomachus’ extant musical work, there is
no the division of music and we do not have the longer one which
Nicomachus promised to write. Therefore, we may well say that the division
of music was not to be part of the original text of Nicomachus. Boethius’
threefold division of kinds of music is unlikely to be original with him,
because implicit in the thoughts of Plato and Pythagoras there were similar
ideas. However, it is sure that the first person who expressed this idea
distinctly in Latin is Boethius.
Boethius’ clear exposition of dividing music may result from
Peripatetics’ division of the forms of speech. In the commentary on
Aristotle’s On Interpretation, Boethius says, “Peripatetics who draw from
Aristotle were right to posit three forms of speech (oratio): one which can
be written in letters, a second which can be vocally expressed and a third
which can be connected by thought; one contained in thoughts, the second
by spoken sound, the third by letters.” (2InInter., 29.15-20) The division of
speech and the division of music are both divisions of a genus into its
species. The differentia of different kinds of speed is their form, which is the
same with that of music. There are hierarchies in both divisions. The lowest
kind of speech is the speech that can be written in letters. In other words,
this kind of speech exists in tangible objects. The highest kind of speech can
be connected by thought, the incorporeal form. And the second kind of
speech, which is contained by spoken sound, is the connection between the
extremes. Similar to the hierarchy of speech, the lowest kind of music,
instrumental music, is the music which exists in tangible instruments; and
the highest type of music, cosmic music, is contained by incorporeal form.
132 Bower (1978), p. 44.
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Human music, the middle one in the hierarchy, can connect cosmic music
and instrumental music. The threefold division of kinds of music is so
important in Boethius’ thoughts that I will provide a more detailed
discussion in Section II.2.2.3.
II.2.2.3. Basic Ideas of Music Used in Boethius’ OtherWorks
The basic idea of music which will be applied to Boethius’ other works,
especially Consolatio, is the view on three kinds of music. The lowest kind
of music is instrumental music, which is produced by strings, winds and
percussion. It is not hard to grasp instrumental music, for this kind of music
is the one which we can listen to directly with our ears. Another reason why
instrumental music is understood without effort is that the whole extant
work on music of Boethius deals with instrumental music. As for the two
higher kinds of music, human music and cosmic music, we only have
general introductions to them at the beginning of Boethius’ work. After each
short introduction, Boethius uses similar sentences: one is “these things
ought to be discussed later more studiously”, and the other is “I shall also
speak about these things later” (Musica, I.2.188-189), both of which
together show that human music and cosmic music would be explained in
detail in the later parts of his work. However, unfortunately, at the end of his
extant work on music, Boethius does not come back to the topics of human
music and cosmic music.
Boethius begins to choose Ptolemy as his source of his Book V, but his
extant work ends abruptly at Chapter 19 of Book V with eleven titles of the
remaining chapters, which just finishes the first book of Ptolemy’s. Some
ideas of Ptolemy’s second book are condensed and larded with the
corresponding part in first four books. Inferentially, it is said that if Boethius
had finished his whole work on music, he would have come to the
discussion on human music and cosmic music following the third book of
Ptolemy’ Harmonics. It is possible that Boethius changed some ideas on
Ptolemy’s human music and cosmic music, but from what Boethius applies
in his Consolatio the knowledge of human music and cosmic music in
Boethius is similar to Ptolemy’s. In order to better comprehend applications
of the three kinds of music in his later works, I shall here add more of
Boethius’ ideas on human music and cosmic music with reference to the
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third book of Harmonics.
Human music can be perceived, in Boethius’ point of view, by whoever
penetrates into his own self. As to how to comprehend human music,
Boethius and Ptolemy both resort to a kind of analogy. Low sounds and high
sounds can be brought into one to produce one consonance. Similar to this,
Boethius believes the incorporeal nature of reason can be united with the
body by a certain harmony. And in his third book of Harmonics, Ptolemy
says that the consonances are in accord with the soul. Before explaining this
relationship, a short introduction to the knowledge of the consonances
should be given first.
One consonant sound consists of two unequal sounds, which is based on
the proportional theory in arithmetic. The consonance of the diapason is that
which is made in duple ratio (2:1). The diapente is that which consists of the
ratio sesquialter (3:2). The diatessaron is that which occurs in the ratio
sesquitertian (4:3). Ptolemy connected these three consonances to three first
parts of the soul — the intellectual, aesthetic, and habitual.
“So that that of the diapason accords with the intellectual, for
mostly in each is what is simple, equal, and not different, the
diapente to the aesthetic, and the diatessaron to habitual.”133
For the ratio 3:2 is nearer the ratio 2:1 than the ratio 4:3, which means that
the diapente is nearer the diapason than the diatessaron, thus the
corresponding parts of the soul have the same relation, that is to say, “the
aesthetic is nearer the intellectual than the habitual on account of its sharing
some of the same perception.” Our soul can be divided in another way, viz.
into the rational, emotional, and cupidinous.
“The rational, for the sake of an equality similar to what we have
previously discussed, we equate properly to the diapason, the
emotional somehow approaching it, to the diapente, and the
cupidinous, arranged below it, to the diatessaron.”134
By virtue of these three important consonances, Ptolemy discusses the
133 Ptolemy, Harmonics, III.5: 96.1-3; Solomon (2000).
134 Ptolemy, Harmonics, III.5: 96.28-9; Solomon (2000).
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nature and species of each part of the soul. In addition, harmonic
modulations resemble the circumstantial modulations of souls. For example,
the peaceful conditions make the souls of citizens more tranquil and
equitable, but by contrast, martial conditions cause the souls to be more rash
and contemptuous. In a similar way, the tension in strings or a higher pitch
gives a more arousing sense, and the relaxation in strings or the lower pitch
produce a more depressing sense. Consequently, it can be said that “our
souls evidently experience the same effects as the melody, as if they
recognize the kindred relationship of the ratios of each state and are
modeled by some movements appropriate to individual musical forms.”135
With the help of instrumental music, human music would be understood, but
both music types imitate the highest level of music, cosmic music.
As I discussed above, the motion can cause sounds, so it must be the
case that when a heavenly machine moves extremely fast, there is a sound
that does not penetrate our ears. This kind of sound belongs to cosmic music.
In the Chapter 9-16, Book II of Harmonics, Ptolemy makes an analogy to
examine musical principles in the heavenly bodies or movements. He
discusses how the harmonic consonances and dissonances resemble those in
the Zodiac, how the succession in the notes resembles the longitudinal
movement of the stars, how the stellar movement in altitude compares with
the harmonic genera, that modulations of tonoi are like stellar crossings in
latitude, on the similarity of the tetrachords and the aspects of the sun, by
what first numbers might the fixed notes of the perfect system be compared
to the first spheres in the cosmos, and how the combinations of the planets
should be compared to those of the notes. From these comparisons, it is
remarkable that although we could not hear cosmic music, it does exist.
Boethius believes that the failure of the sound of a moving heavenly
machine to penetrate our ears happens necessarily for many reasons.
Nevertheless, it is impossible that such extremely fast motion of such large
bodies should produce absolutely no sound, especially since the courses of
the stars are joined by such harmonious union that nothing so perfectly
united, nothing so perfectly fitted together, can be realized (Musica,
I.2.187-188). Cosmic music means cosmic harmony, which holds together
135 Ptolemy, Harmonics, III.7: 99.25; Solomon (2000).
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the four elements of earth, air, fire, and water, or the cycle of the four
seasons, in consonance and equilibrium. It leads to the change of season and
determines the movement of the celestial bodies. Cosmic music is
discernible especially in those things that are observed in heaven itself or in
the combination of elements or the diversity of seasons.
Of course one discerns musical principles through instrumental music,
but Boethius suggests his readers to go beyond the music of instruments to
the music of human beings, and even further to the music of the universe.
For likeness attracts, and thus the harmony of proportions in human beings
could help us be attracted to the harmony in the universe which is the pure
proportion or the idea of harmony itself. The three kinds of music and the
process from instrumental music to human music and finally to cosmic
music are very important in Boethius’ thought, which will be fully exhibited
in Boethius’ Consolatio.136
II.3. Conclusion
From the discussion of Boethius’ logic, we can find that applications of
mathematics to logic are mostly examples. Boethius’ logical knowledge
does have an influence on his mathematical works, as has been discussed
above. Although Boethius’ mathematical works are not original, his
application of logic gives his works a distinct character. Even at this level
there is a certain connection between mathematics and logic.
As elementary disciplines, both mathematics and logic play an essential
role in Boethius’ philosophy. When Boethius discusses theological issues, he
employs this elementary knowledge of mathematics and logic, and even
when he faces death, he uses his knowledge of mathematics and logic to
console himself, which will be discussed in Chapter III and Chapter IV,
respectively.
136 Cf. Section IV.2.2.1.
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III. Applications of Basic Logic and
Mathematics in the Theological Tractates
At the beginning of Chapter I, I set out that the fields Boethius mainly
wrote about were mathematics, logic and theology, and that Boethius
regarded all of them as philosophy. From the above chapters, it has become
clear that mathematics and logic are elementary disciplines in Boethius’
curriculum. In the chapter on logic and mathematics,137 I gave a short
introduction into some basic ideas of these two disciplines and I promised to
show how Boethius employs them in his philosophical writing. From this
chapter onwards, I will discuss the applications of basic logic and
mathematics. In this chapter, I first investigate their use in Boethius’
theology.
Boethius’ theological works are usually called Opuscula Sacra.138 The
traditional order of these five theological tractates is the order in which the
tractates were found in the manuscripts and in which they are generally
printed: De trinitate, Utrum pater, Quomodo substantiae, De fide, and
Contra Eutychen et Nestorium. However, this is not the chronological order.
I follow Chadwick in regarding De fide as the first in the chronological
order. Then Boethius wrote the Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, followed by
De trinitate and Utrum pater. The relative position of Quomodo substantiae
remains uncertain.
Why did Boethius see the need to write on Christian theology? In the
age of Boethius, religious and political affairs were often inseparably bound
137 Cf. Section II.1.2, Section II.2.1.3 and Section II.2.2.3.
138 Cf. Bradshaw (2009), “The Opuscula Sacra: Boethius and Theology,” in Marenbon
(ed.), pp. 105-128; Mair (1981), “The Text of the Opuscula Sacra,” in Gibson (ed.), pp.
206-213; Reiss (1982), pp. 58-79. — Thomas Aquinas wrote two works on Boethius’ De
trinitate; cf. Aquinas (1953 and 1987). He also wrote a work on Boethius’ Quomodo
substantiae; cf. Aquinas (2001). McInerny has argued that Thomas Aquinas was a reliable
interpreter of Boethius’ thought (McInerny, 1990 and 1992). On Boethius and Aquinas, cf.
Hall (1992); Hankey (1981).
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up with each other.139 As a consul, therefore, Boethius had to closely follow
the theological developments of his day.140 Among his five theological
tractates, only the Contra Eutychen et Nestorium gives us clear information
on the circumstances of its composition.
“I have been long and anxiously waiting for you to discuss with me
the problem which was raised at the meeting. ... You no doubt
remember how, when the letter was read in the assembly, it was
asserted that the Eutychians confess that Christ is formed from two
natures but does not consist of them ...” (Contra Eutychen et
Nestorium, 1-2; 6-7)
The meeting Boethius refers to took place in the year 512 A.D..141 In 512
A.D., some Eastern European bishops from the Byzantine Empire were
caught between Eutychians and Nestorians, so they appealed to Pope
Symmachus142 for his advice and help. In the same year, an assembly of
high clergy and Roman senators was held, and Boethius and John the
Deacon, to whom Contra Eutychen et Nestorium is addressed, attended this
meeting. At this assembly, the letter that Boethius refers to was read; it
contained a plea for help from the Eastern bishops.143 In this letter, a
formula was submitted, to the effect that Christ both consisted of two
natures and subsisted in two natures (“ex duabus naturis et in duabus
naturis”). Boethius agrees to this formula, and he says that “among
followers of the true Faith He is equally believed to be of two natures and in
two nature” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, 9-12). This formula is different
from that of Eutychians, who “confess that Christ is formed from two
139 Cf. Charanis (1974); Dvornik (1951). — In section II.2.1.3.d above, I noted that
Boethius added chapter 45 of Book II to his work on arithmetic, discussing “which medial
proportions are compared to what things in the state of public affairs”, which shows that
even in the context of arithmetic, Boethius’ interest in state affairs perspires.
140 Cf. Reiss (1982), “The Philosopher as Public Administrator”, “Theological
Controversies”, and “Joining East and West”, pp. 55-58, pp. 64-66, and pp. 76-79.
141 Cf. Chadwick (1981b), pp. 180-190; Marenbon (2003), pp. 68-69.
142 Pope Symmachus (died 19 July 514 A.D.) was the head of the Catholic Church from 22
November 498 to his death in 514. His tenure was marked by a serious schism over who
was legitimately elected pope by the citizens of Rome. Cf. Davis (1989), pp. 43-46 and
Richards (1979), pp. 69-99 on the Symmachan Schism; see Townsend (1937) on councils
held under Pope Symmachus.
143 For the text of the letter, see Mansi (1901-1927) (V.8), pp. 224-225.
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natures but does not consist of them” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, 7-8).
In the letter, the Eastern bishops say that, there is a middle way between
Arius144 and Sabellius145. Since the position of Nestorius resembles that of
Arius, and the position of Eutyches resembles that of Sabellius, therefore,
they in fact asked Pope Symmachus to give them a middle way between
Nestorius and Eutyches. Boethius attaches importance to this issue raised by
the bishops and thus effectively lends them his aid by means of a tractate
against Eutyches and Nestorius. He provides them with the requested
middle way, which is the position of the Christian faith. He says that he was
struck by the novelty of the assertion in the letter that was read in the
assembly. Here we see Boethius’ motivation for writing the Contra
Eutychen et Nestorium, together with its political significance.
After the completion of the treatise Contra Eutychen et Nestorium,
Boethius turns his interests to the doctrine of the Trinity. He wrote two
treatises on the Trinity, in both of which there is no certain information to
show what caused Boethius to focus on this issue. From the study of the
religious and political events at that time, it is clear that issues concerning
the Trinity directly resulted from the Christological debate, especially from
an anti-Nestorian slogan.146 This slogan “unus ex trinitate passus carne
(one of the Trinity suffered in the flesh)” was offered in 519 A.D. by
Scythian monks from the East to protect Christ’s divinity by allowing for his
suffering as a human, i.e. in his passible nature.147 The theology of the
Scythian monks sounded dangerously close to making an intimate link
between Monophysite Christology and a strongly pluralistic doctrine of God,
in antithesis to Nestorius’ tendency to link a diphysite Christology with an
144 Arius (250 or 256-336 A.D.) was an ascetic North African Christian presbyter and priest
in Alexandria, Egypt, of the church of Baucalis; Arianism originated with him. Arius
asserted that the Son of God was a subordinate entity to God the Father. Cf. Anatolios
(2011), p. 44; Williams (2001).
145 Sabellius is a theologian and priest from the 3rd century A.D.; the theological teaching
attributed to him is Sabellianism. In Christianity, Sabellianism (also known as modalism,
modalistic monarchianism, or modal monarchism) is the nontrinitarian belief that the
Heavenly Father, the Resurrected Son and the Holy Spirit are different modes or aspects of
one God, as perceived by the believer, rather than three distinct persons in God Himself. Cf.
Pelikan (1975), pp. 179-181.
146 Cf. Chadwick (1981b), p. 211.
147 Bark (1944), p. 417. Cf. Marenbon (2003), pp. 76-77.
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exclusively unitary doctrine of God.148 This event led to a schism in the
Church, beginning in the year 482 A.D.. In 482 A.D., the Emperor Zeno had
issued a document known as the Henotikon aimed at upholding the Nicene
and Constantinopolitan creeds. The original purpose of the Henotikon was
the reconciliation of the theological differences, so it avoided any definitive
statement on whether Christ had one or two natures. This document
condemned the teachings of Nestorius and Eutyches, but Zeno’s attempt to
appease the parties was not successful, and it was followed by the schism of
the Eastern and Western churches.149 Boethius undoubtedly realized the
importance of the question for the restoration and maintenance of peace
within the Church. Thus, Boethius set down to discuss the doctrine of the
Trinity in his next two theological tractates, De trinitate and Utrum pater.
Besides the three treatises introduced above, Boethius also composed a
tractate named Quomodo substantiae, in which he does not discuss any
point of Christian dogma. Despite this difference in character, these four
works (De trinitate, Utrum pater, Quomodo substantiae, and Contra
Eutychen et Nestorium) adopt a similar method: Boethius uses numerous
applications of basic logic, but very few applications of mathematics, to
throw further light on the issues at stake. In the De fide Boethius makes no
use of basic logic and mathematics at all.150 The De fide is by far the least
studied work of the theological tractates, but this treatise is of great
importance, for it gives a brief sketch of the central doctrines of Christianity
and covers the topics which are discussed in other tractates. For this reason,
I shall investigate De fide first and point out how it prepares for the other
theological treatises. Then I shall discuss the three tractates on Christian
doctrine in chronological order. The last treatise I shall analyze is Quomodo
substantiae, for it looks like a philosophical essay, and is therefore closer to
his last work, the Consolatio, which I shall discuss in Chapter IV.
Mair points out that “the relationship between the logical and
148 Cf. Chadwick (1981b), p. 212.
149 Cf. Baker (1973), pp. 17-22; Bark (1944); Bury (1958), pp. 314-347; Dvornik (1951);
Matthews (1981), “Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius,” in Gibson (ed.), p. 33.
150 The authenticity of De fide has often been discussed by scholars, but now it is generally
accepted as one of Boethius’ theological works. Cf. Bark (1946); Chadwick (1980a).
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theological works of Boethius himself”151 still awaits detailed examination,
which is what I am trying to do now. In this chapter, I will examine
applications of basic logic and mathematics in Boethius’ theological
tractates, and establish the relationship between Boethius’ logical and
mathematical works, and his theological works.
III.1. On the Treatise De Fide Catholica
The title of De fide was lacking from the manuscripts. It is Renatus
Vallinus, in the Leyden edition of Consolatio and the tractates (1656), who
first gave it the title under which it appears in subsequent edition.152
Although the time of writing is uncertain, I agree with Chadwick that De
fide was probably written first.153 The Catholic faith is the basis of
Boethius’ arguments in other theological tractates. For example, at the
beginning of De trinitate, he emphasizes this: “I think that the method of
our inquiry must be borrowed from what is admittedly the surest source of
all truth, namely, the fundamental doctrines of the Catholic faith.” (Utrum
pater, 3-5) In addition, if any argument is against the Catholic faith,
Boethius will come to the conclusion that it is impious, “for the truth of the
faith and the unwontedness of the miracle alike remain, for Catholics,
unshaken.” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, IV.61-62) Secondly, De fide is
composed of a succinct survey of the Bible history and some great truths of
Christianity, especially the doctrines of the Trinity and Christ’s Nature and
Person, which will be tackled in De trinitate, Utrum pater, and Contra
Eutychen et Nestorium. And finally, De fide sets out the range of problems
Boethius’ other theological treatises will deal with, and leaves detailed
explanations for later discussions. For instance, several heresies are
discussed briefly in De fide, but Boethius leaves the refutation of these
heresies for later discussions. Take Arius and the Manichaeans for example.
Boethius introduces Arius and the Manichaeans in De fide. “Arius, for
instance, who, while calling the Son God, declares Him to be vastly inferior
151 Mair (1981), “The Text of the Opuscula Sacra,” in Gibson (ed.), p. 212.
152 Cf. Stewart (1974), p. 139. Also cf. Chadwick (1981b), pp. 175-180; Marenbon (2003),
pp. 66-68.
153 Cf. Chadwick (1981b), p. 180.
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to the Father and of another substance.” (De fide, 32-34) But the error of the
views of the Arians is pointed out by Boethius in Chapter I of De trinitate.
And in the case of the Manichaeans, they refuse the divine nature of Christ,
and also refuse the Virgin birth of the Son. Boethius does not further
consider these points here. He says that “the points will be presented in the
proper place as the proper arrangement demands (De fide, 52-53),” which
may imply the treatise against Eutyches and Nestorius.
Therefore, of the five theological treatises I will discuss De fide first. In
this section, I focus on two important issues discussed in De fide, i.e. issue
of the Trinity and Christology, and point out the relation between these two
issues and Boethius’ other theological treatises.
III.1.1. The Issue of the Trinity
The first important issue is on the Trinity154, upon which Boethius says
the Christian and Catholic religion is chiefly based (De fide, 7-9). This
implies that issue of the Trinity is essential to discuss other Christian issues.
Boethius begins De fide with the sentence that “the Christian Faith is
proclaimed by the authority of the New Testament and of the Old (De fide,
1-2)”. In the Scripture, the word “trinity” is not found, but thoughts of the
Trinity are deemed to emerge from Scripture by theologians. For example,
the verse “Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name
of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit” (Matthew 28:19) is
taken to imply the faith that baptism is administered in God who is Father,
Son, and Holy Spirit, but in his “name” in the singular (not “names”). That
is the required unity-in-diversity. Although three names are provided, no
explanation of the plurality is supplied. This is not a trinity (though trinity is
not excluded) but a triad.155 Phan believes that the understanding of
Christian faith in the Trinity should not be based exclusively on explicitly
triadic formulae such as the verse in Matthew 28:19.156
The word trias was first used in the East by Theophilus of Antioch in
154 Cf. Davis [etc.] (1999/2002); Phan (2011); Wolfson (1956).
155 Cf. Grant (1986), p. 151.
156 Cf. Phan (2011), p. 3.
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the second century. In the West, in the third century, the African theologian
Tertullian157 (160-about 225 A.D.) coined a Latin word trinitas, meaning
“three persons in one substance”.158 At first the word “trinity” only implied
the threefoldness of the Godhead, but later came to include the unity as well.
The doctrine of the Trinitarian unity, says Grant, is not a product of the
earliest Christian period. As a matter of fact, before the end of the second
century, we could not find this doctrine expressed carefully.159 Before
Nicaea160 the main problem was to derive the Trinity of persons from the
unity of God; while after Nicaea the main issue was to achieve the unity of
God from the Trinity of the persons.161
For the inquiry of the Trinitarian doctrine, Boethius writes two tractates,
namely De trinitate and Utrum pater. There are some similar thoughts in
these two tractates, which they have in common with De fide. For example,
when Boethius introduces the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, he says,
“there has existed one divine substance of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit in
such wise that we confess the Father God, the Son God, and the Holy Spirit
God, and yet not three Gods but one God.” (De fide, 9-14) And later in De
trinitate and Utrum pater, the alike thoughts, words, and phrases relating to
the Trinity are repeated.
“I take together all three, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the result is
not three substances but one substance. The one substance of the
Three, then, cannot be separated or divided, nor is it made up of
various parts, combined into one: it is simply one.” (Utrum pater,
12-14)
157 On the introduction on Tertullian, cf. Barnes (1985); Dunn (2004).
158 Cf. Phan (2011), “Developments of the Doctrine of the Trinity,” in Phan (ed.), p. 8.
159 Cf. Grant (1986), p. 156.
160 The First Council of Nicaea took place in 325 A.D.. According to the Nicene Creed, the
belief “in one God, the Father; and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God” implies that
there is unity between them. Cf. Ayres (2004).
161 McKim (1988), p. 19. Barnes summarizes the form of Latin theologies of the Trinity
from Tertullian to Augustine thus: “there is an explanation for how the Three are
understood to be one”; “there is an explanation for how the Three are distinct from one
another”; “there is a statement that the Three are eternally irreducible and unconvertible”;
and “there is a word for what is three in God — that is, person (persona)”. Cf. Barnes
(2011), “Latin Trinitarian Theology,” in Phan (ed.), p. 71.
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“For instance if we say ‘the Father is God, the Son is God, and the
Holy Spirit is God,’ then Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God.”
(Utrum pater, 19-21)
“The belief of this religion concerning the Unity of the Trinity is as
follows: the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God.
Therefore, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are one God, not three
Gods.” (De trinitate, I.6-9)
In De fide, Boethius states that Father, Son, and Holy Spirit have one
divine substance, and they are not the same. However, he does not give the
reason why they are not the same, which is the main topic of De trinitate.162
III.1.2. The Issue of the Nature and Person of Christ
In De fide, Boethius uses a long passage to state Christ’s birth from the
Virgin, his assumption of manhood, and Nestorius’ and Eutyches’ distortions
of the orthodox teaching on the subject. The thought here is wholly
concordant with which Boethius sets forth in his tractate against Eutyches
and Nestorius. It should be said that De fide introduces the vital issue
discussed in Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, which focuses on Christology,
concerning the identity of Jesus Christ, or in other words, relating to Nature
and Person of Christ.
In the first three centuries of the church, formulations of Jesus’ identity
were not explicit.163 Jesus Christ stood in common with other humans in
terms of his human characteristics, but he is also seen as one in whom God
is realized and known in a special and unique way. Jesus Christ is
considered both divine and human at the same time. Two important terms
related to Jesus Christ, ousia and hypostasis, were first used as synonyms,
and Basil of Caesarea (329 or 330-379 A.D.) was the first to attempt to
distinguish explicitly between them: “ousia is related to hypostasis as the
common to the proper; the Son is homoousion with the Father, but the
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit must each be confessed in his own
162 Cf. Section III.3.
163 Cf. McKim (1988), p. 25.
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hypostasis.”164 However, Basil was concerned with the words in a
Trinitarian content rather than in a Christological context.
The terminology of Christ “two substances or natures in one person”
was coined by Tertullian. He was the first theologian to deal with the issue
of Christ’s two natures, using the term “substance”. He believes that both
substances, divine and human, belong to the same person165, excluding any
division in God. In Christ, the divinity and humanity maintain their own
distinctive qualities and activities.166 Similar with Basil, Tertullian discusses
the issue on “two natures, one person” by citing the Psalms and the apostle,
so he did not have an explicit idea about nature and person of Christ from
the Christological perspective. As a result, he did not give an exposition of
what unity of Person in Christ means and how two natures united in one
person. The point is mainly significant for him in the discussion on the two
natures or the two substances. A new christological significance of
discussions on one person finally appeared in the writings of Augustine in
411A.D..167
Concerning Christology, there are two important heresies, which are
refuted by Boethius in his fifth tractate, namely Nestorius and Eutyches.
Nestorius was a Syrian monk who became patriarch of Constantinople from
428 A.D. and was deposed in 431 A.D.. He believes that the divine and
human in Christ maintain their own properties. According to him, Nature
and Person always exist side by side: Person could not exist without Nature,
and when Nature exists, there must be Person. Therefore, for Nestorius,
there are two persons with their respective natures in Christ.168 In the year
444 A.D., in an attempt to stop a new outbreak of Nestorianism, Eutyches,
an aged monk from Constantinople began teaching a subtle variation on the
164 Davis [etc.] (1999/2002), pp. 103-107.
165 Tertullian believes “there are two natures present in Christ Jesus, a divine and a
human.” Cf. Tertullian, Against Praxeas, 29; Souter (1920).
166 Tertullian sums all up these ideas in a scriptural quotation: “Learn, therefore, with
Nicodemus that ‘what is born in flesh is flesh, and what is from spirit is spirit (John III.6).’
Neither does flesh become spirit nor does spirit become flesh. However, they can, to be sure,
be present in one. Of these Jesus consisted, as man, of flesh, as God, of spirit.” Cf.
Tertullian, Against Praxeas, 27; Souter (1920).
167 Cf. Grillmeier (1975), pp. 124-125, p. 129, and p. 131.
168 Cf. Wolfson (1956), p. 451-463.
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traditional Christology. Eutyches denied that the human nature of Christ was
consubstantial with ours, and held that there had been two natures before the
Incarnation, but after the Incarnation, the human nature of Christ was
completely absorbed by his divine nature. So this leaves Christ with a single,
divine nature.169 In the treatise Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, Boethius
analyses the errors of Nestorius and Eutyches, and interprets orthodox
Christology.
III.1.3. Conclusion
From the analysis of two important issues in De fide, it is clear that De
fide is closely related to Boethius’ other theological tractates. It is a
summary of Christian doctrine, and it can also be regarded as the prologue
of De trinitate, Utrum pater, and Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, introducing
issues briefly and leaving detailed explanations for later discussions. From
De fide, we can best understand the outlook of Boethius’ theological works,
so it may well be written first. Next, I will discuss how Boethius discusses
the two issues of the Trinity and Christology in detail using his theory of
basic logic and mathematics.
III.2. On Christology —Contra Eutychen et Nestorium
The motivation of the treatise Contra Eutychen et Nestorium170 is the
assembly described in the preface to Chapter III. The distinction between
unions formed from two natures and unions that consist in two natures, in
Boethius’ perspective, had not been solved, and Boethius believed no one
really touched the edge of it. In this situation, he decided to inquire the issue
in order to solve it. The goal of this treatise, as Boethius says (Contra
Eutychen et Nestorium, Pref. 54-58), is to clear away the extreme and
self-contradictory errors of Nestorius and Eutyches, and then by God’s help,
to set forth the middle way of the Catholic faith, in response to the request
169 Cf. Mair (1981), “The Text of the Opuscula Sacra,” in Gibson (ed.), p. 207.
170 Cf. Marenbon (2003), “Against Eutyches and Nestorius: The Argument,” pp. 70-76.
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of the Eastern bishops.171
While refuting Nestorius and Eutyches, Boethius employs basic logic,
especially the theory of definition, to demonstrate where and how these two
heresies are at fault. Boethius is not the first to use this method in this
context, but by his use of the method he clarifies the issue of Christology
considerably, and develops the application of logic to theology.
III.2.1. Interpreting Terms “Nature” and “Person”
The terms “nature” and “person” were first used as synonyms. Even
though later the distinction between these two terms was discussed, most
people are concerned with these terms in a Trinitarian context. For instance,
Pope Leo I (440-461 A.D.) takes over the distinction between Person and
Nature from the Latin tradition for the theology of the Trinity. His primary
interest was not in terminology and its definition, but in the theological
contents which he wanted to combine by means of it.172 Unlike him,
Boethius begins the interpretation of these two terms with their definitions,
for in Boethius’ logical works, definition is very important. The discussion
of any problem begins from the definition of terms. Nature and Person are
two important terms to understand the identity of Christ.173 And the dispute
in Nestorius and Eutyches also centers on these two terms. Thus, the correct
interpretation of these two terms is indispensable. Boethius’ method in
opting for definitions is in line with the thoughts in his logical works.
III.2.1.1. Definition of Nature
The definition of Nature174 had been discussed a lot before Boethius. In
his works, Boethius does not give a new definition of this term, but he lists
other people’s opinions, analyzes them, and finally chooses the best one.
Boethius lists four definitions of Nature belonging to different types of
definition, which are stated in Boethius’ commentary on Cicero’s Topics
171 Cf. the preface to Chapter III above.
172 Cf. Grillmeier (1987), pp. 159-160.
173 Cf. Chadwick (1981b), “Nature and Person”, pp. 190-202.
174 Cf. Catholic Encyclopedia on the definition of nature;
http://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=8348.
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(C.Topica, 323/1096)175. The first kind of definition is that where accidents
are gathered together into one thing and one thing is produced from them; it
is a sort of enumeration of parts located not in substance but in a gathering
together of accidents. This sort of definition is called a description. In this
sense, Boethius lists the first definition of Nature, which is “Nature belongs
to those things which, since they exist, can in some measure be apprehended
by the mind.” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, I.8-10) This definition
describes all things, substantial or accidental.
The second kind of definition is at play if someone makes a definition
by presenting species rather than members in the definition; this is called a
definition from the division of species. In this sense, Boethius lists a
definition of Nature that runs “Nature is either that which can act or that
which can be acted upon.” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, I.25-26) This
definition refers to corporeal substances or incorporeal substances.
The third kind of definition is that when a definition is constructed of
genus and differentiae, we unfold substantial parts. This is called definition
in the strict sense of the term. In this sense, Boethius lists two definitions of
Nature: one is “Nature is the principle of movement properly inherent in and
not accidentally attached to bodies” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium,
I.41-42); the other is “Nature is the specific difference that gives form to
anything” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, I.57-58).
Of these four definitions of Nature, it is the last one Boethius chooses to
use in his argument.176 In the last definition, Nature is the species of the
genus “difference”, and it differs from other kinds of difference with
differentiae “specific” and “that gives form to anything”. The same specific
differences could not apply to both God and man, so Boethius assures that
“both Catholics and Nestorians firmly hold that there are in Christ two
natures of the kind laid down in our last definition” (Contra Eutychen et
Nestorium, I.58-63).
Thanks to the last definition, it can be understood that Christ has two
175 Cf. Section II.1.2.2.
176 The context of the last definition is the system of genera and species of Aristotle’s
Categories which is put forward by Porphyry in his Isagoge. Cf. Marenbon (2003), p. 70.
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natures. In other words, Christ has two specific differences: the specific
difference for man and the specific difference for God. What exactly are the
specific differences for God and man? This could be clear from the
Porphyrian Tree of Contra Eutychen et Nestorium in Section III.2.1.2 (see
Diagram III).
In the Porphyrian Tree of Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, man is
corporeal, living, sensitive, and rational substance; God is incorporeal,
immutable and impassible, and rational substance. There seems to be one
specific difference in common, namely “rational substance” which both God
and man possess. If so, it would be contradictory to what Boethius believes
that “the same specific differences cannot apply to God and man”. Actually,
the contradiction does not exist, for the term “rational substance” is not used
univocally. In this term, the two words — “rational” and “substance” — are
both equivocal. In the case of “rational”, God falls under the genus
“incorporeal substance”, while man falls under the genus “corporeal
substance”, thus rationality for God and for man does not have the same
meaning. As for the word “substance”, as Boethius says, substance is
subject to accidents (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, III.48-49). God is the
origin of all things, so substance could not be predicated of Him. When
Boethius applies Person to God, we must understand that God is not a
substance in the same way as a man is a substance. In De trinitate, Boethius
calls the substance of God “supersubstantial” (De trinitate, IV.14-16).
Consequently, the specific differences applied to God and man are not same.
In Christ, there are two kinds of specific differences, that is, there are two
natures in Christ.
III.2.1.2. Definition of Person
The definition of Nature is given first, because “Person cannot be
predicated apart from Nature.” Here Boethius returns briefly to the second
definition of Nature: Natures are either substances or accidents. However, a
person cannot come into being among accidents, thus Person is identified as
something predicated of Nature in the sense of substance, that is “Person is
properly applied to substances.” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, II.13-18)
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Nevertheless, this is not the definition of Person,177 because the term
“substance” needs to be explained more clearly.
There are many types of substances, so to which substance is the term
“person” properly applied? Boethius again uses the Porphyrian Tree to draw
the distinction between substances (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, II.18-28).
Following Boethius’ description, I illustrate the Porphyrian Tree as follows.
(See Diagram III)
Diagram III: Porphyrian Tree of Contra Eutychen et Nestorium
Substances
Corporeal Incorporeal
Living Non-living Rational Irrational
Sensitive Insensitive
Rational Irrational mutable&passible immutable&impassible by nature
(man) (animals) (angels,human soul) (God)
The Porphyrian Tree here is similar to what Boethius describes in his
commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge. (2InIsag., 103A-104D) (See Diagram
IV)













177 The classic definition of person is that given by Boethius. Cf. Catholic Encyclopedia on
definition of person; http://www.catholic.org/encyclopedia/view.php?id=9193.
178 Diagram IV is from Boethius’ 2InIsag. by Brandt (1906), p. 209.
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From this kind of division of substances both in Boethius’ logical works and
in his theological works, it is clearly shown that “Person cannot be affirmed
of bodies which have no life, nor yet of living things which lack sense, nor
finally of that which is bereft of mind and reason.” (Contra Eutychen et
Nestorium, II.28-35) Hence, Person only applies to man, God, and angels,
who all belong to rational beings. Moreover, some substances are universal,
and others are particular. From the Porphyrian tree, we can also find that
individual persons, such as Plato, Cato, and Cicero, are located under homo,
the particular. In any case, it is impossible that Person can be applied to
universals, thus, Person is particular and individual (Contra Eutychen et
Nestorium, 47-49).179
The idea can be found early in Boethius’ commentary on Aristotle’s
Categories. In the third book of his commentary, Boethius makes a
distinction between Socrates and Plato, saying that they “do not differ
according to the species of humanity, but differ only by the quality of person
of their own.” (In Categorias, 241D) This distinction implies that the term
“person” is individual rather than universal substance.
From the Porphyrian Tree, it is easy to point out that the term “person”
is properly applied to an individual substance of a rational nature. However,
it is not enough to understand this definition of Person. Boethius deems the
term “person” needs a further exposition. In order to expound the term
“person”, he discusses the etymology of the word “person”. Boethius
observes that it is good to go back to the Greeks for a clear understanding of
this conception, for it originated with them, while the Latins only know it
through translation.
According to Boethius, the Greeks sometimes describe the same object
using many synonyms for which the spellings are totally different.
Additionally, they sometimes use the same word to refer to different objects,
so the same word has different significations. Nevertheless, the Latins may
not understand these, thus they are likely to make mistakes. The second
situation is analogous to the division of a spoken sound into its
significations, which Boethius discusses in Divisio.
179 Cf. Koterski (2004) and Marshall (1950).
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“Division of a spoken sound into its proper significations occurs
whenever a single spoken sound is revealed as signifying more than
one thing and its plurality of signification is shown.” (Divisio,
877d)
The Greek term prosopon has at least two meanings. The first one is “mask”,
and the Latin persona is derived from this. This may lead to the error of
Sabellianism.180 God was said to have three “faces” or “masks”.181
Modalists note that the only number ascribed to God in the Holy Bible is
One and that there is no inherent threeness ascribed to God explicitly in the
Scripture. Tertullian and Augustine both believed that one should guard
against interpreting persona as mask, and Boethius follows them. Moreover,
the Greeks also use the term prosopon and the term hypostasis as a synonym.
As a matter of fact, the definition of Person should be corresponds to this
word. “Greece with its richer vocabulary gives the name ὑπóστασις to the
individual subsistence.” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, III.23-25)
Consequently, the term “person” should be defined as “the individual
substance of a rational nature.” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, III.4-5)
III.2.1.3. A Problem of Boethius’ Definition of Person
When coining the terminology of Christ as “two substances or natures
in one person”, Tertullian used substantia and persona as equivalents of
ousia and prosopon (or hypostasis) respectively.182 Different from the
translation of Tertullian, when tracing the etymology of terms “nature” and
“person”, Boethius equals the term “nature” to ousia (essence) and the term
“person” to hypostasis. In the view of Boethius, the Greek word ὑπóστασις
is translated to substantia, and πρόσωπον to persona.
“But the Greeks called individual substances ὑποστάσεις because
they underlie the rest and offer support and substrate to what are
called accidents; and we in our term call them ‘substances’ as being
substrate — ὑποστάσεις, and since they also term the same
substances πρόσωπα, we too may call them ‘persons’.” (Contra
180 Cf. the preface to this chapter.
181 Cf. Lossky (1976), pp. 51-55.
182 Cf. McManners (2001), pp. 49-50.
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Eutychen et Nestorium, III.62-68)
By such translation, the word “substance” is identical to the word “person”,
which leads Boethius in certain troubles. At the end of Chapter III in Contra
Eutychen et Nestorium, Boethius tries to apply the definition of Person he
gives to the doctrine of the Trinity, saying that “And indeed, following this
use, men have spoken of One essence, three substances and three persons of
the Godhead.” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, III.93-95) However, this
application of substances and persons to God is not very successful. In
Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, Boethius equals the word “substance” with
the word “person”, so there is no problem to say “three substances and three
persons of the Godhead”. However, later in Utrum pater, Boethius says, “I
take together all three, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the result is not three
substances but one substance. The one substance of the Three, then, cannot
be separated or divided, nor is it made up of various parts, combined into
one: it is simply one.” (Utrum pater, 9-14) So the first problem is that
Boethius’ views in Contra Eutychen et Nestorium and in Utrum pater are
contradictory. Another problem is that “One essence, three substances and
three persons of the Godhead” is not quite in line with the teaching of the
Church. Augustine also points out this problem in his De trinitate
mentioning that “Our Greek friends have spoken of one essence, three
substances; but the Latins of one essence or substance, three persons.”183
Boethius realizes the difficulty, but he does not want to abandon his
definition of Person. He insists: “For did not the language of the Church
forbid us to say three substances in speaking of God, substance might seem
a right term to apply to Him.” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, III.98-101)
Even though, later he has to say that “all I have said so far has been for the
purpose of marking the difference between the terms ‘nature’ and ‘person’.
The exact terms that should be applied in each case must be left to the
decision of ecclesiastical usage.” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, IV.1-5)
This confirms that Boethius writes his theological treatises as a philosopher
but not as a theologian. Moreover, the connection between Boethius’ own
logical works and theological works is also shown, and will become much
clearer in our later discussions.
183 Augustine, On the Holy Trinity, VII.7; Schaff (1887).
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Although there is a flaw in the definition of the term “person”, the
distinction between Nature and Person is sufficient to refute the heresies.
Boethius goes on to refute Nestorius and Eutyches.
III.2.2. Refutations of Nestorius and Eutyches
The inability to distinguish between terms “nature” and “person”, in
Boethius’ judgment, results in the errors of Nestorius and Eutyches. The
forms of the reasoning of Nestorius and Eutyches are similar, which could
be summaries as follows.
Nestorius may argue:
Person may be applied to every Nature.
There are in Christ two natures.
Therefore, there are likewise two persons.
Eutyches may argue:
Nature may be applied to every Person.
There is only one person in Christ.
Therefore, Nature in Christ should be regarded as single.
From these two statements above, we can see that the first proposition in
each of the syllogisms has the same meaning, that is, Person and Nature are
in the relationship of one-to-one correspondence. Accordingly, the errors of
both Nestorius and Eutyches spring from the same source. Nestorius deems
if Person were doubled, there could be a double Nature, so Nestorius
confesses the double Nature in Christ. Just like Nestorius, Eutyches reckons
that if Person was not double, Nature was not double, and since he did not
confess a double Person, he thought it is a necessary consequence that
Nature should be regarded as single. (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium,
V.8-16)
The refutation of Nestorius is easier than the refutation of Eutyches, so
Boethius first points out the errors of Nestorius and refutes him.
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III.2.2.1. Refuting Nestorius
Boethius has confidence in definitions of Nature and Person he gives
above. He believes these definitions are enough to prove Nestorius wrong
(Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, IV.14-15). According to the definition of
Person Boethius gives, a Person is an individual substance of a rational
nature, which implies that the presence of a person entails the presence of a
nature. The reverse of this statement is not true. It is not necessary that the
presence of a nature involves the presence of a person. Hence, although
Nestorius rightly holds Christ’s Nature to be double, it is not inevitable to
come to the conclusion that in Christ Person is twofold.
In Boethius’ opinion, the name of one thing denotes its singular number,
a unity. And because being and unity are convertible terms, what is not one
cannot be, and whatever is one, can be. According to Nestorius, if there
were two persons, it would mean that there were two individual substances,
so Christ would not be one, that is to say, Christ would not exist. Or, from
two Persons it could be argued that there are two Christs, which is “nothing
else than madness of a distraught brain” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium,
IV.45-46). The same conclusion can be derived from the nature of definition,
which Boethius discusses in his In Ciceronis Topica.
“Only a definition, which is produced by a phrase, unfolds what a
thing is; a genus and the rest, which are expressed for the most part
by a single name, do not unfold what a thing is. ... A definition does
not unfold what it defines with respect to quality or quantity or any
of the other categories. Rather, the definition shows what the thing
defined is; that is, it shows its substance.” (C.Topica, 319/1091)
From the nature of definition, we could know that one definition of a thing
shows that it has one substance. It is the same with the definition of Christ.
Then the very name of Christ, which is defined, shows that Christ has one
substance. Two different substances could not be covered by the same
definition. Nestorius himself also admits that he could not apply the
substance of one definition to both his Christs. Boethius argues that
Nestorius wrongly uses the same name for two utterly different natures.
“For if the substance of God is different from that of man, and the one name
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of Christ applies to both, and the combination of different substances is not
believed to have formed one person, the name of Christ is equivocal and
cannot be comprised in one definition.” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium,
IV.51-59) Moreover, in his Divisio Boethius defines a genus as that “which
is predicated of a number of specifically different things in respect of what it
is” (Divisio, 880a). Accordingly, two different things could be united in one
genus, but there are some conditions. “Men indeed and oxen are united in
one animal nature, for by genus they have a common substance and the
same nature in the collection which forms the universal.” (Contra Eutychen
et Nestorium, IV.106-109) If the distinction of persons continues under a
difference in nature, God and man will be fundamentally different at all
points. Then the salvation has not been brought to us, and the human race
has not been saved. In other words, “the birth of Christ has brought us no
salvation, the writings of all the prophets have but beguiled the people that
believed in them, contempt is poured upon the authority of the whole Old
Testament which promised to the world salvation by the birth of Christ.”
(Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, IV.112-118) This is an impious conclusion.
In order to confute the thoughts of Nestorius, Boethius sets up some
assumptions and raises some questions about Nestorian opinions, and then
all of these lead to the impious conclusion which is against the Catholic
faith. “For the truth of the faith and the unwontedness of the miracle alike
remain, for Catholics, unshaken.” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, IV.61-62)
Boethius admits that his method is only one of many strong weapons to
wound and demolish the Nestorian view, but he is content with this. Then he
proceeds to refute Eutyches.
III.2.2.2. Refuting Eutyches
Eutyches rightly believes the Person of Christ to be single, but
impiously professes that the Nature of Christ is also single. As stated above,
the definition of Nature is “Nature is the specific difference that gives form
to anything.” It is clear that divine nature is different from human nature.
And Eutyches also seems to confess this, so he declares his belief to be “two
Natures in Christ before the union and only one after the union” (Contra
Eutychen et Nestorium, V.23-25). The refutation of Eutyches is more
Chapter III. Application of Mathematics and Basic Logic to Theological Tractates
- 87 -
complicated.
Due to the vagueness of what Eutyches declares, Boethius puts forward
some suppositions and begins his arguments on the basis of these
suppositions.
The union which Eutyches holds may take place:
(a) either at the moment of conception;
(b) or at the moment of resurrection — in one of the following
two ways:
(b1) Christ was conceived and did not assume a body from the
Virgin Mary;
(b2) Christ did assume a body from the Virgin Mary.
The arguments based on (a) and (b1) suggest the falsehood of the
Godhead. In these arguments, no basic logic or mathematics is applied.
Concerning the argument based on (b2), Boethius believes if Christ received
the body from Mary, and later the human and divine nature united and did
not continue, then this situation may have happened in one of three ways
(Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, VI.3-8):
(b2.1) “Godhead was translated into manhood”
(b2.2) “manhood was translated into Godhead”
(b2.3) “both were so modified and mingled that neither substance
kept its proper form”
Boethius demolishes these three ways by means of logic.
According to the Porphyrian Tree of Contra Eutychen et Nestorium in
Section III.2.1.2 (See Diagram III), God falls under the genus “incorporeal”,
and of manhood, which consists of body and soul, human body falls under
the genus “corporeal” and human soul falls under the genus “incorporeal”.
Therefore, the first two ways (b2.1-2) both concern transformations between
the incorporeal and the corporeal. In the first commentary on Porphyry’s
Isagoge, Boethius pays emphatic attention to the relationship of the
incorporeal and the corporeal. In Boethius’ point of view, the corporeal
could not be the genus of those things that are placed under the incorporeal
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substances; and nothing corporeal in genus can fall under an incorporeal
species, neither can a corporeal substance be changed into an incorporeal
(1InIsag., 20A). There is a sharp disjunction between the corporeal and the
incorporeal. Thus, Boethius says, “Only those things can be interchanged
and transformed which possess the common substrate of the same matter,
nor can all these so behave, but only those which can act upon and be acted
on by each other.” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, VI.24-27) But
incorporeal things lack matter, so the corporeal and the incorporeal do not
share any common underlying matter, therefore, they cannot be
interchanged and transformed.
Accordingly, it is not possible for God, as a species of the incorporeal,
and human body, as a species of the corporeal, to be changed into each other.
Moreover, as a species of the incorporeal, God and human soul both lack
matter, so they could not be translated into each other. In a word, it is
irrational and also impious to say that God could be transformed into man;
and it is impossible for man to be translated into God. “If neither body nor
soul can be turned into Godhead, it could not possibly happen that manhood
should be transformed into God.” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, VI.75-77)
Therefore, the first two ways are demolished.
As regards the third way (b2.3), Boethius takes an example of the
mixture of honey and water.
“When honey is mixed with water neither remains, but the one
thing being spoilt by conjunction with the other produces a certain
third thing, so that third thing which is produced by the
combination of honey and water is said to consist of both, but not
in both.” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, 87-91)
This example is similar to the mixture of wine and water used by Aristotle
for illustrating what a mixture is. In On Generation and Corruption,
Aristotle maintains that “if mixture has taken place, the compound must be
uniform — any part of such a compound being the same as the whole.”184
Mixture is a union of different constituents, and each constituent in this
union, Aristotle says, changes out of its own nature towards a third property,
184 Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, 328a9-11; Barnes (1984a).
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yet neither becomes the other, but both become that which is intermediate
and common.185 The third property is a compromise between the properties
of the constituents. If Eutychians says that “Christ consists of two natures,
but not in two natures” in this sense of union, a mixture, it means that God
and man were mixed to become “a third property”. According to Aristotle,
such “third property” is different from the properties of the constituents, and
in case of Eutychians, Christ will be different from the properties of both
God and man. This conclusion is absolutely impossible. Consequently, the
third way, “both God and man were so modified and mingled that neither
substance kept its proper form” is demolished.
All in all, the upshot of Boethius’ reasoning is that “no one of the three
ways is a possibility” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, VI.108-109). In other
words, Godhead could not be translated into manhood, nor could manhood
be translated into Godhead, nor were both so modified and mingled that
neither substance kept its proper form. Thus, the doctrine of the Eutychians
is incorrect.
III.2.3. The Middle Way of the Catholic Faith
In the letter of the year 512, the Eastern bishops requested from Pope
Symmachus a middle way between Nestorius and Eutyches. After clearing
away the self-contradictory errors of Nestorius and Eutyches, Boethius sets
forth the middle way of the Catholic faith.
From the refutations of Nestorius and Eutyches, it is clear that the terms
“person” and “nature” are at the heart of the debate. Boethius lists four
possible combinations of Nature and Person in Christ (Contra Eutychen et
Nestorium, VII.80-93). In Christ, there are (1) two natures and two persons
(as Nestorius says); (2) one nature and one person (as Eutyches says); (3)
two natures and one person (as the Catholic faith holds); (4) one nature and
two persons, which is manifestly absurd. The errors of (1) and (2) have
185 Aristotle, On Generation and Corruption, 328a29-31; Barnes (1984a). Aristotle also
describes a different situation in which “a great quantity (or a large bulk) of one of these
materials be brought together with a liter (or with a small piece) of another.” If so, “the
effect produced is not mixture, but increase of the dominant”: a small amount of wine in the
ocean will turn into water.
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already discussed by Boethius, and for (4), he only says that “there has
never been anyone so mad as to believe that His Nature was single but His
Person double.” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, VII.90-91) Hence (3) is the
only one left, and this is what the Catholic faith affirms, that is “Nature is
double, but the Person is one.”
The question arises how, in accordance with the affirmation of the
Catholic faith, Christ consists as one person in and of both natures. Boethius
confesses that the term “to consist of two natures” is equivocal. There are
two ways to interpret this. One way is the way Eutyches adopts — which
has been proven false. The other way is a union consisting of two natures in
which the two natures continue to exist without changing into each other
(Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, VII.12-15). This is the way to interpret the
Catholic faith. Boethius illustrates this using an example of a crown that is
composed of gold and gems. Just like a crown consisting of gold and gems,
Christ consists of God and man. In a crown, the gold and the gems continue
to exist without surrendering their proper forms (Contra Eutychen et
Nestorium, VII.16-20). And it is the same with Christ: neither is God
converted into man nor is man turned into God, but both natures continue to
exist in Christ, and they both remain perfect, as the Catholic faith confesses.
Therefore, that “Christ consists both in and of the two natures” is to be
interpreted thus: “in the two because both continue, of the two because the
One Person of Christ is formed by the union of the two continuing natures.”
(Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, VII.29-30)
The Eastern bishops requested the middle way, and their reason was
that there was a middle way between Arius and Sabellius, so in imitation of
them, there should be a middle way between Nestorius and Eutyches.
Boethius regards the Catholic faith as the middle between two false
extremes, because he says it is “just as virtues also hold a middle place”
(Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, VII.74-76). The similar thought has already
been stated early in Boethius’ arithmetical works, and was introduced in
Section II.2.1.3.a. When Boethius discusses the property of “perfect
number”, he makes an analogy. He says imperfect number and
superabundant number are just like two unequal and intemperate elements,
and between these two kinds of numbers, we can put a number “which holds
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the middle place between the extremes like on who seeks virtue”. And this
number that maintains the place of the middle is called perfect number.186
Similarly, as the virtues we seek hold a middle place, the Catholic faith also
holds the middle place, and it is the right way.
In the treatise against Eutyches and Nestorius, Boethius makes an
exposition of his orthodox thoughts of Christology, that is to say, Christ is
one Person with two Natures. With the definitions of Nature and Person he
establishes, Boethius confutes the errors of Eutyches and Nestorius, and he
succinctly interprets the union of two natures in Christ. Boethius relies on
his logical ability to solve the question of the Natures and Person of Christ.
The discussion of these topics is not new, but Boethius, unlike the
Church Fathers before him, adopts the knowledge of basic logic to make
these Christian issues much more articulate and lucid. In Contra Eutychen et
Nestorium there are more connections to Boethius’ own logical works,
especially his theory of definition and his commentaries on Porphyry’s
Isagoge, and there are also some similar thoughts in Contra Eutychen et
Nestorium and his work on arithmetic.
The solution to the question of Christology is clearly stated by Boethius.
Christ is One God with two natures, divine nature and human nature. And
Boethius believes that “quaternity is not added to the Trinity by the addition
of human nature to perfect Godhead, but that one and the same Person
completes the number of the Trinity.” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium,
VII.51-55) Here Boethius just mentions the Trinitarian question, but later he
makes a further elaboration about that. Thus, in the following section, I will
go on to introduce applications of basic logic and mathematics in Boethius’
works on the Trinity.
186 Arithmetica I.19. See Section II.2.1.3.a. In that section, I also explain that “mean” in the
notion “virtue is the mean” used by Aristotle is not a point exactly in the middle, but a
stretch of the continuum around the middle. And here the meaning of “Catholic faith as the
middle between two false extremes” is similar to what Aristotle says “the third holds the
middle, which is the right, position.” Cf. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 1116a7; Barnes
(1984b).
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III.3. On the Trinity — De Trinitate & Utrum Pater et
Filius et Spiritus Sanctus de Divinitate Substantialiter
Praedicentur
In De fide Boethius says that the Trinity became the orthodox teaching
in the Church. In Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, he also touches on this
topic, but he does not penetrate into this question. The main reason is that
Boethius’ research of theological issues is not due to systematic theological
study, but arises out of the political purpose mentioned in the preface to
Chapter III.
The early Church Fathers only restated basic principles of Christianity
in the manner of faith, so they did not truly argue why the Trinity is one God,
not three. They wanted to translate the doctrines to the common people in
order to convince them. In this way, the early Church Fathers were unable to
confute various heresies. For example, from the overview the Greek
patristic theology of the Trinity one can see that there are different acts in
this period, but the continuous development of these acts has its own basis
in biblical premises. Specifically, these acts mediate through the Church’s
lived experience.187 Unlike them, Boethius thinks people who cast their
thoughts before the common herd “would seem to bring discredit on the
study of divinity” (De trinitate, 12-16), so he writes only to Symmachus and
himself. Boethius believes that logic and reason must be used to make a
reinterpretation of the theological issues including issue of the Trinity.188
The interpretation of the Trinity, that is, God’s identity, could be divided
into two questions. One is the unity in God, and the other is the diversity in
God. Boethius is also concerned with these two questions and examines the
doctrine of the Trinity in De trinitate189 and Utrum pater. Boethius admits
that the truth about the Trinity, indeed, has already been established by
187 Cf. McGruckin (2011), “The Trinity in the Greek Fathers,” in Phan (ed.), p. 49.
188 Cf. Chadwick (1981b), pp. 211-222; Marenbon (2003), pp. 79-87.
189 Cf. Marenbon (1982) examines the discussion by three medieval scholars of a passage
from Boethius’ De trinitate.
Chapter III. Application of Mathematics and Basic Logic to Theological Tractates
- 93 -
Augustine,190 as I will set out in this section. Especially, Utrum pater comes
near to Augustine’s De trinitate, but it is a short treatise and does not make a
further argument on the Trinity, which is continued in Chapter V of
Boethius’ De trinitate. Boethius hopes to throw some further light on this
argument by means of his logical training. He wants to set forth the problem
about the One God in logical order and cast it into literary form (De trinitate,
1-5). In this section, I will introduce how Boethius applies basic logic and
mathematics to issue of the Trinity in his two treatises. This section is
divided into two parts: one deals with the unity in God, which is discussed
in De trinitate; the other part deals with the diversity in God, which is
discussed in both De trinitate and Utrum pater.
III.3.1. The Unity in God
Boethius starts his discussions with the Christian faith on the Trinity,
which is “the Father is God, the Son is God, the Holy Spirit is God” (De
trinitate, I.7-8). The statement of the Trinitarian orthodoxy in the formula of
one ousia and three hypostaseis was finally fixed by the Cappadocian
Settlement.191 The Cappadocian Settlement was raised to refute Arian
teaching. In agreement with the tradition, Boethius’ route to examine the
doctrine of the Trinity also takes it starting point from the refutation of Arian
views.
Generally speaking, the pastoral task of clerics is to express the truths
of faith in ways that their contemporaries could understand. The theologians
who were busy with this task but laid great stress only on one aspect rather
the whole of the Christian faith, are condemned as heresiarchs.192 Arius is
someone who advocates the oneness of God to the detriment of the divinity
of the Son. The Arians ascribe grades to Persons, and so they break up the
Unity of the Trinity and convert it into Plurality (De trinitate, 12-13).
Boethius sets forth the error of Arianism on account of their lack of
190 Bradshaw gives an explanation between Boethius’ De trinitate and Augustine’s writings;
cf. Bradshaw (2009), “The Opuscula Sacra: Boethius and Theology,” in Marenbon (ed.), pp.
109-115. And Marenbon discusses Utrum pater and Augustine’s On the Trinity; cf.
Marenbon (2003), pp. 77-79.
191 Cf. Davis [etc.] (1999/2002), pp. 99-121; Prestige (1952), p. 233.
192 Cf. Phan (2011), p. 5.
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knowledge of difference, and demolishes Arianism on account of their
theory of form. From these two respects, Boethius refutes Arianism,
pointing out that the plurality in God is different from the plurality in men.
If, however, there are three persons, how does the repetition of three persons
in God not produce a plurality of number? Boethius tackles this question by
means of a distinction between two kinds of number.
III.3.1.1. Arguing from Knowledge of Difference
The Arians covert the unity in God to plurality, which, Boethius informs
us, is caused by difference or otherness, for “the essence of plurality is
otherness” (De trinitate, I.13-14). Thus, Boethius begins his arguments from
basic knowledge of sameness and otherness.
Sameness and otherness are the formal principles of the universe, which
is elaborated by Nicomachus in Introduction to Arithmetic.193 Nicomachus
points out that when these two principles enter into the composition of
things, sameness assures the things to preserve their identity, and to continue
being in the same manner, and otherness causes things to “change from their
original forms and assume others.”194 Although in the Arithmetica Boethius
omits the discussion of this principle, he has the same conviction, as I
mentioned in Section II.2.1.3.a. Boethius believes that otherness inheres in
the number two and the whole even series, and that otherness is the essence
of plurality. Therefore, it is impossible to understand plurality apart from
otherness (De trinitate, I.14-15).
Concerning sameness, Boethius adopts most of Aristotle’s point of view.
Aristotle states in his Topics,
“Sameness would be generally regarded as falling, roughly
speaking, into three divisions. We generally apply the term
numerically or specifically or generically — numerically in cases
where there is more than one name but only one thing; specifically,
where there is more than one thing, but they present no differences
in respect of their species. Similarly, too, those things are called
193 Cf. Nicomachus, Introduction to Arithmetic, II.17.1; 18.1 and 4; 19.1 and 20.2; D’Oog
(1938).
194 D’Ooge (1938), p. 99.
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generically the same which fall under the same genus.”195
Since “otherness”, or in other word “difference”, is the necessary correlative
of “sameness”, “difference” is similarly expressed in these three ways: by
genus, species, and number (De trinitate, I.23-24).
However, there is a little difference between Boethius and Aristotle on
“sameness”. In the second commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, Boethius
takes an example of human property to explain sameness in number. He
affirms that Socrates, Plato, and other people are plural in number, and that
the sameness of them as human beings, the unique property, is arising out of
accidents (2InIsag., 114D). Unlike Aristotle, Boethius reckons that sameness
in number is sameness in accidents. So the difference in number is also
difference in accidents. In other words, “numerical difference is caused by
variety of accidents” (De trinitate, I.24-25); hence, three men do not differ
by genus or species, but only by accidents. If all other accidents are absent,
there will always remain the place, which is also an accident (De trinitate,
I.24-30). The point that the place is an accident is made by Boethius early in
his commentary on Aristotle’s Categories. In that commentary, Boethius
takes an example of a man departing a theatre. A man can depart a theatre
without destroying the substantial notion of his humanity, which implies that
the theatre as a place is an accident. “Wherefore it is because men are plural
by their accidents that they are plural in number.” (De trinitate, I.31-32)
This is possibly the reason of the Arian error, for they consider God the
same as men, so God is also plural. As a matter of fact, the plurality in God
is different from that in men, which will be clear from the theory of form.
III.3.1.2. Arguing from Theory of Form
In God, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are three persons, so why they
does this not result in a plurality of number? The reason which will be
explained by Boethius in the following is that the three persons are in God
without accidents. The subject of the Divine Substance belongs to Theology,
thus Boethius gives a brief description of the division of speculative science
first.
195 Aristotle, Topics, 103a7-14; Barnes (1984a).
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In the second commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, Boethius points out
that one branch of philosophy is speculative philosophy, which concerns the
nature of things or elaborates the knowledge of things (2InIsag., 73D).
Further division of speculative science is discussed in Chapter II of De
trinitate.196 “Speculative Science may be divided into three kinds: Physics,
Mathematics, and Theology.” (De trinitate, II.5-16) As one branch of
speculative science, theology does not deal with motion and is abstract and
separable using intellectual concepts, that is to say, it deals with the Divine
Substance which is without either matter or motion. Boethius alarms us that
we should not “be diverted to play with imaginations” in Theology.
Everything owes its being not to matter, but to the form which is imprinted
on it. What we should do is to “simply apprehend that Form which is pure
form and no image, which is being itself and the source of Being” (De
trinitate, II.17-21).
Boethius distinguishes two kinds of forms. The first kind consists of
Plato’s Forms, in which being is separate from matter. The second kind of
forms is found in an Aristotelian framework, where universals solely have
being in so far as they are instantiated in the particulars that compose
them.197 As Boethius says: “Form which is without matter cannot be a
substrate, and cannot have its essence in matter, else it would not be form
but a reflexion” (De trinitate, II.48-51). Boethius believes that the entities
that reside in bodies are misnamed by us, for “they are mere images; they
only resemble those forms which are not incorporate in matter.” (De
trinitate, II.55-56) But the Divine Substance is pure Form without matter
(De trinitate, II.29-31). The Divine Substance is what it is and its own
essence, which “does not consist of This and That, but is only This”.
Therefore, the Divine Substance is truly One, in which there is no number,
and in which except its own essence nothing is present (De trinitate,
II.37-42). This thought is similar to what Augustine expresses in his De
trinitate.
“He is, however, without doubt, a substance, or, if it be better so to
196 Kijewska gives a discussion on the division of philosophy in Boethius’ De trinitate and
his commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge. Cf. Kijewska (2003), pp. 628-631.
197 Cf. Chadwick (1981b), p. 215.
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call it, an essence, which the Greeks call οὐσία. ... But other things
that are called essences or substances admit of accidents, whereby a
change, whether great or small, is produced in them. But there can
be no accident of this kind in respect to God; and therefore He who
is God is the only unchangeable substance or essence, to whom
certainly being itself, whence comes the name of essence, most
especially and most truly belongs.”198
Unlike men who are plural by accidents, God, in whom there is no accident,
is not plural in number, and is absolutely simple. Therefore, in God, there is
no difference, and then there is no plurality arising out of difference, and no
multiplicity arising out of accidents, and accordingly no number (De
trinitate, II.56-58). The error of the Arians is refuted now. By accidents men
are plural in number, but unlike men, in God there is no accident and no
difference, therefore, God is not plural. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is one
God, but not three Gods.
Nevertheless, we indeed call God “Father”, “Son”, and “Holy Spirit”.
Why does the repetition of three persons not produce a plurality of number?
This can be explained from a distinction between two kinds of number.
III.3.1.3. Arguing from Two Kinds of Number
The question why the repetition of three persons does not produce a
plurality of number can be further explained by dividing the type of number
into abstract number and concrete number.199 The number with which we
count is the abstract number; and the number inherent in the things counted
is the concrete number. “In the case of abstract number a repetition of single
items does produce plurality; but in the case of concrete number the
repetition and plural use of single items does not by any means produce
numerical difference in the objects counted.” (De trinitate, III.10-14)
Therefore, when a repetition of unities is a question of abstract number, it
produces plurality, but when it is a question of concrete number, it does not
produce plurality.
198 Augustine, On the Holy Trinity, V.3; Schaff (1887).
199 Cf. Kijewska (2003), pp. 634-637.
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This formula is derived from Aristotle, who states that if three
synonyms are used for the same object, then the object is one, not three.
Boethius states the same point of view in his second commentary on On
Interpretation.
“And when in the same language many terms are applied to one
thing, it is demonstrated that the thing in question is not named
naturally but by applying names; for if each thing were called by a
natural name, we would signify one thing by just one name.”
(2InInter., 56.4-9)
For example, in saying “one sword, one brand, one blade”, synonymous
terms are used, for each of these names denotes one and the same thing, a
sword. So the repetition of single terms here does not result in plural number.
This idea can be applied to God. “Similarly, if God be predicated thrice of
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, the threefold predication does not result in
plural number.” (De trinitate, III.29-31) God is One.
Thus far, from three respects, i.e. the knowledge of difference, the
theory of forms, and the distinction between two kinds of number, Boethius
explains the unity of God. However, at the end of the discussion of the two
kinds of number, one question seems to remain. While “sword”, “brand”,
and “blade” are synonymous, “Father”, “Son”, and “Holy Spirit” are not
synonymous terms. Though these three terms denote the same thing, they
are not identical. “There is not, therefore, complete indifference between
Them; and so number does come in — number which we explained was the
result of diversity of substrates.” (De trinitate, III.50-53) Boethius discusses
this view by examining how the ten categories can be applied to God. Hence
we arrive at the second question about the Trinity, which concerns the
diversity in God.
III.3.2. The Diversity in God
The ten categories can be universally predicated of things, viz.
substance, quality, quantity, relation, place, time, condition, situation,
activity, passivity. They are divided into two kinds, Boethius says, viz.
substantial categories and accidents. The categories in the first kind “denote
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the reality of a thing”, declaring “that a thing is something”; and categories
in the second kind “denote a thing’s accidental circumstances”, saying
“nothing about its being anything, but simply attach to it, so to speak,
something external.” (De trinitate, IV.100-104)
How are the categories applied to God? Boethius tries to apply every
category to God to examine whether it is possible. The same use of
categories in relation to God is found in Augustine’s De trinitate.
“We may understand God, if we are able, and as much as we are
able, as good without quality, great without quantity, a creator
though He lack nothing, ruling but from no position, sustaining all
things without “having” them, in His wholeness everywhere, yet
without place, eternal without time, making things that are
changeable, without change of Himself, and without passion.”200
When applied to God, the meanings of these categories are changed entirely.
In reference to God, it is only possible to employ the category of substance.
God is substance not in the common sense, and God is supersubstantial.
That, which is an accidental quality in man, is an essence in God, or rather a
supersubstantial quality. It is not possible to apply the remaining categories
(time, place, condition, activity, situation, and passivity) to God. The
category of relation is considered last.
In Utrum pater, Boethius gives a concise account of the question
“whether Father, Son, and Holy Spirit may be predicated of the Divinity
substantially or otherwise.” Utrum pater comes near to Augustine’s De
trinitate.
“But because the Father is not called the Father except in that He
has a Son, and the Son is not called Son except in that He has a
Father, these things are not said according to substance; because
each of them is not so called in relation to Himself, but the terms
are used reciprocally and in relation each to the other; nor yet
according to accident, because both the being called the Father, and
the being called the Son, is eternal and unchangeable to them.
200 Augustine, On the Holy Trinity, V.2; Schaff (1887).
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Wherefore, although to be the Father and to be the Son is different,
yet their substance is not different; because they are so called, not
according to substance, but according to relation, which relation,
however, is not accident, because it is not changeable.”201
Following Augustine, Boethius ends Utrum pater with the conclusion that
“The Trinity is effected by diversity of Persons, wherefore Trinity does not
belong to Substance. Hence neither Father, nor Son, nor Holy Spirit, nor
Trinity can be substantially predicated of God, but only relatively.” (Utrum
pater, 62-68) Similarly to Augustine, Utrum pater does not take the
argument that far. However, Boethius continues this argument in Chapter V
of De trinitate.
The theory used in Chapter V of De trinitate is Aristotelian theory of
relation. In the Categories, Aristotle begins his statement of relation with it
definition: “We call relatives all such things as are said to be just what they
are, of or than other things, or in some other way in relation to something
else.”202 In God, Father is said to be the Father of the Son, for Father begets
Son; and Holy Spirit is said to be in some other way in relation to Father
and Son, for Holy Spirit is begotten by Father and Son. Hence, Father, Son,
and Holy Spirit are called relatives.
“The category of relation”, Boethius says, “has nothing to do with the
essence of the subject; it simply denotes a condition of relativity, and that
not necessarily to something else, but sometimes to the subject itself.” (De
trinitate, V.19-22) So when the category of relation is applied to God, the
essential nature of God cannot be altered, changed, or disturbed in any way.
The Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God. There is only
one essence of the Three. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are predicated of the
Divinity relatively.
The diversity in God is expounded through the category of relation.
“The relation of Father to Son, and of both to Holy Spirit is a relation of
identicals.” (De trinitate, VI.20-22)
201 Augustine, On the Holy Trinity, V.6; Schaff (1887).
202 Aristotle, Categories, 6a.36-38; Ackrill (1963).
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Therefore, in God, there are three Persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.
And They are not separated by any difference.
“But where there are no differences there is no plurality; where is
no plurality there is Unity. Again, nothing but God can be begotten
of God, and lastly, in concrete enumerations the repetition of units
does not produce plurality. Thus the Unity of the Three is suitably
established.” (De trinitate, V.52-57)
III.3.3. Conclusion
From the analysis above, we may surmise that the seeds for reconciling
unity and plurality in God are sown in Boethius’ mind, as he acknowledges,
by Augustine’s writings (De trinitate, 31-33), especially Augustine’s On the
Holy Trinity. Boethius discusses the Trinitarian doctrine along the same
lines as Augustine. In his work on the Trinity, Augustine employs
Aristotelian categories when addressing the issue of Trinitarian relations. At
the same time, he always appeals to the Scripture for evidence. For example,
Augustine says,
“But position, and condition, and places, and times, are not said to
be in God properly, but metaphorically and through similitudes. For
He is both said to dwell between the cherubims, which is spoken in
respect to position; and to be covered with the deep as with a
garment, which is said in respect to condition; and ‘Thy years shall
have no end,’ which is said in respect of time; and, ‘If I ascend up
into heaven, Thou art there,’ which is said in respect to place. And
as respects action (or making), perhaps it may be said most truly of
God alone, for God alone makes and Himself is not made. Nor is
He liable to passions as far as belongs to that substance whereby
He is God. So the Father is omnipotent, the Son omnipotent, and
the Holy Spirit is omnipotent; yet not three omnipotents, but one
omnipotent: ‘For of Him are all things, and through Him are all
things, and in Him are all things; to whom be glory.’ ”203
203 Augustine, On the Holy Trinity, V.9; Schaff (1887).
Chapter III. Application of Mathematics and Basic Logic to Theological Tractates
- 102 -
In this quotation, Augustine employs a combination of exegesis, argument,
and prayerful meditation. Unlike Augustine, in the tractates on the Trinity,
De trinitate and Utrum pater, Boethius does not refer to verses in the
Scripture, but he attempts to demonstrate the coherence of Trinitarian
doctrine on purely philosophical grounds, relying on arithmetic and basic
logic, such as his commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge and Aristotle’s On
Interpretation.
By examining how categories can be applied to God, Boethius explains
the diversity of God. He secures the diversity of the Trinity by means of the
category of relation, thus removing simple unity. The unity which is
preserved by the category of substance consists in simplicity of substance,
and is proven by the absence of all diversity in the Divine nature.
As demonstrated in the discussions on the Trinity and Christology
above, Boethius investigated two important issues in Christian doctrine.
These issues are the main topics in his theological tractates. There is only
one so-called theological treatise left, but it is more like a philosophical
essay. The Quomodo substantiae is close to Boethius’ last famous work, the
Consolatio, and not only similar in content but also similar in method, as I
will introduce in Section III.4 and then give a detailed explanation in
Chapter IV. In Quomodo substantiae we also find applications of basic logic
and mathematics.
III.4. On the Treatise Quomodo Substantiae in eo
Quod Sint Bonae Sint cum non Sint Substantialia Bona
The four treatises discussed above are all about the Christian doctrines,
but unlike them, Quomodo substantiae204 appears to have little direct
relation to Christian doctrines, and it has nothing to do with the theological
controversy at that time either. Thus it looks odd to rank Quomodo
substantiae among Boethius’ theological tractates. As a matter of fact, the
content of Quomodo substantiae is in accordance with Christian theology.
204 Cf. Chadwick (1981b), pp. 203-211.
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Quomodo substantiae is concerned with the demonstration of the Prime
Good, and Its relation to the created existences. “The Prime Good”,
Boethius admits, “can be deduced from the religious beliefs of savage
races”. (Quomodo substantiae, 92-95) As Marenbon discusses, the area of
problems Quomodo substantiae is concerned with, is the same as that of De
trinitate and Utrum pater, but the particular difficulty Quomodo substantiae
deals with does not involve a specifically Christian doctrine, thus its
language is neutral.205 Hence, there is no doubt that Quomodo substantiae is
one of the theological tractates.
The motivation to write Quomodo substantiae, which is given at the
beginning of this treatise, is to reply to a request of John the Deacon. As
Boethius says, John asked him to “state and explain somewhat more clearly
that obscure question in my Hebdomads concerning the manner in which
substances are good in virtue of existence without being substantial goods”
(Quomodo substantiae, 1-2). In the Middle Ages the title of this tractate (as
accepted by Thomas Aquinas) was derived from these opening lines: it was
called De Hebdomadibus (On the Hebdomads).206 Most scholars nowadays
regard this title as mistaken. In some manuscripts, this tractate has no title;
however, in most manuscripts it is given a long title, viz. Quomodo
substantiae in eo quod sint bonae sint cum non sint substantialia bona.207
The Quomodo substantiae has a conspicuous character. John the
Deacon urged Boethius to write an essay because “the method of this kind
of treatise is not clear to all” (Quomodo substantiae, 6-7). Boethius decides
to follow “the example of the mathematical and cognate sciences”
(Quomodo substantiae, 15). And later in his last composition, Consolatio,
Boethius gives an exposition of this mathematical method again. The
mathematical method is as follows:
“As the geometricians are wont, out of their propositions which
they have demonstrated, to infer something which they call
porismata (deductions) so will I give thee as it were a corollarium.”
(Consolatio, III.pX.80-83)
205 Cf. Marenbon (2003), p. 87.
206 Cf. Casey (1987); Crouse (1982); Solère (2003).
207 Cf. Chadwick (1981b), pp. 203-204.
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In this method, there is a key term, porismata (porism) which is from the
Greek word πόρισμα. Proclus distinguishes two senses in which this word is
used.
“The first is that of corollary where something appears as an
incidental result of a proposition, obtained without trouble or
special seeking, a sort of bonus which the investigation has
presented us with. The other sense is that of Euclid’s Porisms. In
this sense porism is the name given to things which are sought, but
need some finding and are neither pure bringing into existence nor
simple theoretic argument.”208
Here in Quomodo substantiae and also in Consolatio, Boethius uses the
word porism in the first sense, which is equal to corollary. And the method
Boethius uses here is similar to what Euclid calls “analysis” and
“synthesis”.
“Analysis is the assumption of that which is sought as if it were
admitted <and the arrival> by means of its consequences at
something admitted to be true.”
“Synthesis is an assumption of that which is sought as if it were
admitted <and the arrival> by means of its consequences at
something admitted to be true.”209
Boethius first uses the method of synthesis to the attainment of what is
sought, and then uses problematical analysis210 — one kind of the method
analysis — to come to the conclusion. Section III.4 will be divided into
three parts: the first one concerns the premises for the demonstration
(Section III.4.1), the second one introduces the mode of mathematical
example (Section III.4.2), and the last one is the solution to the problem
208 Heath (1956), p. 13.
209 Euclid, Elements, XIII.1; Heath (1956).
210 Cf. Heath (1956), pp. 138-139: “In the problematical kind we assume that which is
propounded as if it were known, after which we pass through its successive consequences,
taking them as true, up to something admitted: if then (a) what is admitted is possible and
obtainable, that is, what mathematicians call given, what was originally proposed will also
be possible, and the proof will again correspond in reverse order to the analysis, but if (b)
we come upon something admittedly impossible, the problem will also be impossible.”
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(Section III.4.3).
III.4.1. The Premises for the Demonstration
Boethius first lays down “bounds and rules” according to which he
develops nine rules for the demonstration.211
Rule I: A common conception is a statement generally accepted as
soon as it is made. (Quomodo substantiae, 18-19)
Rule II: Being and a concrete thing are different. Simple Being
awaits manifestation, but a thing is and exists as soon as it has
received the form which gives it Being. (Quomodo substantiae,
28-30)
Rule III: A concrete thing can participate in something else; but
absolute Being can in no wise participate in anything. (Quomodo
substantiae, 31-32)
Rule IV: That which exists can possess something in addition to
itself. But absolute Being has no admixture of anything besides
Itself. (Quomodo substantiae, 35-37)
Rule V: Merely to be something, and to be something absolutely
are different; the former signifies an accident; the latter substance.
(Quomodo substantiae, 38-40)
Rule VI: Everything that is participates in absolute Being in order
to exist. (Quomodo substantiae, 41-42)
Rule VII: Every simple thing possesses as a unity its existence and
its particular being. (Quomodo substantiae, 45-46)
Rule VIII: In every composite thing existence and it particular
being are different. (Quomodo substantiae, 47-48)
Rule IX: Diversity repels; likeness attracts. (Quomodo substantiae,
49-50)
211 Cf. Marenbon (2003), pp. 87-90.
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The first rule concerns the common conception. One kind of it is
universally intelligible, which could be considered as maximal proposition
in Boethius’ logical works. In his two works on topics, In Ciceronis Topica
and De Topicis Differentiis, Boethius sets forth the maximal proposition.
“We call highest and maximal propositions those propositions that
are universal and known and manifest to such an extent that they
need no proof but rather themselves provide proof for things that
are in doubt, for those proposition for those propositions that are
uncertain.” (C.Topica, 280/1051)
“Those for which where is no proof are called maximal and
principal, because it is necessary that these prove those which do
not deny that they can be demonstrated.” (TopicisD., 1176C.21-24)
After the two statements about the maximal proposition above, and also
after the statement of the universally intelligible common conception in the
first premise, Boethius uses the same example from mathematical theory,
that is, “if equals be taken from equals the remainders are equal.” Rule II
and Rule VIII are all regarding the difference between being and a concrete
thing. Being is absolute, and it can “in no wise participate in anything” and
“have no admixture of anything besides Itself” (Quomodo substantiae,
31-32; 36-37). The points here are in accord with the analysis of pure form
in De trinitate, which I have already discussed in Section II.3.1.2 on the
Trinity. The last rule is about diversity and likeness.
After laying down these nine preliminary rules, Boethius takes up his
argument in the way he proposed in the context of mathematical lines.
III.4.2. Demonstrations of a Problem212
Armed with nine rules, Boethius first employs the method of synthesis
to get what is sought.
Suppose “Every existing thing tends to good.” (This is in line with
Rule I. The second kind of common conception is intelligible only
212 Cf. Marenbon (2003), pp. 90-94.
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to the learned, and it is just agreed by all learned.)
According to Rule IX, everything tends to its like.
Therefore, things are themselves good.213
According to Rule I, things are good in one of the following two
ways: either by participation or by substance.
Here we arrive at what is sought, and this proposition is what Boethius plans
to show, which results in a problem. Then Boethius employs the method of
analysis to demonstrate two parts of this problem in turn. The first part of
the problem: things are good by participation.
Suppose the problem solved.
Then according to the definition of “participation”, the thing itself
does not have what it participates in as part of its essence. (This is
in line with Rule I.)
Therefore, things do not possess goodness in themselves.
But according to Rule IX, what does not own goodness in itself
cannot be good in itself.
Therefore, these things are not good, which is opposite to the
supposition.
Therefore, the supposition is impossible, that is, things cannot be
good by participation.
Accordingly, things are good in the other way: things are good by substance.
Suppose the problem solved.
Then according to Rule V, to be something and to be something
absolutely are different.
If something’s substance is good, its particular being is good.
According to Rule VIII, since the absolute and particular being of
213 Cf. MacDonald (1988).
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all things is the same, they are substantial goods like the First
Good.
Therefore, all things are like the First Good, and are God, which is
an impious assertion.
Therefore, the supposition is impossible, that is, things cannot be
good by substance.
From this analysis, the problem follows that things are in no way good,
for they are good neither by participation nor by substance. Boethius solves
this problem in the following way.
III.4.3. The Solution to the Problem
At the beginning of the solution, Boethius offers a process of
mathematics related to mental abstraction.
“There are many things which can be separated by a mental process,
though they cannot be separated in fact.” (Quomodo substantiae,
87-88)
In order to make this process clear, Boethius gives an example from
mathematics:
“No one can actually separate a triangle or other mathematical
figures from the underlying matter; but mentally one can consider a
triangle and its properties apart from matter.” (Quomodo
substantiae, 88-91)
By imitating this mathematical process, Boethius removes the presence of
the Prime Good from the mind for a moment. So the proposition that needs
be proved is: All things are good, which is the repetition of the first
proposition, and then inquires how they could possibly be good if they did
not derive from the Prime Good.
The imitation of this mathematical process suggests that “the Goodness
of all things and their existence are two different things.” (Quomodo
substantiae, 98-100) Hence, the being of all things would be not identical
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with their goodness. Simple goodness is the distinguishing feature of the
one sole Good, thus if the things were nothing else but good substances,
“they (or rather it) would seem to be not things but the principle of things”
(Quomodo substantiae, 113-115). But this conclusion is out of the question.
For things derive their existence from the Will of the Good, so they are
neither independent nor simple.
“For the Prime Good is essentially good in virtue of Being; the
secondary good is in its turn good because it derives from the good
whose absolute Being is good.” (Quomodo substantiae, 121-124)
In the case of the Prime Good, Being and Goodness are identical, and It is
good due to Its existence, irrespective of all conditions. Unlike the Prime
Good, absolute Being of all things is not good under all circumstances,
though they be good in virtue of their existence. Unless the true good had
produced them, these things could not actually exist. In this way the
problem is solved.
Augustine also discussed the topic of goodness and existence. For
example, “A nature with no good in it cannot exist.”214 Augustine neither
states the internal relationship between the created existence and its
goodness, nor does he explain how the existence of a substance makes it
good. However, unlike Augustine, Boethius adopts the mathematical method
and the demonstrative method to address these issues. Boethius employs the
mathematical method, and regards his demonstration as an example of
mathematical demonstration. Boethius also employs a similar mathematical
method for the arguments in his famous work Consolatio. Lady Philosophy
begins her argument by an imitation of this geometrical method, which I
will set out in Chapter IV.
The issue of goodness discussed in Quomodo substantiae will also
continue in Consolatio. In Book III, the ninth prose, of Consolatio, when
Lady Philosophy argues for the proposition that unity and the good are
identical, she draws the conclusion that “All things then desire goodness,
which you may define thus: goodness is that which is desired of all things.”
(Consolatio, III.pXI.110-112) In absolute terms, the good is the final cause
214 Augustine, City of God, XIX.13; Schaff (1890).
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of all things, and the good is identical with happiness. People also seek the
good in order to be happy. However, most of the time, they are not happy,
for the good they seek is not the true good. So where is the true good? How
do people to get to it? These will be discussed in the following chapter on
the Consolatio.
III.5. Conclusion
Boethius’ five theological treatises are brief but greatly contribute to the
intellectual tradition of the West, not only in content but also importantly in
method.215
The content, as Boethius himself admits, follows Augustine’ thoughts,
but the terminology and the method in these treatises are Boethius’ own,
independent from Augustine.
Sutherland speaks very highly of Boethius’ contribution:
“In On the Trinity, he employed the term theology for the first time
as a technical Christian term denoting the philosophical inquiry into
the nature of God. Methodologically, his contribution lies in the use
of formal Aristotelian demonstrative logic for the first time in the
service of Christian theology.”216
This estimate is not very accurate, for before Boethius, there are other
people who used Aristotelian logic to explain Christian issues. However,
Boethius may have been the first to systematically apply formal Aristotelian
demonstrative logic to solve Christian issues. In doing so, Boethius conjoins
philosophy and faith, which is the aim stated in his second treatise, viz. to
“reconcile faith and reason” (Utrum pater, 71).
From the chapters on logic and mathematics, it is obvious that Boethius
215 Cf. Erismann, (2009), “The Medieval Fortunes of the Opuscula Sacra,” in Marenbon
(ed.), pp. 155-177; Gibson (1981), “The Opuscula Sacra in the Middle Ages,” in Gibson
(ed.), pp. 214-235; Nash-Marshall (2012), “Boethius’s Influence on Theology and
Metaphysics to c.1500,” in Kaylor and Phillips (eds.), pp. 163-192; Marenbon (2003), “The
Method and Character of the Opuscula,” pp. 94-95.
216 Eliade (2005), p. 277.
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is a philosopher, which is confirmed again by his theological tractates.
Boethius is also labeled as a theologian by some scholars, such as
Sutherland, who called Boethius “Roman philosopher, theologian, and
statesman”.217 The label of “theologian” is not accurate in Boethius’ case.
Indeed, Boethius wrote five theological tractates. However, this is not
enough to prove that he is a “theologian”. The term theologia was used by
Boethius to denote a subdivision of philosophy. In Boethius’ view, theology
as an academic discipline deals with motionless and incorporeal reality,
which is different from the theology of the theologians. Boethius did not
write the theological treatise as a theologian in the ordinary sense of the
word and his audiences are the few people who are actually capable of
tackling properly theological disputation.218
From the motivations for writing the theological treatises, it has been
shown that Boethius’ active interest in Christian disputes is of the greatest
political importance. The political reason aside, Boethius’ interest on these
Christian issues is also scientific and speculative. As Boethius admits, in his
works on the Trinity, no new Christian issues are discussed, and the seeds in
his mind are sown by Augustine’s writings (De trinitate, 31-32). However,
he decides to try his best to make these issues clear. For theology, like all
Liberal Arts, has a limit: the inquiry about God is beset by the weakness of
man’s wit and reason. In spite of this, Boethius is confident that philosophy
could be a little useful. He purposely uses brevity and wraps up the ideas he
draws from the deep questionings of philosophy in new and unaccustomed
words (De trinitate, 16-18). That is to say, the theological tractates of
Boethius are written from the perspective of philosophy.219 This is the
reason why it is not accurate to call Boethius a theologian. The accurate
label for Boethius is Philosopher, which is confirmed again by his last
217 Eliade (2005), p. 276.
218 Chadwick points out that Boethius is “addressing himself only indirectly to a pastoral or
‘political’ situation in the Church, as a logician who thought there was some tidying up to
be done in the ecclesiastical garden.” Cf. Chadwick (1981a), “Introduction,” in Gibson
(ed.), p. 1. The audiences of Boethius’ theological tractates imply that “one must have both
piety and knowledge, and be able to assess clearly the proper relationship between faith and
reason.” Cf. Reiss (1982), “The Question of Audience,” pp. 66-70.
219 This implies an answer to the question why Boethius chooses philosophy to console
him when facing death. Cf. Section IV.4.
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composition, Consolatio, to which we now turn.
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IV. Applications of Basic Logic and
Mathematics in Consolatio Philosophiae
IV.1. Introduction to Consolatio Philosophiae
At the end of previous chapter, I gave only one label to Boethius, i.e.
Philosopher, which will be confirmed again by his last but famous work,
Consolatio. At the end of his life, Boethius lost his power, wealth, and fame,
and he was suddenly condemned as a traitor, stripped of his goods,
imprisoned, and sentenced to death.220 When facing the death, Boethius
appeals to the solace from philosophy, which is implied by the title of his
last work. If Boethius is a Christian, then it looks odd, because it is good for
those who trust in Christ to appeal to Christ’s redeeming work or to the
religious consolation of St. Paul. However, in Consolatio, it seems that there
is no direct reference to Christian doctrine and no citation of Christian
scripture.221 It is philosophy that supplies him with consolation. At the end
of this chapter I shall discuss the reason why he makes this choice.222
There are numerous discussions of the sources of the Consolatio among
220 Cf. Magee (2005); Reiss (1981); Relihan (2007); Shanzer (1984).
221 Courcelle (1969, pp. 318-322) says that the problem of Boethius’ Christianity has
produced a spate of discussion from the ninth century, and he lists some different opinions
in Note 1 of p. 318. Astell (1994) compares Boethius’ Consolatio with books of Job, and
she tries to give a new approach to the well-established problem of the ascendancy of
romance over epic. Chadwick (1981b, p. 249) claims that Consolatio “contains no sentence
that looks like a confession of faith either in the gods of paganism or in Christian
redemption.” In Shanzer’s point of view, it is more likely that Boethius is neutral. It appears
that Boethius consciously avoided any specific attitude. Cf. Shanzer (2009), “Interpreting
The Consolation,” in Marenbon (ed.), pp. 241-242. In that article Shanzer lists some proofs
to show why Boethius remained neutral. Sharples (1991, pp. 46-48) suggests different kinds
of answer to this problem of the Consolatio and Christianity. On Boethius’ Christianity and
Philosophy, also cf. Bernardine (1949); Chadwick (1981b), pp. 247-253; De Vogel (1973);
Lewis (1967), pp. 76-79; Magee (1988); Marenbon (2003), pp. 154-159; Olmsted (1989);
Starnes (1981); Shanzer (2009), “Interpreting The Consolation,” in Marenbon (ed.), pp.
241-254; Varvis (1991), p. 1.
222 Cf. Section IV.4.
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Boethius’ predecessors, including Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, Cicero,
Platonists and Neoplatonists.223 Stewart points out that, in the various
themes of Consolatio, the recollection of earlier studies and modes of
thought is palpable.224 And Chadwick regards Consolatio as the work of a
refined humanist scholar with a richly stocked memory.225 In these scholars’
works on Boethius’ Consolatio, they sum up the sources and possible
sources of Consolatio from earlier scholars.226 There are very few scholars
who focus on the relation between Boethius’ own earlier works and his last
work.227 Sometimes authors do discuss this relation, but without explaining
how Boethius’ earlier ideas function in his consolation. For example,
Courcelle mentions that in Consolatio Boethius refers quite often to his
earlier scientific or logical works,228 and Reiss regards Consolatio as
representing “the memorializing of work Boethius had been involved in for
some time,”229 but they do not give detailed expositions on the connection
between Consolatio and Boethius’ earlier works. Also Sharples signals that
Boethius draws on his own earlier studies and goes beyond them in a
striking way in Consolatio, but he limits himself to Book IV.5-7 and Book V
of Consolatio. Sharples, too, points out only a few connections between
223 Cf. Silk (1939) discusses Boethius’ sources fromAugustine.
224 Cf. Stewart (1974), p. 56.
225 Cf. Chadwick (1981b), p. 223.
226 On sources of Consolatio in general, cf. Chadwick (1981b), pp. 228-234; Courcelle
(1969), pp. 295-318; Marenbon (2003), pp. 97-99; Rand (1904); Reiss (1982), pp. 147-153;
Sulowski (1961). Also cf. Sharples (1991, pp. 41-46) discusses the sources of IV.5-7 and V
in Consolatio. And Shanzer discusses the classical sources of Consolatio; cf. Shanzer
(2009), “Interpreting The Consolation,” in Marenbon (ed.), p. 230.
227 Chamberlain (1970, p. 80) points out that “Consolatio is a major instance of the close
relations among philosophy, music, and literature in late classical and mediaeval culture,
but an instance that has been overlooked by scholars in all three disciplines.” Chamberlain
does connect Boethius’ work on music and Consolatio, but what he focuses on is the
literature of these two works. Neither Sharples nor Chamberlain give full discussions on the
function of Boethius’ earlier ideas in his whole consolation. Uhlfelder gives an outline of
the role of Liberal Arts in Boethius Consolatio. She points out two uses of arithmetic. One
is connected with the number five, which she considers may be the reason of Boethius’
dividing of Consolatio into five books. The other use of arithmetic Uhlfelder points out is
metaphorical adaptations of proportions. On these two uses of arithmetic and the use of
astronomy, cf. Uhlfelder (1981), “The Role of the Liberal Arts in Boethius’ Consolatio,” in
Masi (ed.), pp. 24-25.
228 Cf. Courcelle (1969), p. 319.
229 Cf. Reiss (1982), p. 99.
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Boethius’ early works and Consolatio, apart from more numerous
connections between Boethius’ sources and Consolatio.230
It is clear, however, that Boethius’ early works on mathematics, logic,
and theology are all applied in his last work. In Consolatio, he employs
mathematics most, and then logic, and just some methods from the theology.
In this chapter, I will focus on applications of basic logic231 and
mathematics in Consolatio and identify applications of method in these
cases.
The consolation, in Boethius’ point of view, is like the therapy for a
patient.232 He employs the style of dialogue to console himself.233 One
person in the dialogue is, of course, Boethius himself, who has become a
sick man;234 the other person is his physician, the personification of
philosophy, called Lady Philosophy235, in whose house Boethius had
230 Cf. Sharples (1991), p. 41.
231 Cf. Section II.1.2.
232 Cf. Duclow (1979) regards Boethius’ Consolatio as one of the most remarkable works
in the therapeutic tradition, and he examines Consolatio as an exercise in psychotherapy,
the healing of the soul.
233 In later antiquity, the genre of consolation literature flourished. This genre was both
philosophical and rhetorical and embraced a variety of forms, including letters, treatises,
and poetry. And as its title indicates, Consolatio stands within this genre, and it is written in
alternating meters of poetry and prose. In order to distinguish poetry and prose in citations,
I use “p” for prose and “m” for meters of poetry. I will not focus on the literary method of
Consolatio (except the relation between meters and music); on this type of discussion, cf.
Cooper and Santo (2009), “Boethius, Gregory the Great and the Christian ‘Afterlife’ of
Classical Dialogue,” in Goldhill (ed.), pp. 173-190; Crabbe (1981a), “Literary Designs in
the De Consolatione Philosophiae,” in Gibson (ed.), pp. 237-277; Crabbe (1981b); Curley
(1986 and 1987); Dronke (1994), pp. 41-46; Dwyer (1976); Lerer (1985); Lewis (1967), pp.
79-90; Marenbon (2003), “Prose and Verse: The Consolation as Menippean Satire,” pp.
159-163; Payne (1981), Chapter 3: “The Consolation of Philosophy as Menippean Satire,”
pp. 55-85; Shanzer (2009), “Interpreting The Consolation,” in Marenbon (ed.), pp. 228-254;
Walz (2011).
234 In the following discussions, in order to distinguish Boethius as the author of
Consolatio and as the interlocutor in the dialogue of this work, I will call the person in the
dialogue “the patient”. There is a question on the difference between the author and the
patient Boethius. It is very difficult to determine where the patient stops and the historical
Boethius begins, which is a problem I shall not discuss. On this question, cf. Chadwick
(1981b), p. 247; Albrecht [etc.] (1997), pp. 1708-1710.
235 Cf. Chadwick (1981b), pp. 225-228; Courcelle (1981); Gualtieri (1971); Marenbon
(2003), pp. 153-154; Shanzer (2009), “Interpreting The Consolation,” in Marenbon (ed.),
pp. 231-232.
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remained from his youth (Consolatio, I.pIII.3-6). The nature of Lady
Philosophy can be defined by the interplay of Boethius’ own experience and
the image of Lady Philosophy.
Lady Philosophy comes from heaven (Consolatio, I.pIII.6-8), but she is
not a god, as she says herself quoting Homer (Iliad XII.176) (Consolatio,
IV.pVI.196). Boethius also admits that Lady Philosophy did instil into his
ears and thoughts daily that saying of Pythagoras, “Follow God.”
(Consolatio, I.pIV.140-141) In the ninth meter of the third book, Lady
Philosophy and her patient pray to God together to ask Him for help.
“Thou and God Himself who had inserted thee in the minds of the
wise, are my witnesses that nothing but the common desire of all
good men brought me to be a magistrate.” (Consolatio,
I.pIV.28-31)
The role of Lady Philosophy236 could be considered that of being an
interlocutor between God and man. She derives from God and was put into
the human mind by God. She personifies the tradition of philosophical
thinking, which nourished Boethius’ mind. This could be confirmed by
Boethius’ own words. “I am endued with thy knowledge, and adorned with
thy virtues.” (Consolatio, I.pIV.151-152) In Boethius’ work on arithmetic,
he defines philosophy, following Pythagoras, as “the love of wisdom”
(Arithmetica, I.1), and in his first commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, he
calls philosophy “the love and pursuit of wisdom and in some way the
friendship with it” (1InIsag., 10D). For Boethius, wisdom belongs to God,
so “the love and pursuit of wisdom” means the love and pursuit of God.
This interpretation suggests that philosophical thought is the means to reach
God. However, I must here point out that God in this context does not refer
to the Christian God, but to divine wisdom.237 The task of Lady Philosophy
is to try and lead her student back to this God and shape him into such
236 There are various discussions on the different roles of Lady Philosophy, such as: (1) as
the text says, Lady Philosophy is a healer; (2) Lady Philosophy is the philosophical
tradition; cf. Marenbon (2003), p. 154; (3) Lady Philosophy is an educator in eloquence:
from silence to speech; cf. Lerer (1985), pp. 96-99.
237 This corresponds with the claim that Consolatio is written from the perspective of
philosophy, and not Christian in character. Cf. Section IV.4.
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excellence as to make him like to God (Consolatio, I.pIV.145). This means
that Lady Philosophy does her best to make her student get the highest
knowledge, the divine wisdom.
On Lady Philosophy’s arrival, Boethius gives a detailed description of
her appearance.238 Lady Philosophy is both young and ancient; in her left
hand she carries a book and in her right hand she has a scepter239; the height
of Lady Philosophy is uncertain — both normal and enormous height.240
The reason for her uncertain height may be that since she can provide
practical knowledge, she seems normal; since she is also able to provide the
speculative philosophy, she looks enormous. This uncertain height could be
connected with the symbolic meaning of the images in her dress, which is
the more important part of her appearance.
“In the lower part of them was placed the Greek letter Π, and in the
upper Θ, and betwixt the two letters, in the manner of stairs, there
were certain degrees made, by which there was a passage from the
lower to the higher letter: this her garment had been cut by the
violence of some, who had taken away such pieces as they could
get. In her right hand she had certain books, and in her left hand she
held a sceptre.” (Consolatio, I.p1.18-22)
The symbol Π and Θ represent practical and theoretical (or speculative)
philosophy respectively.241 This division of philosophy can also be found in
Boethius’ early logical works.
In the second commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge, when analyzing what
logic itself should be, a part of philosophy or an instrument of philosophy,
238 Cf. Consolatio, I.pI.1-25.
239 The book Lady Philosophy carries in her left hand may be “her text, the writings of the
philosophers, or the symbol of study”, and the scepter she has in her right hand is “a
symbol of her majesty, authority, and rule.” Cf. Varvis (1991), p. 32.
240 The uncertain height of Lady Philosophy indicates, as Marenbon shows, “how the study
of philosophy progresses from the easily graspable towards an intimation of what is beyond
comprehension.” Cf. Marenbon (2003), p. 153.
241 Chadwick (1980b) says that there is no doubt that these two symbols stand for the two
main divisions of philosophy, practical and theoretical. He also argues that the theta on the
dress of Lady Philosophy represents the mark of a condemned man, and thus mirrors the
letter on Boethius’ own clothing.
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Boethius first gives two kinds of opinions on the division of philosophy.242
One opinion is that philosophy should consist in three parts, that is,
speculative, practical, and rational. Of course, rational philosophy refers to
logic, so logic is considered a part of philosophy. The other opinion is that
logic is not a part but an instrument of philosophy, so that philosophy should
be divided only two parts, naming speculative and practical. As for the role
of logic in philosophy, Boethius reckons that logic serves at the same time
the function of part and instrument (2InIsag., 73D-74D). In both divisions of
philosophy we find practical and speculative (or theoretical) philosophy,
which correspond to the letters Π and Θ in the dress of Lady Philosophy.
Practical philosophy concerns morals, and speculative philosophy
works out the knowledge of the nature of things. The ladder between the
symbol Π and Θ in the dress of Lady Philosophy represents the hierarchy of
philosophy, ascending through practical philosophy (the inferior disciplines)
up to speculative philosophy, which is divided into physics, mathematics,
and theology in Boethius’ treatise on the Trinity.243
As a teacher, Lady Philosophy is faithful to her students, so when one
of her students is ill, she arrives as a physician to heal him. Generally, in
order to cure Boethius’ illness completely, the diagnosis of the illness is
followed by two treatments, which I shall call Treatment 1 and Treatment 2.
In Consolatio, the diagnosis and Treatment 1 are closely related in the first
three books, and the three diagnostic reasons of the disease244 as figured out
by Lady Philosophy, are elucidated in the first three books, so that it seems
that the whole work should come to the end at Book III. As a matter of fact,
apart from the three diagnostic reasons, there is still a root cause that is not
solved. As a result, the treatment should continue with Treatment 2, a further
treatment, which covers Books IV and V.
Accordingly, my discussion of the whole work is divided into two
242 On the detailed discussion of this, cf. Section I.2.3.
243 Varvis (1991, p. 32) claims, “the ladder between represents the movement of the human
mind from the lower to the higher realms of understanding.” Also Chadwick (1980b, p. 176)
says that “The steps connecting the two are then natural enough: they represent the road
from morality and political science to more contemplative and abstract mental enquiries.”
244 Cf. Section IV.2.
Chapter IV. Applications of Basic Logic and Mathematics to Consolatio Philosophiae
- 119 -
sections:245 the first section covers Book I-III, the second section deals with
Book IV-V. There is a further reason for this division. As I introduced above,
Consolatio is Boethius’ last work. In it, Boethius uses his knowledge, which
was presented in his early works, to console himself. In addition, he adds
some new thoughts the seed of which was sown in his early works. So in
Consolatio we find both Boethius’ old knowledge and his more recent
insights, which are included in the first and second sections respectively.
Thus the division of sections in this chapter rests on these two reasons.
In both sections, basic logic and mathematics are applied as part of the
remedy, which Lady Philosophy administers to console her patient.246
Mathematics, especially arithmetic and music, are often used in the first
section, while basic logic and a geometrical method are used in both
sections. In this chapter, I investigate applications of basic logic and
mathematics in Consolatio. In Section IV.2, I will discuss applications of
basic logic and mathematics in Book I-III. The application of mathematics
in the second section consists of only one geometrical method which will be
introduced in the first section. Hence, in Section IV.3, I shall only focus on
applications of basic logic in Book IV-V.
245 Magee points out that according to a certain formal consideration, Consolatio should be
divided into three parts: Book I both begins and ends with poetry; Book II-IV begins with
prose and ends with poetry; Book V both begins and ends with prose. Magee further
divides Book II-IV into two parts according to the tasks to accomplish. Cf. Magee (2009),
“The Good and Morality: Consolatio 2-4,” in Marenbon (ed.), p. 181 and p. 184. Courcelle
(1969, p. 297) divides Consolatio into four parts according to its design. He says that the
design is based on a dual conversion in three stages: self-knowledge (Book II); knowledge
of the purpose of things (Books III and IV to paragraph 5); knowledge of the laws that
govern the universe (end of Book IV and Book V). For the division of Consolatio, also cf.
Lerer (1985), pp. 96-99.
246 Uhlfelder claims that the belief Boethius associates with his study of Liberal Arts is one
of the reasons that lead to the existence of Consolatio; logic and mathematics “provide a
mean between earth and the Creator, reveals the physical universe as a mirror of the divine
plan, and so makes it possible for man to reach the third level.” Cf. Uhlfelder (1981), “The
Role of the Liberal Arts in Boethius’ Consolatio,” in Masi (ed.), p. 23 and p. 29.
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IV.2. Applications of Basic Logic and Mathematics in
Book I-III
The first scene in Consolatio is that the patient is sorrow, and his
physician Lady Philosophy is standing over his head. Facing her silent and
even mute and dumb patient, Lady Philosophy encourages him to open his
mouth. After the patient’s complaint and the outburst against the iniquity of
Fortune, Lady Philosophy responds to him with the criticism that he has
exiled himself from his country (Consolatio, I.pV.4-6). Lady Philosophy
tells her patient that no one could exile him from his country except
himself.247 The patient’s country refers to the kingdom of God, which refers
to the divine wisdom, not to the Christian God.248
Continuing with a few questions, Lady Philosophy touches and tries the
state of her patient’s mind (Consolatio, I.pVI.1-3). With the reflection and
answers of her patient, Lady Philosophy makes a diagnosis of his illness and
finds out the means of his recovery.
“For the confusion which thou art in, by the forgetfulness of thyself,
is the cause why thou art so much grieved at thy exile and the loss
of thy goods. And because thou art ignorant what is the end of
things, thou thinkest that lewd and wicked men be powerful and
happy; likewise, because thou hast forgotten by what means the
world is governed, thou imaginest that these alternations of fortune
do fall out without any guide, sufficient causes not only of sickness,
but also of death itself.” (Consolatio, I.pVI.42-49)249
Lady Philosophy elicits three reasons of her patient’s sickness. Terms that
Lady Philosophy uses to describe the attitude of her patient are
247 The exile here means the patient’s spiritual exile which is mirrored by his physical exile.
Cf. Chadwick (1981b), p. 227.
248 Cf. Section IV.1.
249 Magee analyses the questions in the diagnosis and assesses the patient’s condition by
these questions. Cf. Magee (2009), “The Good and Morality: Consolatio 2-4,” in Marenbon
(ed.), p. 193.
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“forgetful”250, “ignorant”, and “forgotten”. These words imply that the
so-called three reasons for his illness were familiar to the patient at an
earlier time. However, the distress has clouded the recollection of the
patient.
The first reason is that he has no idea of what true happiness, and the
final cause of all things are. In Consolatio, happiness is equal to goodness;
the topic of the good was touched upon in Boethius’ theological tractate
called Quomodo substantiae.251 That tractate proves that everything is good.
Based on this conclusion, in Consolatio, Boethius raises some issues related
to the Good and attempts to solve them.252
The second reason is that though he does not doubt that the world is
governed by reason, he is at a loss by what methods the world is governed.
He does not remember the nature and origin of the order of the world.
Actually, the subject of how the world is governed was discussed in
Boethius’ mathematical works, especially on arithmetic and music.253
The third reason is that he holds a wrong definition of man. He forgets
what man, or the nature of man, is. The discussion of human nature was
involved in Boethius’ commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge.254 By her
treatment, Lady Philosophy helps her patient to solve his three problems and
lead him to the right way to his country with Treatment 1, and at last bring
him back to the kingdom of God.
With these three reasons, the remedy for the illness begins. In Treatment
1 Boethius employs basic logic (especially the Porphyrian Tree and the
theory of definition) and mathematics (especially music and arithmetic).
250 Cf. Donato (2013b) emphasizes the significance of forgetfulness in Boethius’
Consolatio.
251 Cf. Section III.4.
252 Cf. the preface to Section IV.3.1.
253 In his Arithmetica, Boethius assures his readers that God binds the world’s elements
together by number; cf. Section II.2.1 and Section IV.2.2.2. In his Musica, Boethius gives a
short introduction to cosmic music which means the cosmic harmony holding together four
elements of earth, air, fire, and water, or the cycle of the four seasons in consonance and
equilibrium. Cf. Section II.2.2.3 and Section IV.2.2.1.
254 Cf. 1InIsag., 10C-13D and 17C-D.
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IV.2.1. Applications of Basic Logic in Book I-III
In order to explain the diagnostic reasons of the patient’s illness, Lady
Philosophy adopts an order similar to the one Boethius used in Contra
Eutychen et Nestorium in which he first refuted the faith of heresies, and
then by reflecting of the contrary, he gave the Catholic faith.255 In Contra
Eutychen et Nestorium, Boethius writes in the preface about the procedure
of that treatise, saying that, “But since the pen is now to take the place of the
living voice, let me first clear away the extreme and self-contradictory
errors of Nestorius and Eutyches. After that, by God’s help, I will
temperately set forth the middle way of the Christian Faith.” (Contra
Eutychen et Nestorium, 54-58) Similar to this order, in Consolatio, Boethius
uses a poem to show how to discern the first diagnostic reason, viz. what is
the true happiness.
“So thou, whom seeming goods do feed, first shake off yokes
which so thee press, that truth may then thy mind possess.”
(Consolatio, III.mI.11-13)
To insure a fruitful harvest, one must clear the ground before sowing the
seed, which can be deemed as reproducing the principle of the procedure in
Contra Eutychen et Nestorium. That is to say, in order to find what true
happiness is, the first thing is the analysis of false happiness. Then the
contrary of false happiness will be true happiness.256 After recognizing false
goods, the mind should abandon those false goods to make way for the true
good, so as to make the mind more receptive to true one. There is another
reason to begin with false happiness. Because the patient is turmoiled with
the multitude of affections, and his mind is so blinded and impeded by his
grief and anger, he cannot understand reasonable arguments immediately. In
this case, Lady Philosophy decides to cure her patient with the easier
remedies first, but not to use more forcible remedies, so that the patient’s
affections, “which are, as it were, hardened and swollen with perturbations,
may by gentle handling be mollified and disposed to receive the force of
255 Cf. Section III.2.
256 De Vogel gives another reason for this order, viz. that Lady Philosophy “does precisely
according to the rules laid down for such a case by the philosopher Plotinus in that
well-known first treatise of the fifth Ennead.” Cf. De Vogel (1973), pp. 357-358.
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sharper medicines.” (Consolatio, I.pV.41-44) Later, the forcible medicine
will be applied to him. Lady Philosophy attempts to declare in words and to
give shape to that which is better known to her patient, so that her patient
could understand it thoroughly (Consolatio, III.pI.22-24). False happiness is
familiar to all human beings, including the patient here, which is the
beginning of an initial cure of a gentle kind.
Boethius complains that though he once owned riches, dignities,
kingdoms, glory, and pleasure, which are the forms of human felicity, these
things have now abandoned him.257 People seek these material goods
separately in different ways. Some people seek one of them, and some
people seek some of them. Some people believe that possessing these
material goods will make them happy. Are they right? The truth could be
discovered through the Porphyrian Tree. As the Porphyrian Tree of Contra
Eutychen et Nestorium in Section III.2.1.2 shows,258 human beings consist
of soul and body. Human soul falls under the genus of incorporeal substance,
so “the souls of men are in no wise mortal.” Unlike human soul, human
body falls under the genus of corporeal substance, which suggests that the
body will die. If the human body would disappear, the casual felicity, or
material goods people sought would end. It follows that, without doubt,
these material goods could not bring human beings to happiness (Consolatio,
II.pIV.91-101). Lady Philosophy makes the exposition of institutions when
chasing these common goods.
In the case of riches, money cannot keep itself from being taken from
those who possess it (Consolatio, III.pIII.30-33). Human beings are greedy,
and they want more and more money. However, money is limited, so if a
person wants to earn more money, he has to take it from other people. Thus,
everyone with money will need a bodyguard to protect him from losing his
257 The discussions on these forms of human felicity are split between two parallel
treatments, and the distribution of themes is as follows:
Riches II.p5, m5 III.p3, m3
Dignities II.p6, m6 III.p4, m4
Kingdoms II.p6, m6 III.p5, m5
Glory II.p7, m7 III.p6, m6
Pleasure — III.p7, m7
258 Cf. Diagram III.
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money. The rich man will thus not be free. In other words, the riches require
additional protection, and the greed of human beings is insatiable. Therefore,
“riches cannot make a man wanting nothing nor sufficient of himself, and
this was that they seemed to promise.” (Consolatio, III.pIII.28-30) In the
case of dignity, the person who wants dignities has to beg for them from
those who can bestow them. Therefore he may become vile by crouching to
the giver. “The desire of bodily pleasures is full of anxiety, and the enjoying
of them breeds repentance.” (Consolatio, V.pVII.1-3) Other forms of
happiness259 people seek after will not bring people to the happiness either.
“These goods, which can neither perform that they promise, nor are
perfect by having all that is good, do neither, as so many paths, lead
men to happiness, nor make men happy of themselves.”
(Consolatio, III.pVIII.31-35)
By reviewing these material goods, to which men aspire, Lady Philosophy
concludes that happiness cannot be found in these forms of human
happiness, which are false goods. The searches for material goods are only
uncertain by-ways to happiness, “which can never bring any man thither
whither they promise to lead him” (Consolatio, III.pVIII.1-3). So the search
for them is the wrong avenue, which fails to lead to happiness.
These material goods are controlled by Fortune.260 Then Lady
Philosophy exploits rhetoric261 as one method of treatment.
“Wherefore let us use the sweetness of Rhetoric’s persuasions,
which then only is well employed when it forsaketh not our
ordinances.” (Consolatio, II.pI.21-22)
Rhetoric was regarded by Aristotle as a close ally of philosophy. In his
monograph on topics, Boethius devotes the fourth book to the discussion of
rhetoric.
259 Cf. Consolatio, II.p6-II.m7, and III.p3-m7.
260 For the discussion on Fortune in Consolatio, cf. Magee (1987).
261 Rhetoric here and Music later are described by Boethius as slaves belonging to Lady
Philosophy which represents the power of philosophy. On the rhetoric in Consolatio, cf.
Uhlfelder (1981), “The Role of the Liberal Arts in Boethius’ Consolatio,” in Masi (ed.), pp.
19-20.
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“The rhetorical [discipline] investigates and discusses hypotheses,
that is, questions hedged in by a multitude of circumstances.
Circumstances are who, what, where, when, why, how, by what
means.” (TopicisD., 1205D.15-19)
The use of the rhetoric by the speaker functions as the appropriate
persuasion. There are three species of rhetoric: judicial, epideictic, and
deliberative. In Consolatio, what Lady Philosophy adopts is epideictic
rhetoric, since “every one that has to do with praise or censure is put under
the epideictic genus.” (TopicisD., 1207B.10-11) The instrument of rhetoric
is discourse. So Fortune uses her own speech to censure the patient for his
complaint. She believes that riches, dignities, and the rest of that sort belong
to her. So if those things are taken from the patient, he should not have lost
them. In other words, the search for riches, dignities, kingdoms, glory, and
pleasure cannot lead human beings to true happiness.
What, then, is true happiness?262 Lady Philosophy provides a definition.
She defines happiness (or blessedness) as “a state replenished with all that is
good” (Consolatio, III.pII.10-12). The good grants happiness, because
attainment of the good leaves no room for further desires (Consolatio,
III.pII.2-7). This means that this good must be the chief of all goods and
contains whatsoever is good within it. Were it to lack anything of
whatsoever is good, there would still be something left to desire (Consolatio,
III.pII.7-10).
Lady Philosophy declares that her patient must abandon those false
goods, and by reflecting of the contrary, he may discover the true goods.
Lady Philosophy gives the nature of the true good with a dialectic
technique.263 As Boethius states in De Topicis Differentiis, “The dialectical
discipline examines the thesis only; a thesis is a question not involved in
circumstance.” (TopicisD., 1205C.14-15)
As part of the gentle remedy Lady Philosophy employs rhetoric,
whereas in the strong remedy she chooses the technique of dialectic. Similar
262 Cf. Marenbon (2003), pp. 102-108.
263 On the dialectic in Consolatio, cf. Uhlfelder (1981), “The Role of the Liberal Arts in
Boethius’ Consolatio,” in Masi (ed.), pp20-22.
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to rhetoric, dialectic uses discourse as its instrument. Using dialectic, Lady
Philosophy encourages her patient to cooperate with her in the search for the
true good. Besides their definitions, rhetoric and dialectic are also different
in some respects, which are discussed in De Topicis Differentiis,
IV.1205C-1206C.
(1) “Dialectic is restricted to question and answer. Rhetoric, on the
other hand, goes through the subject proposed in unbroken
discourse. Similarly, dialectic uses complete syllogisms. Rhetoric is
content with the brevity of enthymemes.”
(2) “The rhetorician has as judge someone other than his opponent,
someone who decides between them. But for the dialectician, the
one who is the opponent also gives the decision because a reply
[which is], as it were, a decision is elicited from the opponent by
the cunning of the questioning.”
According to two differences above, rhetoric seems softer and sweeter than
dialectic.264 With the technique of rhetoric, Fortune gives an unbroken
discourse and the patient does not to respond to her, so the technique of
rhetoric is fit for the patient who is dumb in the soft remedy. After the
patient has become ready for the forcible medicine, the technique of
dialectic is used, and Lady Philosophy and her patient ask and answer the
questions in an interrupted discourse.
In theory of definition, there is one important standard, which is that the
definition of something must equal the thing itself. Otherwise, the definition
is not complete (Divisio, 886a). According to this definition, the definition
of man that the patient first gives, which is “Man is a rational and mortal
animal”, is not a good one. Indeed, “rational” and “mortal” are two
differences of the species “man”, but when they are joined to the genus
“animal”, the definition is not equal to “man”. Thus, Lady Philosophy
claims that her patient forgets himself because he is so much grieved at his
exile and the loss of his goods (Consolatio, I.pVI.42-46).
264 According to Lerer’s analysis, the rhetorical self-defence follows the patient’s initial
silence, and then debate and questioning takes the place. Cf. Lerer (1985).
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With the Porphyrian Tree, theory of definition, and rhetoric and
dialectic, the wrong way to happiness is cleared away, the general picture of
true happiness is given, and the incomplete definition of man is explained.
However, the detailed discussion of true happiness and the definition of man
need the help of mathematics, which will be discussed in the Section IV.2.2.
Before the discussion of applications of mathematics, some methods
that the arguments will use should be introduced first. They can be found in
Boethius’ theological treatises.
In his theological treatises, one kind of argument is often used by
Boethius. Boethius gets into an argument from one respect, and then reaches
an impious conclusion, so that argument is refuted. The examples of this
method are as follows.
“Hence all things that are, are God — an impious assertion.”
(Quomodo substantiae, 79-80)
“Wherefore man’s nature has not been saved by the birth of Christ
— an impious conclusion.” (Contra Eutychen et Nestorium,
IV.123-125)
Similar to the method of arguments above, in Consolatio, Boethius also
draws some impious conclusions.
“Which it were impious to think of God, than whom, we know
certainly, nothing is better.” (Consolatio, III.pX.54-55)
“For if He judgeth that those things shall happen inevitably, which
it is possible shall not happen, He is deceived, which is not only
impious to think, but also to speak.” (Consolatio, V.pIII.67-69)
“And — than which there can be nothing invented more impious —
since that all order of things proceedeth from Providence, and
human counsels can do nothing, it followeth that our vices also
shall be referred to the author of goodness.” (Consolatio,
V.pIII.94-97)
Other important methods are mathematical methods, which are used in
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Quomodo substantiae. These methods are analysis and synthesis.265 In the
following discussions I will show how these methods are used in Boethius’
arguments. Now I move on to applications of mathematics in Book I-III.
IV.2.2. Applications of Mathematics in Book I-III
IV.2.2.1. Applications of Music in Book I-III
In Treatment 1 music is an important part of the therapy. 266 Music is
used both in the diagnosis and in the remedies (gentle and strong).
In his work on music, Boethius divides music into three kinds:
instrumental music, human music, and cosmic music.267 Instrumental music,
the lowest level of music, is often used in the process of consolation in the
form of meters of poetry and the singing voice. In the soft remedy, except
instrumental music, human music is also applied. Cosmic music as the
highest level of music is applied only as part of the strong remedy. In this
section, I will introduce how these three kinds of music are used and what
functions they fulfil to the consolation.
Among three kinds of music, the only audible one is instrumental music,
which resides in various instruments. It is governed either by tension, or by
breath, or by a certain percussion. In this case, the singing voice in songs is
also included in instrumental music.
First of all, instrumental music is used in the form of this composition.
The whole work of Consolatio is written in alternating poetry268 and prose.
One of the basic elements of poetic language is rhythm. When meters of
poetry are read, the rhythm sounds like music. For rhythm and meter are
265 Cf. Section III.4. “Analysis is the assumption of that which is sought as if it were
admitted (and the arrival) by means of its consequences at something admitted to be true.
Synthesis is an assumption of that which is sought as if it were admitted (and the arrival) by
means of its consequences at something admitted to be true.”
266 Cf. Chamberlain (1970); Uhlfelder (1981), “The Role of the Liberal Arts in Boethius’
Consolatio,” in Masi (ed.), pp. 25-26.
267 Cf. Section II.2.2.3.
268 Harpur (2007) translates the poems in Consolatio, and he argues for the reappraised of
Boethius as poet. However, in my dissertation, I do not focus on the poetry of Consolatio.
About discussions on the poetry of Consolatio, see Barnish (1990); Blumenthal (1986);
Marenbon (2003), pp. 146-153; Newman (2003); O’Daly (1991); Sweeney (2006).
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essential to song, and the meters, sometimes, are just sung by Lady
Philosophy.269 For example, “Philosophy had sung these verses with a soft
and sweet voice.” (Consolatio, IV.pI.1-2) When one hears rhythms and
modes which reach the intellect through the ears, it is doubtless that the
mind is affected and reshaped according to the particular characters of those
rhythms and modes (Musica, I.1.181). This may be one of the reasons that
Boethius uses the style of meters. The meters in Consolatio play a vital role
in changing the patient’s psychological disposition. The meters have the
power to soothe the patient (Consolatio, I.pV.38-44), to refresh wearied
minds (Consolatio, III.pI.4-6), and to delight the patient (Consolatio,
IV.pVI.17-20).270 These roles of meters are all related to instrumental
music.
Boethius insists that “music is associated not only with speculation but
with morality as well” and it forms a part of us through nature,271 “for
nothing is more characteristic of human nature than to be soothed by
pleasant modes or disturbed by their opposites.” (Musica, I.1.179) This
function of music refers directly to instrumental music but the fulfilment of
this function needs the cooperation with human music. Music has effects on
mood and moral growth and it can ennoble or debase character. That is to
say, different styles of instrumental music have different effects upon human
nature. A harsh tune can interrupt the mind. This is the reason why at the
arrival of Lady Philosophy, she cries out to and shoos away the “Sirens”, the
poetical Muses, who suggest words to the patient and make him burst into
tears using sad music.272 In contrast, a sweet song can have positive effects
on the human mind. Accordingly, human behavior can be modified by
hearing pleasant music. In his writing on music, Boethius lists some
examples of persons with a serious illness who were saved or cured by the
269 Cf. Consolatio, III.pIX.105, IV.pVI.17-18 and 206-209.
270 Cf. Scarry (1980), p. 102.
271 Cf. Levin (2009).
272 Cf. Consolatio, I.pI.28-34: Lady Philosophy says with angry look that, “Who hath
permitted these tragic harlots to have access to this sick man, which will not only not
comfort his grief with wholesome remedies, but also nourish them with sugared poison?
For these be they which with the fruitless thorns of affections do kill the fruitful crop of
reason, and do accustom men’s minds to sickness, instead of curing them.”
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assistance of pleasant songs.273 Accordingly, Lady Philosophy has her own
Muses, who, she assures, can cure and heal her patient. In other words, Lady
Philosophy refers to the help from Music.274 From the beginning to the end
of the treatment, Lady Philosophy sings verses or songs,275 which gives her
patient the feeling of comfort.
The functions of instrumental music cannot be fulfilled without the help
of human music. Human music, in its turn, is the interpretation of the
cosmic harmony. Whoever penetrates into himself perceives human music.
This music is a certain harmony uniting the incorporeal nature of reason
with the body. Human music unites the parts of the soul, which, according
to Aristotle, is composed of the rational and the irrational. It intermingles
elements of the body or holds together the parts of the body in an
established order (Musica, I.2.188-189). The whole structure of our soul and
body has been joined by means of musical coalescence. When a human
being hears an instrumental music, his soul responds to this because of
human music. Therefore the patient feels comfort when listening to the
songs. At the beginning of Prose I of Book III, though Lady Philosophy
ended her verse, the sweetness of the song made her patient remain
astonished, attentive, and desirous to hear her longer. Human music can also
unite the rational with the irrational soul. When the patient is listening to
instrumental music, not only is his soul affected by this music, but his
irrational soul is also united with his rational soul. In this manner, with a
song, Lady Philosophy also makes her patient come to himself and recover
his judgment (Consolatio, I.pIII.1-2).
In the soft remedy, Lady Philosophy sings a lot of beautiful songs. The
sweetness of the songs arouses her patient’s interest in the stronger medicine.
Boethius writes,
273 For example, “Terpander and Arion of Methymna saved the citizens of Lesbos and Ionia
from very serious illness through the assistance of song. Moreover, by means of modes,
Ismenias the Theban is said to have driven away all the distresses of many Boeotians
suffering the torments of sciatica.” (Musica, I.1.185)
274 Cf. Consolatio, II.pI.22-25: Lady Philosophy says that, “Let Music, a little slave
belonging to our house, chant sometime lighter and sometime sadder notes.”
275 Although Lady Philosophy is not a human being, as an interlocutor between God and
men, when she talks with her patient, she uses human style. So her singing voice, like
human singing voice, belongs to instrumental music.
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“O most effectual refreshment of wearied minds, how have I been
comforted with thy weighty sentences and pleasing music! ...
Wherefore, I am not now afraid, but rather earnestly desire to know
those remedies, which before thou toldest me were too sharp.”
(Consolatio, III.pI.1-9)
After the help of instrumental music and human music in the soft
remedy, the patient can enter into discussions with his physician Lady
Philosophy, and he is now well enough to engage in deeper reasoning. The
gentle and pleasant things in the soft remedy prepare the patient for stronger
potions (Consolatio, II.pI.18-21). Accordingly, a much stronger medicine
can be applied to him now, and cosmic music, the highest level of music, is
applied.
In the diagnosis of his illness, the patient admits that God governs the
world. However, the patient could not tell by what means the world is
governed. In the ninth poem of Book III,276 Lady Philosophy sings a
beautiful song to show how the world is governed.277
“And, standing still Thyself, yet fram’st all moving laws,
Who to Thy work wert moved by no external cause:
But by a sweet desire, where envy hath no place,
Thy goodness moving Thee to give each thing his grace,
Thou dost all creatures’ forms highest patterns take,
From Thy fair mind the world fair like Thyself doth make.
Thus Thou perfect the whole perfect each part dost frame.
Thou temp’rest elements, making cold mixed with flame
And dry things join with moist, lest fire away should fly,
Or earth, opprest with weight, buried too low should lie.”
(Consolatio, III.m9.3-12)
The world is teeming with many contrary parts or elements, such as cold
and flame, but those different things are bound together and achieve a
balance to make up the world in harmony. There are disagreeing natures,
276 This poem is among the most famous ones in Consolatio, and many authors have
discussed it. Cf. Chadwick (1981b), “O qui perpetua,” pp. 234-235; Wiltshire (1971).
277 Cf. Marenbon (2003), pp. 112-114.
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which could separate the concord, but they, too, are held together and united
by the One. This One is called God by all men. (Consolatio, III.pXII.15-26)
This is also a theme expounded in Boethius’ work on music. The
harmony of the universe, both motion and rest, is studied by music. The
term “harmony” was originally used for the whole field of music. Through
music people could get to the principle of nature, which is harmony.
“For when we hear what is properly and harmoniously united in
sound in conjunction with that which is harmoniously coupled and
joined together within us and are attracted to it, then we recognize
that we ourselves are put together in its likeness.” (Musica, I.1.180)
Boethius believes that people can go beyond instrumental music to
achieve our own music, human music, and then proceed to the harmonious
proportion of human music in general. People could even arrive at cosmic
music. In cosmic music, one can understand the pure concept of proportion
or harmony itself, and then get to the state of happiness. Through cosmic
music, the patient understands that God governs the world in a harmonious
way, but the question “by what specific method does God govern the world”
is not solved. The musical therapy is not enough to cure the patient from this
illness, so another one needs to be added in the strong remedy, which is
arithmetic. In Section IV.2.2.2, I will discuss applications of arithmetic in
the strong remedy.
IV.2.2.2. Applications of Arithmetic in Book I-III
With applications of basic logic and music, the three diagnostic reasons
of the patient’s illness are touched upon to some extent but not solved
completely. With applications of basic logic, Lady Philosophy refutes false
happiness, and she provides a definition of happiness without explanation of
what true happiness looks like. The answer to “what is the end of
everything” is not given. With the theory of definition, Lady Philosophy
points out that the definition her patient provides in reply at first is
incomplete. She claims that man is not only a rational and mortal animal,
but she has not given the full definition either. By means of the musical
therapy, the patient recalls that God governs the world in a harmonious way,
but Lady Philosophy does not explain how this works. All unsolved
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questions will be solved by applications of arithmetic.
Just like “They [i.e. the souls] stream, like fire returning, back to Thee,
their God” (Consolatio, III.mIX.21), the patient should also return to God.
The kingdom of God is just the patient’s own country. Before the treatment
of his illness, his physician Lady Philosophy gave the diagnosis that he had
exiled himself from his country (Consolatio, I.pV.4-6). Here she determines
to lead her patient to “return to thy country in safety” (Consolatio,
III.pXII.28-29). As the remedy for the illness continues, applications of
arithmetic are needed.
God binds the world’s elements together on mathematical principles by
number; the exemplar of His thought is arithmetic. Arithmetic studies
number itself, and it introduces people to the numerical expression of
quantity.
“From the beginning, all things whatever which have been created
may be seen by the nature of things to be formed by reason of
numbers. Number was the principal exemplar in the mind of the
creator.” (Arithmetica, I.2)
Through numbers of an assigned order, all things exhibit the logic of their
maker, God. “From Thy fair mind the world fair like Thyself doth make”
(Consolatio, III.m9.8). Consequently, all things found harmony. The
geometrical figures follow the laws of harmony, and the movements of the
celestial bodies of astronomy follow the harmonious interval.
God is the beginning of all things, which is known by the patient at first.
However, he forgets what the end of all things is. Then the method of
synthesis278 is used.
Suppose a living creature given.
Since unity is the substance and principle of any constant quantity,
(Arithmetica, II.1)
Then this living creature is a unity.
278 On the explanation of this method, cf. Section III.4.and the end of Section IV.2.1.
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According to the Porphyrian Tree, this living creature consists of
body and soul. (Diagram III)
Therefore, body and soul are united as a unity.
According to the nature of unity, when a unity is dissolved by their
separation, it is manifest that it perishes.
Thus, the body or the soul of a living creature is not representative
of this living creature. If one of them is separated and sundered,
there is no longer a living creature.
Therefore, we get what is sought after, that is, in order to keep the
identity of a living creature, it must not lose its unity. In other
words, all things desire unity.
Furthermore, according to Rule I of Quomodo substantiae,279 it is a
common conception that complete and absolute goodness is only found
when all is united as it were into one form. When things differ, they are not
good, and when they are one, they become good, so such things are made
good by obtaining unity (Consolatio, III.pXI.18-21). The good and unity of
course do not have diverse effects, so they have the same substance
(Consolatio, III.pXI.24-26). And it is clear that all that is good is good by
partaking of goodness (Consolatio, III.pXI.22-23). Therefore, goodness and
unity are identical.
Now we arrive at a proposition from the synthesis (i.e. All things desire
unity) and an equation (i.e. goodness=unity). We arrived at the conclusion
that all things desire goodness. Everything, both animate and inanimate,
seeks goodness. Thus, goodness is that which is desired by all things, that is
to say, “we must confess that goodness is the end of all things.” (Consolatio,
III.pXI.121-123) With the idea of unity (unitas) or, as she more often says,
the one (unum), Lady Philosophy explains the final goal of all things.
In musical therapy, the patient recalls that God governs the world in a
harmonious way. Harmony is the sufficient state, neither more nor less,
which is perfect. From Chapter 19-20 of Book I in Arithmetica, we know
279 Cf. Section III.4.1.
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that the perfect numbers does not extend in a superfluous progression nor
are they reduced in a contracted reduction, “the sum of its parts is not more
than the total nor does it suffer from a lack in comparison with the total.”
Such as 6, its parts are 1, 2, and 3, and the sum of its part just equals to 6.
For “Thou perfect the whole perfect each part dost frame” (Consolatio,
III.m9.9), God commands its perfect parts to form a perfect world. And
“within the first ten numbers there is only one perfect number, 6; within the
first hundred, there is 28; within a thousand, 496; within ten thousand,
8128.” This means that within the first ten thousand numbers, there are only
four perfect numbers, that is, 6, 28, 496, 8128, thus perfect numbers are rare,
and like this goodness is rare.
The definition of happiness is “a state replenished with all that is good”
(Consolatio, III.pII.10-12), and by means of this definition we can produce a
second equation, that is, goodness=happiness. Since goodness is rare,
happiness is rare. The way in which human beings can achieve such rare
happiness can be explained by two deductions:280 one is concerned with the
question whether the perfect happiness exists, and the other asks, if true
happiness does exist, where we can find it. Here the method of synthesis is
used again.
Suppose equality given.
Then according to theory of equality,281 the world begins with
equality.
Equality entails being entire and absolute, and inequality implies
being defective and incomplete.
Hence the world began with perfections, from which it lapsed into
the present diminished and exhausted state.
For the less perfect derives from what is more perfect and never
vice versa.
Thus “if in any kind we find something imperfect, there must need
280 Deduction is translated from the word porismata, which I give an explanation in
Section III.4. Lady Philosophy here regards it as a corollarium.
281 Cf. Section II.2.1.3.a.
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be something perfect also in the same kind.” (Consolatio,
III.pX.11-13)
But we indeed find imperfect happiness, or in other words false
happiness, which is explained in Section IV.2.1.
Then imperfect happiness must derive from perfect happiness.
Therefore, perfect happiness exists.
Now we get what we are seeking: perfect happiness does exist.
However, what’s the difference between perfect happiness and false
happiness? Before answering this question, I need go back to a distinction
between form and matter put forward by Boethius in his earlier work on the
Trinity.
“Form which is without matter cannot be a substrate, and cannot
have its essence in matter, else it would not be form but a reflexion
(imago). ... We misname the entities that reside in bodies when we
call them forms; they are mere images (imagines); they only
resemble those forms which are not incorporate in matter.” (De
trinitate, II.48-51; 53-56)
If an analogy is drawn between human beings and the goods, then the
goods could be regarded as the combination of the goods of body and the
goods of soul. The goods of body are a substrate with matter, thus they are
just the images of their form, “the images (imagines) of the true good, or
certain imperfect goods, but they cannot give them the true and perfect good
itself.” (Consolatio, III.pIX.91-94) Unlike the goods of the body, the goods
of the soul are without matter, since they are form. In fact, the material
goods, including riches, dignities, kingdoms, glory, and pleasure are just the
goods of the body, and what they counterfeit are the goods of the soul or the
form of goods, which are the true goods, including sufficiency, power,
respect, renown, and joy. The goods of the soul equal perfect happiness, and
the goods of the body equal false happiness. Therefore, perfect happiness
and false happiness are just like form and matter.
The goods of the soul are simple and undivided. The division is unlike
the division of a whole into parts. If the goods of soul could be divided into
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parts, such as sufficiency, power, respect, renown, and joy, then, as Boethius
describes in his Divisio, each part would differ from another. However, this
is not the truth. “Every one of these things (the goods of soul) is the same
with the rest, whosoever seeketh for any of them without the rest obtaineth
not that which he desireth.” (Consolatio, III.pIX.64-67) Goods of the soul
are one and the same thing. When human beings are seeking happiness, they
wrongly divide it into different things, which cannot be owned separately,
but only as one substance. As a result, the goods are translated from true and
perfect to false and imperfect. The goods of the soul have different names,
but do not differ in substance (Consolatio, III.pIX.41-44).
In his treatise against Eutyches and Nestorius, Boethius chooses one
definition of Nature from the four he listed, that is, “Nature is the specific
difference that gives form to anything.”282 From this definition of Nature,
we could see that the goods of the soul, i.e. sufficiency, power, respect,
renown, and joy, are one and simple by nature. However, man wrongly
divides it and tries to obtain parts of the goods of that soul that have no parts,
so the result is that “he neither getteth a part, which is none, nor the whole,
which he seeketh not after.” (Consolatio, III.pIX.45-49)
True and false happiness are different; they are like form and matter, so
that “neither sufficiency by riches, nor power by kingdoms, nor respect by
dignities, nor renown by glory, nor joy can be gotten by pleasures.”
(Consolatio, III.pIX.4-6)
So, if true happiness does indeed exist, where can it be found? The
method of analysis283 is applied first.
Suppose God is not the source of all things.
Then there must be something that is the source of God, say that is
α.
According to a common concept, i.e. if one thing is source of
another thing, then this thing must be prior to that thing, α is prior
to God.
282 Cf. Section III.2.1.
283 On the explanation of this method, cf. Section III.4 and the end of Section IV.2.1.
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But God is given to prevent an infinite series, and He is the
beginning of all things.
Then nothing is prior to God.
Therefore, the supposition is wrong.
From the method of analysis, we know that God is the source of all things.
There is no doubt that “the nature of nothing can be better than the
beginning of it” (Consolatio, III.pX.56-59), which is just what Boethius
calls a common concept in Quomodo substantiae. Thus there is nothing
better than God, which means that God is the perfect good. Alternatively,
this can be expressed in an equation: God=perfect good. And from the
definition of happiness given by Lady Philosophy, viz. happiness is “a state
replenished with all that is good” (Consolatio, III.pII.10-12), it can be
inferred that true happiness=perfect good. So according to the nature of the
equation, true happiness=God, which means that happiness resides in
God.284
With the help of mathematical methods and knowledge, we know where
true happiness is, but how can human beings get it? The answer to this
question needs to explain the last diagnostic reason of the patient’s illness,
concerning what man is.285
The question what man is asks for the nature of man. In his arguments
to this question, Boethius combines the ideas of Plato and Aristotle.286
When Lady Philosophy asks, “Well then, canst thou explicate what man is?”
the answer of the patient is as follows, “Dost thou ask me if I know that I
am a reasonable and mortal living creature? I know and confess myself to be
284 On the arguments on “God, the Good, and Happiness”, cf. Marenbon (2003), pp.
108-112.
285 Cf. Dougherty (2004).
286 Boethius made a great plan to harmonize Plato and Aristotle, but he did not finish his
plan. Cf. Section I.2.1. In Consolatio, it seems that in content he prefers Plato. For example,
on the definition of man, Lady Philosophy asserts that Aristotle’s definition is not enough,
and the complete definition of man should include man’s higher self which is learnt from
Plato. And also when defining chance, Lady Philosophy is not satisfied with Aristotle’s
definition, and the difference from Aristotle’s concept of chance is characteristic of the
Platonic tradition, cf. Section IV.3.2.1.b. In method, however, Boethius prefers Aristotle, as
the use of Aristotle’s logic shows.
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so.” (Consolatio, I.pVII.35-37) In Section IV.2.1, with reference to the
theory of definition, Lady Philosophy claims that this definition is
incomplete. “Man is a rational and mortal animal”287 is the Aristotelian
definition, which is not enough to explain the nature of man. Besides this,
man could be something else, which is man’s higher self or abstract being,
which is learnt from Plato. Here Boethius harmonizes the definition of man
from Aristotle and Plato, for the Aristotelian definition is closer to this world,
whereas the Platonic definition sets men free from this world and makes it
possible for the patient to return to God.
According to what have already discussed, true happiness or
blessedness and God are the same, which is equal to the perfect good. From
this it follows that “blessedness is equal to divinity”. As we all know, “All
men can be made blessed by obtaining of blessedness.” Thus, “all men can
be made blessed by the obtaining of divinity.” (Consolatio, III.pX.83-86)
The divinity is a nature of God. If men can obtain this nature of the divinity,
then they who obtain divinity must become gods. Therefore, man’s higher
self is a god by participation, for there is only one God by nature
(Consolatio, III.pX.86-90).
Hitherto, all of three diagnostic reasons of the patient’s illness have
been expounded by Boethius employing knowledge and methods of basic
logic and mathematics.
IV.2.3. How to Get to Happiness
After the exposition of the three diagnostic reasons, it is clear that the
goods of the body human beings use to seek after are not true and perfect
goods. These false avenues do not lead to real happiness. These false goods
should now be gathered into a unity, or, in other words, be harmonized.
God rules the world in a harmonious way. As human music is human
expression of natural harmony, human mind can imitate the nature or God
and liberate himself from this world. God disposes all things by Himself, for
“Who to Thy work wert moved by no external cause” (Consolatio, III.m9.4).
287 This definition of man appears in Boethius’ first commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge; cf.
1InIsag., 12D-13D and 17C-D.
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And it has already been proved that God is goodness itself. Therefore, God,
Whom we have argued to be Goodness, governs the world in a harmonious
way by Himself. As I discussed above, man could become a god by
obtaining divinity which is equal to blessedness (or happiness). And man is
comprised of soul and body which are joined by means of musical
coalescence. Imitating God, man needs to find the way within himself.
“O mortal men, why seek you for your felicity aboard, which is
placed within yourselves? ... Wherefore, if thou enjoyest thyself,
thou shalt possess that which neither thou wilt ever wish to lose nor
fortune can take away. And that thou mayst acknowledge that
blessedness cannot consist in these casual things, gather it thus.”
(Consolatio, II.pIV.72-79)
Nothing is more precious to us human beings than our selves. Therefore, if
man wants to get to the end, to goodness and happiness, he can do so in the
same manner as God: by himself. When we learn this, we should not be sad
about the things outside us.
All discussions set out above are not new to Boethius: “what thou hast
uttered, though the force of grief had made me forget it of late, yet
heretofore I was not altogether ignorant of it.” (Consolatio, IV.pI.7-9) This
has already been proven from Boethius’ earlier works on mathematics and
logic.288
Three diagnostic reasons of the patient’s illness have been explained, so
the course of treatment prescribed by Lady Philosophy in the first book of
Consolatio seems to be completed, and the dialogue seems to be brought to
a close.
However, as I announced in the preface of this chapter, the patient’s
illness has not really been cured. Treatment 1 in the first three books is not
enough. Treatment 2 should be provided as a further treatment and will
comprise Books IV and V. Unlike Treatment 1, in Treatment 2, the patient
will take the initiative. Boethius will again apply basic logic in Treatment 2,
but most of the ideas expressed will be new to him. In Section IV.3, I will
288 Cf. Section IV.2.1 and Section IV.2.2.
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focus on applications of basic logic in Book IV and Book V.
IV.3. Applications of Basic Logic in Book IV-V
During Treatment 1 in Book I-III, the patient at first was mute and
dumb, and Lady Philosophy asked him some questions to help him. At the
end of Treatment 1, the patient recalls something and can reason by himself
now. However, apart from the three diagnostic reasons of the patient’s
illness, there is another vital question in his mind, which is related to evil.289
Lady Philosophy claims that “there is nothing that God who is almighty
cannot do,” and “God cannot do evil,” therefore, “evil is nothing.”
(Consolatio, III.pXII.74-78) However, evil does exist in a world that is
universally governed by the God! This is the root cause of the patient’s
illness. The patient makes the diagnosis himself,
“O thou who bringest us to see true light, those things which
hitherto thou hast treated of have manifestly appeared both to be
divine when contemplated apart, and invincible when supported by
thy reasons, and what thou hast uttered, though the force of grief
had made me forget it of late, yet heretofore I was not altogether
ignorant of it. But this is the chiefest cause of my sorrow, that since
the governor of all things is so good, there can either be any evil at
all, or that it pass unpunished. Which alone I beseech thee consider,
how much admiration it deserveth. But there is another greater than
this; for wickedness bearing rule and sway, virtue is not only
without reward, but lieth also trodden under the wicked’s feet, and
is punished instead of vice. That which things should be done in the
kingdom of God, who knoweth all things, can do all things, but will
do only that which is good, no man can sufficiently admire nor
complain.” (Consolatio, IV.pI.5-19)
289 Cf. Chadwick (1981b), pp. 239-241; Marenbon (2003), pp. 114-117; Sharples (1991),
pp. 31-34. On the discussions on evil and punishment also cf. Evans (1982a), about
Augustine on evil; Mackenzie (1985), about Plato on punishment; Sorabji (2004a), pp.
95-108, about the texts of the commentators from 200-600AD on evil; Steel (1998), about
Proclus on evil.
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The patient’s diagnosis contains two main questions. One is that evil seems
powerful than the good; and the other one is that it appears that the good is
not rewarded while evil is not punished. Both of these seem abnormal in a
world governed by an almighty and good God. Therefore, the patient needs
further treatment.
Treatment 2 is different from Treatment 1. The questions discussed in
Treatment 1 used to be known by Boethius, but were temporarily forgotten,
while the issues argued in Treatment 2 are not discussed nor solved by
Boethius in his earlier works. The necessary continuation applies the
metaphysics of the Good to moral considerations.290 The questions in the
patient’s diagnosis derive from Plato’s Gorgias.291 In Gorgias, especially
466b-481b, Socrates discusses with Polus what rhetors or tyrants do, which
deals with concrete examples.292 Unlike Plato, in Consolatio Boethius
discusses the good, and evil men who are abstract and general.
In the following two sections, I will first introduce the analysis of the
questions in Treatment 2, viz. the power of good and evil; and the reward of
good and the punishment of evil. Then I will give the explanation Lady
Philosophy provides for these questions, which relates to Providence. In the
discussion of these two sections, Boethius adopts basic logic.
IV.3.1. Analysis of Questions in Treatment 2
The questions in Treatment 2 are related to good and evil, which are
contraries. Contrary is one of four classes of opposites.293 In Chapter 11 of
Categories, Aristotle gives a further discussion of contraries with special
mention of good and evil. Good and evil are contraries, so the power of the
good and the evil can be proved as follows. If a potent feature of the good is
obvious, then it will be acknowledged that the evil is frail; and on the
contrary, if a weakness of evil is discerned, then it will be manifest that the
290 Cf. Magee (2009), “The Good and Morality: Consolatio 2-4,” in Marenbon (ed.), pp.
198-200.
291 Cf. Marenbon (2009), p. 198.
292 Cf. Plato, Gorgias, 466b-481b; Nichols (1998).
293 Opposites can be divided into correlatives, contraries, positives and privatives,
affirmation and negation.
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good is strong. (Consolatio, IV.pII.6-8)
Before the discussion, one theorem is given first, that is, “There be two
things by which all human actions are effected, will and power, of which if
either be wanting, there can nothing be performed.” (Consolatio,
IV.pII.12-14) This theorem is developed from Plato’s Gorgias.
“SOC.: By preparing what, then, would a human being help himself,
so as to have both of these benefits — that of not doing injustice
and that of not suffering injustice? Is it power or wish? This is how
I mean it: if he does not wish to suffer injustice, will he not suffer
injustice; or if he has prepared a power of not suffering injustice,
will he not suffer injustice?”294
Unlike Socrates, Boethius immediately divides the whole of human actions
into two elements, will and power. This is the use of the logical theory of
division, here the division of a whole into parts.295 There are many ways in
which “whole” is used, and among these ways, one is that what consists of
certain powers is called a whole (Divisio, 888c). The division of human
actions is the division of a whole consisting of powers. One characteristic of
this kind of division is that “if a part of the whole perishes then that of
which one part has been destroyed will not be whole” (Divisio, 879c).
Accordingly, if one of these two parts, will or power, is absent, the whole of
human actions cannot be accomplished.
“For if there want will, no man taketh anything in hand against his
will, and if there be not power, the will is in vain. So that, if thou
seest any willing to obtain that which he doth not obtain, thou canst
not doubt but that he wanted power to obtain what he would.”
(Consolatio, IV.pII.14-19)
Based on this theorem, Lady Philosophy begins her argument, again, in
the way of the Quomodo substantiae, i.e. by means of synthesis.
Suppose two kinds of men, the good and the evil.
294 Cf. Plato, Gorgias, 509d; Nichols (1998).
295 Cf. Section II.1.2.2.
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Then according to the theorem, their actions depend on their will
and power.
All men both good and evil without difference of intentions
endeavour to obtain goodness. (This is proved in Section IV.2.2)
Hence, the good and the evil have the same will, that is to say,
obtaining goodness.
Thus, their actions depend on how much power they have.
But every man is mighty in that which he can do, and weak in that
which he cannot do. (Consolatio, IV.pII.22-24)
Then the more powerful men are, the easier men can get their will.
The good men are so-called because they achieve goodness. If evil
men could obtain goodness, they would not be called evil men.
Thus, the good men get what they will, but the evil men do not get
that they will.
Therefore, the good men are more powerful than the evil men.
With the method of synthesis, the first question on the power of the good
and the evil is explained. In order to explain the second question on the
good and the evil, the argument continues.
Since goodness is identical with happiness. (This is proved in
Section IV.2.2)
Then the good who get their will, i.e. goodness, are happy.
Since happy men are gods. (This is proved in Section IV.2.2)
Therefore, the good men become gods, which is the reward for the
good.
Contrary to the reward of the good, the evil could not get their will, i.e.
goodness, so they are unhappy. However, if the wicked men get to the end
of evil, they will have gone too far away from goodness; therefore, they
should be happier in failing their ends than in attaining them. As we know,
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justice is a subordinate species of the genus good, which is a common
concept. So by the reason of justice, punishment is good. This means that
the wicked who are punished have some good annexed. If wicked men
accept their punishment, which is good, they will be happy, for goodness is
identical with happiness. Otherwise, if wicked men escape the hands of
justice, they will not get any good, and then they are less happy than when
they are punished (Consolatio, IV.pIV.42-44). Deductively, the wicked who
are punished justly will be far happier if than those who escape punishment
unjustly (Consolatio, IV.pIV.71-73).
From arguments of the reward of the good and the punishment of evil, it
is manifest that good men are happy and get their reward by becoming gods,
whereas evil men are unhappy. However, there is a far worse outcome of
evil. Because of their all-embracing wickedness, evil men have lost the
nature of men (Consolatio, IV.pIII.50-51). This can be shown from the
Porphyrian Tree. As the Porphyrian Tree of Contra Eutychen et Nestorium
in Section III.2.1.2296 shows, men are composed of body and soul, which is
also a division of a whole into parts. When either of these two parts is
destroyed, the whole “man” will disappear. “For as faintness is a disease of
the body, so is vice a sickness of the mind.” (Consolatio, IV.pIV.149-151)
As for the wicked, though they keep the outward shape of human body, their
souls are destroyed; as a result, in this case, the inward states of the
wicked’s mind are changed into brute beasts. If the human soul, as one part
of the whole human being, is damaged, then the whole human being of evil
men will disappear, and they could not be called men.
“So that he who, leaving virtue, ceaseth to be a man, since he
cannot be partaker of the divine condition, is turned into a beast.”
(Consolatio, IV.pIII.66-69)
With the method of synthesis in mathematics, knowledge of the
category of contrary and the Porphyrian Tree in logic, Lady Philosophy
expounds the patient’s questions about the good and evil. However, the
reason why these questions on the good and the evil are misunderstood is
not solved, and Treatment 2 continues.
296 Cf. Diagram III.
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IV.3.2. A Reason Related to Providence
After the explanation of the questions, the patient points out a confusion.
Specifically, the patient wonders why, if the world is governed by God, a
good ruler, there still exists apparent injustice and irrationality.297
“Wherefore I much marvel why these things are thus turned upside
down, and the punishments of wickedness oppress the good, while
evil men obtain the rewards of the good. ... Now God being the
Governor, my astonishment is increased.” (Consolatio, IV.pV.13-17;
18-19)
At the request of her patient, Lady Philosophy offers a reason, which
concerns providence. The issue of Providence is entangled with many other
questions, including questions “of the simplicity of Providence; of the
course of Fate; of sudden chances; of God’s knowledge and predestination,
and of free will” (Consolatio, IV.pVI.11-13).298 Though these questions had
had a long history of discussion, from Boethius’ point of view they had not
been solved completely. Boethius discusses them with his own methods to
make them much clearer, especially by applying division and definition. In
the following discussions, some ideas or examples in his second
commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation 9 are resumed and advanced
by Boethius here.
IV.3.2.1. Distinction between Providence and two Terms, Fate and
Chance
In order to understand the argument about providence, we first need to
distinguish providence from fate and chance.
IV.3.2.1.a. Providence and Fate
The first term related to providence is “fate”.299 The Stoics, as
297 Throughout Chapter VI of Book IV in Consolatio, the emphasis is laid on the
limitations of human understanding; cf. Lerer (1985), pp. 204-213.
298 Cf. Dubs (1981); Sharples (2009), “Fate, Prescience and Free Will,” in Marenbon (ed.),
pp. 207-227.
299 Sorabji (2004a, pp. 89-92) lists texts of the commentators from 200-600AD on the
relation of providence to fate. Also cf. Chadwick (1981b), pp. 242-244; Marenbon (2003),
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Courcelle indicates, did not know the subordination of fate to providence,
for to the Stoics, it is meaningless except in a philosophy that establishes a
hierarchy among beings. It is the Neoplatonists that state this relationship
between the two conspicuously.300 But it should be said that the
development of the precise nature of Providence has its origin in
Boethius.301 Boethius begins the discussion of the distinction between
providence and fate from their definitions. It is the Neoplatonists that “link
providence with the timeless unity of intellect, and fate with the nature of
the physical universe extended in time and governed by soul.”302 This link
affects Boethius’ differentiation.
From the four types of definition in his commentary on Cicero’s
Topics,303 Boethius here employs the definition in the strict sense of the
term. This type of definition is constructed of genus and differentiae.
Boethius gives two definitions of each concept.
In the first definition, providence and fate both fall into the genus called
the “way” in which all things behave. The differentiae are that this way is
either “considered in the purity of God’s understanding”, or “referred to
those things which He moves and disposes”. The former is named
Providence, and the latter is called Fate by the ancients (Consolatio,
IV.pVI.27-30). The differentiae determine their different forces. Providence
arranges all things and embraces all things together, however diverse and
infinite; while Fate is a disposition inherent in changeable things that
arranging the motion of every particular thing as it is being distributed in
place, form, and time.
In the second definition providence and fate fall into another genus,
called “unity”. Therefore, when the unfolding of temporal order is a unity
within the foresight of God’s mind, it is Providence, but when that unity is
unfolded in time, it is called Fate.
Regardless of the differences between them, providence and fate are
pp. 117-121; Sharples (1991), pp. 29-31.
300 Cf. Courcelle (1969), p. 305.
301 Cf. Craig (1988b) and Patch (1929).
302 Sharples (1991), p. 31.
303 Cf. Section II.1.2.2.
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also related to each other. Fatal order proceeds from the simplicity of
Providence, and Fate depends on Providence.304 So fate obeys to
providence and all that is under fate is also subject to providence. However,
it is not the same contrariwise. There are other things except fate being
placed under providence, which “above the course of fate and nigh to the
first Divinity, being stable and fixed, exceed the order of fatal mobility”
(Consolatio, IV.pVI.60-65).
To illustrate this relation, Lady Philosophy uses an analogy of
geometrical images.305 She describes how orbs turn about the same centre.
“For as of orbs which turn about the same centre, the inmost
draweth nigh to the simplicity of the midst, and is as it were the
hinge of the rest, which are placed without it, about which they are
turned, and the outmost, wheeled with a greater compass, by how
much it departeth from the middle indivisibility of the centre, is so
much the more extended into larger spaces, but that which is joined
and coupled to that middle approacheth to simplicity, and ceaseth to
spread and flow abroad.” (Consolatio, IV.pVI.65-73)
In a similar way, Providence is the center, and what distances itself farthest
from this mind is involved more deeply in the chains of Fate. The closer
things are to the sovereign mind, the more they are free from motion, and
surpass the necessity of Fate. Therefore, the way a circle moves about the
centre represents the course of movable Fate in relation to the stable
simplicity of Providence.
Now that Providence and Fate have been defined, the nature of
providence has become clear. As the author of all nature, God by His
Providence directs and disposes all things to goodness. “While He
endeavoureth to retain in His own likeness those things which He hath
produced, He banisheth all evil from the bounds of His commonwealth, by
the course of fatal necessity.” (Consolatio, IV.pVI.201-204) The nature of
304 Boethius stresses that fate is subordinate to providence. On this point, Sharples
compares Boethius’ opinion with those of his sources, cf. Sharples (1991), pp. 204-205.
305 On the sources of this analogy, cf. Courcelle (1969), pp. 305-306; Patch (1929);
Sharples (1991), p. 205.
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Providence is that it is “the very Divine reason itself, seated in the highest
Prince” (Consolatio, IV.pVI.32-33). If so, it will be perceived that there is
no place left for the so-called evil in the world. Accordingly, it is clear that
all manner of fortune is good.306 The reason is that when fortune is directed
to rewarding the good, it is just, which is good; and when fortune is directed
to punish the wicked, it is profitable, which is also good.
IV.3.2.1.b. Providence and Chance
Another term related to providence is chance.307 On the basis of
Aristotle’s account of chance, Lady Philosophy explains the nature of
chance and gives a definition of chance. Aristotle’s definition of chance in
Physics308 has already been offered by Boethius in his second commentary
on Aristotle’s On Interpretation 9.
“They (the Peripatetics) affirm that there is chance in physical
things: whenever something is done and the outcome is not that for
which the thing which was done was initiated, then the outcome
must be considered to have occurred by chance. Thus chance does
not come about without any action, but as long as something
unexpected happens through the action which is put into effect, the
traditional view of the Peripatetics is that it has occurred by
chance.” (2InInter., 194.2-9)
Later in his commentary on Cicero’s Topica, Boethius distinguishes the
Ciceronian definition of chance from the Aristotelian definition of chance,
and he sums up that of these two definitions have in common that “what is
subject to fortune is always included among uncertain occurrences”
(C.Topica, 374/1153).
In Consolatio, the Aristotelian definition of chance is again given.
However, this time, Boethius does not just state Aristotle’s definition, but
also points out its imperfection. Lady Philosophy says that Aristotle’s
account of chance is “near the truth” (Consolatio, V.pI.35-37), which means
306 Cf. Cioffari (1935), p.89.
307 Cf. Marenbon (2003), pp. 121-124. And Sorabji (2004a, pp. 92-95) lists some texts of
the commentators from 200-600AD on the relation of providence to chance.
308 OnAristotle’s discussion of chance, cf. Aristotle, Physics, II.4-6; Ross (1995).
Chapter IV. Applications of Basic Logic and Mathematics to Consolatio Philosophiae
- 150 -
it is not exactly the truth. The definition of chance given by Boethius is as
follows.
“Wherefore, we may define chance thus: That it is an unexpected
event of concurring causes in those things which are done to some
end and purpose. Now the cause why causes so concur and meet so
together, is that order proceeding with inevitable connexion, which,
descending from the fountain of Providence, disposeth all things in
their places and times.” (Consolatio, V.pI.53-58)
Between Boethius’ definition of chance and Aristotle’s, there are
differences. From Aristotle’s perspective, “by chance” means that the result
of the action is not intended, for this action was done with some other
primary purpose. In other words, there is no explanation of the connection
between the action and the result attaching to it, apart from happening “by
chance”. Like Aristotle, Boethius admits that the action and the result are
coincident and separate. However, unlike Aristotle, Boethius argues that
chance is also the working out of Providence. The difference between the
definitions of chance given by Boethius and Aristotle can also be seen from
the examples of chance. Both in the commentary on Aristotle’s On
Interpretation and Consolatio, Boethius takes man’s digging, which appears
first in abbreviated form in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, 1025A, as an example
to explain chance,309 but what he states about the example in the two works
is not the same. In the commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation,
Boethius states that,
“For if someone while digging the ground or making a ditch for
agricultural purposes finds treasure, the treasure has been found by
chance though not without some action (for the ground had been
dug when the treasure was found), but it was not the agent’s
intention that treasure be found. Thus though the man was doing
something, a different result happened to him while he was doing
something else.” (2InInter., 194.9-15)
Boethius stops the example at the point of stating that this man’s action and
what he gets are coincident. However, in Consolatio, Boethius advances this
309 Cf. Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1025A; Ross (1995).
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example.
“... One digging his ground with intention to till it, findeth a hidden
treasure. This is thought to have fallen thus out by fortune, but it is
not of nothing, for it hath peculiar causes whose unexpected and
not foreseen concourse seemeth to have brought forth a chance. For
unless the husbandman had digged up his ground, and unless the
other had hidden his money in that place, the treasure had not been
found. There are therefore the causes of this fortunate accident,
which proceedeth from the meeting and concourse of causes, and
not from the intention of the doer.” (Consolatio, V.pI.41-52)
Here Boethius admits the coincident of the man’s action and his result, but
he also claims that “it is not of nothing”, without any cause. There is also
the other person who had hidden the treasure in the place where the man
was digging, which is the working out of Providence.
From the exposition of definitions above, fate and chance both depend
on Providence, and all things are arranged and embraced by Providence, so
it seems that there is no free will. Nevertheless, Lady Philosophy confirms
that free will does exist.
“We have [free will] for there can be no reasonable nature, unless it
be endued with free-will. ... Now every one seeketh for that which
he thinketh is to be desired, and escheweth that which in his
judgment is to be avoided. Wherefore, they which have reason in
themselves have freedom to will and nill.” (Consolatio, V.pII.5-6;
9-11)
As a result of the proper definition of providence, an important issue comes
out, namely how it is possible to reconcile free will with providence. The
solution to this is the solution to the patient’s root cause of his illness.
IV.3.2.2. The Solution to the Issue of Providence and Free Will
The patient complains of this issue of Providence and free will310 and
310 Cf. Bobzien (1998 and 2000); Brennan (2001); Chadwick (1981b), pp. 244-247; Kenny
(1969); LaChance (2004).
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concludes that there are three possible scenarios for God to foreknow
uncertain things:311
(a) God judges that things will happen inevitably, but what He
foreknows does not happen;
(b) God knows uncertain things for what they are: they can either
happen or not happen;
(c) God foresees all things without error, and nothing can be
uncertain.
(Consolatio, V.pIII.67-84)
In the first situation (a), the conclusion is that God is mistaken, “which
is not only impious to think, but also to speak” (Consolatio, V.pIII.68-69).
In the second case (b), God could not exceed human opinion, which is also
impious.312 The last situation (c) suggests that there is no free will. The
consequences of the last situation will be far worse. All rewards and
punishments will be arbitrary and in vain, because the good and the wicked
are compelled by the certain necessity proceeding from Providence, and
their own wills lead them to neither. What is worse is that human vices will
also be referred to the author of goodness. Furthermore, prayer to God will
be futile, “since an unflexible course connecteth all things that can be
desired.” (Consolatio, V.pIII.99-100) From this situtation the core of the
patient’s complaint has become clear.
After the patient’s long complaint,313 Lady Philosophy claims that the
issue of the compromise between Providence and free will has a long history,
and that early thinkers already presented the solution. They advanced that
what providence foresees depends on what actually comes to pass, and not
vice versa. In other words, “they suppose that foreknowledge is not the
cause of any necessity in things to come.” (Consolatio, V.pIV.13-15) And
Boethius himself also searched this solution in his commentary on
311 In his commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, Ammonius Hermiae contends that
divine foreknowledge makes the contingent void; Boethius has a different opinion. Cf.
Ammonius, On Aristotle’s On interpretation 9; Blank (1998).
312 The method of arguments (i.e. coming to an impious conclusion) is similar with one
Boethius used in his theological treatises. Cf. Section IV.2.1.
313 Cf. Consolatio, V.pIII.
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Aristotle’s On Interpretation, 225.9ff.314 However, now Lady Philosophy is
not satisfied with those solutions and refutes them. She says that,
“This is an ancient complaint of providence, vehemently pursued
by Marcus Tullius in his Distribution of Divination, and a thing
which thou thyself hast made great and long search after. But
hitherto none of you have used sufficient diligence and vigour in
the explication thereof.” (Consolatio, V.pIV.1-6)
Lady Philosophy indicates that her solution is a novel one. Actually, in
Consolatio, that Boethius lets Lady Philosophy give a solution to the issue
on Providence and free will, which is different from Cicero and Augustine.
Cicero regards this issue as the pagan problem of divination and what he is
concerned with are the implications of divination and prophecy for human
freedom.315 Augustine considers this issue as the Christian problem of free
will and grace.316 Unlike Cicero and Augustine, Boethius treats this issue as
a philosophical problem, for which Lady Philosophy gives a solution in
Consolatio. There are two key terms on which this solution hinges, viz.
God’s knowledge and God’s eternity, which will be explained as follows.
IV.3.2.2.a. God’s knowledge
As we have seen, the patient analyses three scenarios of God
foreknowing uncertainties.317 In his argument, two conclusions are impious,
and the last one is that foreknowledge and necessity should be bound
together, for “if future things be foreseen, there followeth necessity, if there
be no necessity, that they that are not foreknown, and that nothing can be
perfectly known unless it be certain.” (Consolatio, V.pIV.65-68)
Lady Philosophy points out the reason of her patient’s error. This error
314 Cf. 2InInter., 225.9ff.
315 Cicero, On Fate; Sharples (1991).
316 Augustine, The Confessions; Schaff (1886).
317 For three situations of God foreknowing the uncertainties, cf. the preface of Section
IV.3.2.2. Sharples (1991, pp. 25-29) gives a short introduction to the development of the
discussion of divine foreknowledge from Cicero to Boethius; Sorabji (2004a, pp. 69-77)
lists the texts of the commentators from 200-600AD on divine knowledge. And for the
discussions on divine foreknowledge, also cf. Craig (1988a); Davies (1983); Evans (2004);
Knuuttila (2010), pp. 77-80; Obertello (1981).
Chapter IV. Applications of Basic Logic and Mathematics to Consolatio Philosophiae
- 154 -
is caused by the misapprehension of knowledge. “For all that is known is
not comprehended according to the force which it hath in itself, but rather
according to the faculty of them who know it” (Consolatio, V.pIV.75-77).
Knowledge depends on the force of the knower who comprehends things,
rather than on the nature of the things known.318 Since the knowers are
different, it is without doubt that their knowledge of things is not the same.
The first move to correct her patient’s error is to expound the modes of
knowing, which is divided into four levels. From the inferior to the superior,
they are sense, imagination, reason, and understanding.
“For sense looketh upon his form as it is placed in matter or subject,
the imagination discerneth it alone without matter, reason passeth
beyond this also and considereth universally the species or kind
which is in particulars. The eye of the understanding is higher yet.
For surpassing the compass of the whole world it beholdeth with
the clear eye of the mind that simple form in itself.” (Consolatio,
V.pIV.84-91)
The rudiment of this division could be found in Boethius’ earlier works. In
his mathematical work on music, he shows a hierarchical relation between
sense and reason. He reminds people not to grant all judgment to the senses.
“Yet the sense of hearing holds the origin in a particular way, and,
as it were, serves as an exhortation; the ultimate perfection and the
faculty of recognition consists of reason, which, holding itself to
fixed rules, does not falter by any error.” (Musica, I.9.195)
And later in his second commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge, Boethius
discusses the triple power of the soul, without offering a neat
correspondence with the four modes of knowing.
“Of these (viz. the triple power of the soul), the first one supports
the life for the body, that it may arise by birth and subsist by
nourishment; another lends judgment to perception; the third is the
318 This derives from Iamblichus, who claimed that knowledge is intermediate between the
knower and the known, since it is the activity of the knower concerning the known. Cf.
Inglis (2002), p. 128.
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foundation for the strength of the mind and for reason.” (2InIsag.,
71B)
There is no counterpart of the first power in the modes of knowing. The
second power of soul equals sense. The third power “is constituted
completely in reason, and it is occupied in the very firm conception of
present things, or in the understanding of absent things, or in the
investigation of unknown things” (2InIsag., 71C-72A). Even though
Boethius touched the topic of the modes of knowledge in his earlier works,
he did not give a complete division. Here in his last work, he gives a
detailed exposition of four modes of knowledge.319
Just as the triple power of the soul could be found in different animated
bodies, the four modes of knowing also belong to different levels of knower,
who only use their own force and faculty. Among them, reason (ratio)
belongs only to human beings, and understanding (intellegentia) belongs to
things divine. Since all judgment is the act of the knower, “it is necessary
that everyone should perfect his operation by his own power and not by the
force of any other” (Consolatio, V.pIV.118-120). This implies that divine
knowledge and human knowledge are not on the same level. Among the
triple powers of the soul, the first one could not exercise the judgment of the
latter two powers, but the highest carries with it the lower powers and uses
them as slaves and servants. In the same way, among the four modes of
knowing, “the superior force of comprehending embraceth the inferior; but
the inferior can by no means attain to the superior” (Consolatio,
V.pIV.92-94). As a result, the divine understanding knows everything that
human reason knows, but not vice versa. As for future things, human reason
does not think in the same way in which the divine understanding knows. In
fact, that we cannot know in advance the result of uncertain things does not
mean that the divine understanding cannot do so.
“And that is, how a certain and definite foreknowledge seeth even
those things which have no certain issue, and that this is no opinion,
but rather the simplicity of the highest knowledge enclosed within
no bounds.” (Consolatio, V.pV.53-56)
319 Cf. Marenbon (2003), pp. 130-135.
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The nature of knowledge suggests that what the divine understanding
knows on the issue of future things and necessity is different from what
human reason apprehends. Nevertheless, one might ask what the relation is
between future things and necessity in the divine understanding. The nature
of knowledge is a necessary preparation to the explanation, but it alone does
not offer an adequate explanation. What is more, the issue on how to
reconcile Providence with free will is not yet solved. The last term that is
crucial to the solution is the eternity of God.
IV.3.2.2.b. Eternity of God
Eternity is usually compared with temporal things.320 As Sharples
claims, the contrast between eternity and temporal things goes back
“arguably to Parmenides and certainly to Plato, Timaeus 37d-38b”321. Plato
and Aristotle322 both agree that this world had neither beginning of time nor
would ever come to an end. Boethius goes along with them, which verifies
his attempt to harmonize Plato and Aristotle as he planned to do in his
earlier life.323 The world, in Aristotle’s thought324, never “began nor were
ever to end, and its life did endure with infinite time” (Consolatio,
V.pVI.18-22). However, it should not be called everlasting. Following
Plato,325 Boethius confirms that “God is everlasting and the world
perpetual” (Consolatio, V.pVI.57-59).326
Boethius distinguishes eternity (aeternitas) from perpetuity
(perpetuitas). The definition of eternity given by Boethius is as follows.
This definition is not the type of definition in the strict sense, but it is a
320 Cf. Ford (1968); Marenbon (2003), pp. 135-138; Obertello (2003). And Sorabji (2004a,
pp. 221-225) lists some texts of the commentators from 200-600AD on eternity.
321 Sharples (1991), p. 228.
322 The names of Plato and Aristotle appear in the last chapter of Book V in Consolatio.
Lerer (1985, p. 230) claims that it may be no accident that Boethius had intended in his
works to present their doctrines as a harmonized whole. Actually, it is surely not an accident,
for Boethius announced to reconcile the ideas of Plato and Aristotle in his second
commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation, 58; cf. Section I.2.1.
323 Cf. Section I.2.1.
324 Cf. Aristotle. On the Heavens, I.12; Ross (1995).
325 Cf. Sharples (1991), p. 228.
326 Cf. Bubacz (1981) discusses Boethius and Augustine on knowledge of the physical
world.
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description.327
“That then which comprehendeth and possesseth the whole fulness
of an endless life together, to which neither any part to come is
absent, nor of that which is past hath escaped, is worthy to be
accounted everlasting (aeternitas), and this is necessary, that being
no possession in itself, it may always be present to itself, and have
an infinity of movable time present to it.” (Consolatio,
V.pVI.25-31)
Consequently, the eternity of God is like a perpetual present. He always has
an everlasting and present state. This notion has already been stated in
Boethius’ earlier theological treatise on the Trinity. In Chapter IV of De
trinitate, while examining the change of categories when applied to God,
Boethius applies the category of time to God.
“But the expression ‘God is ever (semper)’ denotes a single Present,
summing up His continual presence in all the past, in all the present
— however that term be used — and in all the future. ... He is ever,
because ‘ever (semper)’ is with Him a term of present time, and
there is this great difference between ‘now,’ which is our present,
and the divine present. Our present connotes changing time and
sempiternity; God’s present, abiding, unmoved, and immoveable,
connotes eternity (aeternitas).” (De trinitate, IV.64-66; 69-74)
In his theological works, Boethius does not explain God’s eternity, but in
Consolatio, he gives an exposition.
From the definition of eternity, it could be inferred that God sees even
future events as present, for His knowledge remains in the simplicity of His
presence, and He considers all things in His simple knowledge as if they
were happening now.
In the criticism of earlier thinker’s solution, the patient declared that
future things and necessity are bound together, that is to say, if there be
necessity, then things must be foreseen; and vice versa, if future things be
foreknown, then there must follow necessity; if there be no necessity, then
327 Cf. Section II.1.2.2.
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nothing can be known. And here Lady Philosophy gives the correct
exposition of the issue. The necessities are divided into two: simple and
conditional.328
“The same thing is necessary when it is referred to the Divine
knowledge; but when it is weighed in its own nature that it seemeth
altogether free and absolute. ... Likewise those things which God
hath present, will have doubtless a being, but some of them proceed
from the necessity of things, other from the power of the doers.”
(Consolatio, V.pVI.100-103; 131-134)
Such future things become necessary when they are related to God by
condition of divine knowledge, but when they are being considered in
themselves, they still have the total freedom of their own nature.
In his theological treatise against Eutyches and Nestorius, Boethius
resorted to the method of etymology to trace the source of the word
“person”,329 so that the meaning of it could be more stated more accurately.
Here in Consolatio, Boethius briefly uses this method, too. It is not exact to
call God’s foresight a foreknowledge of the future. The foresight by which
God discerns all things should be regarded as “the knowledge of a never
fading instant” (Consolatio, V.pVI.68-69). For this reason, the so-called
foreknowledge of God should rather be termed providentia (“looking
forward spatially”) rather than praevidentia (“looking forward in time”),
because it is “placed far from inferior things, it overlooketh all things, as it
were, from the highest top of things” (Consolatio, V.pVI.69-72).
Although the issues in Treatment 2 were discussed by Boethius and
others before, here in Consolatio Boethius explains the issue in unparalleled
clarity. It is striking to see how Boethius’ resolution of the thorny issue of
Providence and free will is solved by wielding knowledge of basic logic,
especially the theory of definition and division.
328 Cf. Marenbon (2003), pp. 138-143; Patch (1935a).
329 Cf. Section III.2.1.2.
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IV.4. Back to the Fatherland
Through Treatment 1 and Treatment 2, the patient in Consolatio is
cured and back to his Fatherland.330 This Fatherland is the kingdom of God,
which does not refer to Christian God but the divine wisdom, the
understanding of the true nature of all things.
Boethius, though a Christian,331 and though he wrote theological
treatises, does not resort to the Christian faith and Scripture when he faces
death. In his last work, Consolatio, as the title implies, Boethius is in quest
of consolation from philosophy not from Christ.332 One reason Boethius
chose to write his last work in such philosophical language is in line with
his earlier proposals. In his theological treatises, Boethius tries to “reconcile
faith and reason” (Utrum pater, 70-71), so he employs basic logic and
mathematics to investigate theological issues. As a Christian, Boethius
writes his theological treatises triggered by political circumstances, and not
from the perspective of a Christian but from the perspective of philosophy,
which shows his preference.
Now in his last work, when he faces death, the first thing he remembers
must be philosophy. He displays the power and significance of the
elementary disciplines of philosophy (i.e. mathematics and logic, and
especially music) with which he is so familiar, and the study of which he
sought to promote. Even the most complex issues become clear by applying
330 Cf. Sharples (1991, p. 213) compares this notion with the Stoics and Plato.
331 It is sure that Boethius is a Christian. Cf. Courcelle (1969), p. 318; Sharples (1991), p.
46.
332 Steward and Rand believe it is easy to answer the question “why The Consolation of
Philosophy contains no conscious or direct reference to the doctrines which are traced in
the Tractates with so sure a hand, and is, at most, not out of harmony with Christianity.”
This answer is that “in Consolation he is writing philosophy; in the Tractates he is writing
theology.” Cf. Steward and Rand (1926), p.XI. Similar to the answer given by Steward and
Rand, Lewis (1964, pp. 76-79) gives the answer imitating Boethius, saying “If we had
asked Boethius why his book contained philosophical rather than religious consolations, I
do not doubt that he would have answered, ‘But did you not read my title? I wrote
philosophically, not religiously, because I had chosen the consolation of philosophy, not
those of religion, as my subject. You might as well ask why a book on arithmetic does not
use geometrical methods.”
Chapter IV. Applications of Basic Logic and Mathematics to Consolatio Philosophiae
- 160 -
simple methods, and simple distinctions.
A further reason for his choice may be related the situation he describes.
At the beginning of Consolatio, he is confused and even complains about
Fortune. If he had relied on faith from the start, he would not plausibly have
fallen into such a lamentable condition. As it is, the best way to console him
is not by faith but by reason. As a result, Boethius has Lady Philosophy lead
him out of his state of confusion.
The task of Lady Philosophy in Consolatio is indeed to lead her patient
back to his Fatherland.
“Thou in consenting parts fitly disposed hast
Th’ all-moving soul in midst of threefold nature placed,
Which, cut in several parts that run a different race,
Into itself returns, and circling doth embrace
The highest mind, and heaven with like proportion drives.
Thou with like cause dost make the souls and lesser lives,
Fix them in chariots swift, and widely scatterest
O’er heaven and earth; then at Thy fatherly behest
They stream, like fire returning, back to Thee, their God.”
(Consolatio, III.m9.13-21)
The whole work of Consolatio is Boethius’ course of return to his fatherland,
guided by Lady Philosophy. From the beginning onward, Lady Philosophy
repeatedly promises to bring her student home:
“I think with little labour thou mayest be capable of felicity, and
return to thy country in safety.” (Consolatio, III.pXII.28-29)
“I will show thee the way which will carry thee home. And I will
also fasten wings upon thy mind, with which she may rouse herself,
that, all perturbation being driven away, thou mayest return safely
into thy country by my direction, by my path, and with my wings.”
(Consolatio, IV.pI.35-38)
“I make haste to perform my promise, and to show thee the way by
which thou mayest return to thy country.” (Consolatio, V.pI.7-9)
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In my arguments above, I have divided the process of the consolation
into two parts. The first part is called Treatment 1. In this part, the questions
discussed used to be known by Boethius, as could be shown from his earlier
works, so Lady Philosophy helps her patient to recall them. By Treatment 1,
the patient moves from numbness, sadness, and passivity to consciousness
and initiative. He is back to the peace of his mind and realizes that true
happiness is in one’s heart, which no person can take away. The patient then
diagnoses himself and he awaits further treatment from Lady Philosophy,
which is the second part. The questions dealt with in the second part are not
discussed or solved by Boethius, although he touched upon some of these
questions in his earlier years.
In both Treatment 1 and Treatment 2, applications of basic logic and
mathematics, and even theology could be found. Mathematics, especially
arithmetic and music, are mainly applied in Treatment 1; basic logic is
employed in both Treatment 1 and 2. These applications help render the
organization of Consolatio extraordinary. Though Boethius’ predecessors
are the source of many doctrine set forth in this work, Consolatio can safely
be said to be novel owing to its organization along the lines of basic
mathematics and logic.333
333 On the structure of Consolatio, cf. Rand (1904) and Ranneft (1983). On the influence of
Consolatio, cf. Kneepkens (2003); Cropp (2012), “Boethius in Medieval France:
Translations of the De consolatione philosophiae and Literary Influence,” and Hehle (2012),
“Boethius’s Influence on German Literature to c.1500,” and Love (2012), “The Latin
Commentaries on Boethius’s De consolatione philosophiae from the 9th to the 11th
Centuries,” and Szarmach (2012), “Boethius’s Influence in Anglo-Saxon England: The
Vernacular and the De consolatione philosophiae,” in Kaylor and Phillips (eds.), pp.
319-356, and pp. 255-318, and pp. 75-134, and pp. 221-254; Elliott (2012); Lewis (1967),
“Boethius,” pp. 75-91; Magee (2003); Minnis (1987); Nauta (1997, 2003, and 2009);
Wetherbee (2009), “The Consolation and Medieval Literature,” in Marenbon (ed.), pp.
279-302; Sharples (1991), pp. 48-49.





The study of the oeuvre of Boethius from the perspective of his
application of basic logic and mathematics has provided an answer to the
question whether Boethius is an original thinker. Boethius is indeed an
original thinker, not because the topics he touches upon are original or new,
but because the way he discusses these topics is original. He displays
originality in deciding whose ideas to follow and which logical or
mathematical tools to use in order to obtain the clearest results in the
theological or philosophical matter at hand. Even in a basic work as the De
institutione arithmetica, his rendering differs from his sources by employing
logic.334
Influenced by his father-in-law, Boethius adopted the mission to pass on
Greek culture and thoughts to Rome. In his time, most of the body of Greek
thought was preserved in the seven liberal arts (Section I.1). Grammar and
rhetoric aside, Roman teaching in the liberal arts was rather weak, so
Boethius dedicated himself to the remaining five disciplines, viz. the four
mathematical disciplines (arithmetic, music, geometry and astronomy) and
logic (Section I.2.1). He regarded mathematics and logic as the foundations
of philosophy. Mathematics should be the beginning of the study of
philosophy, for Boethius considered it an indispensable preliminary to the
investigation of the physical world, and to the purification of the human soul
that is needed to comprehend the divine (Section I.2.2). In addition,
Boethius was convinced that logic plays a double role in philosophy, both as
an instrument and as a part of philosophy (Section I.2.3).
Boethius’ logical works include his commentaries on the logical works
of Aristotle, Porphyry, and Cicero, and his monographs on division,
syllogism and topics (Section II.1.1). In these works we find the theory of
categories, division and definition, and also techniques for constructing
arguments. Boethius uses all of these theories and techniques in his
discussions. In this dissertation, I have focused on basic logic, including
334 Cf. Section II.2.1.1.
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theories of categories, division and definition (Section II.1.2), because these
are used most often in Boethius’ works. From Boethius’ mathematical works,
only the discussions of two of the four mathematical arts are (partly) extant,
viz. arithmetic and music. Hence, my discussion of mathematics has been
limited to these two arts. Again, because not every detail of basic
arithmetical and musical knowledge is employed by Boethius, I have first
introduced the basic ideas of arithmetic, such as the theory of equality, unity,
number and divinity (Section II.2.1.3). Equality is like the matrix taking the
force of a root, so it is prior to inequality from which all the other things are
derived. This means that equality is the beginning of the world. The theory
of equality is related to “sameness” and “otherness” which are the principles
of the universe, and it is also related to virtue and vice. Although in his
Arithmetica Boethius omits discussion of these topics, he has them in mind,
for in his other works he does employ them. The idea of unity and the
relationship between number and divinity are the basis of his consolation.
From the De institutione musica I have taken two important ideas. The first
is the division of people in relation to music. Boethius distinguishes
musicians from performers and composers (Section II.2.2.2.b). In his point
of view, performers act as slaves, and composers just take advantage of a
certain natural ability but not so much of reason, so neither could
comprehend musical knowledge. Unlike them, musicians in the right sense
can make full use of reason in forming judgments in musical speculation.
The second important idea taken from Boethius’ Musica is his division of
the kinds of music, viz. instrumental, human, and cosmic music. By the
comparison between Boethius’ extant work on music and that of Ptolemy, it
is revealed that Boethius intended to follow Ptolemy’s first book in both
basic content and detail. In the introduction of the first book, Boethius
promises to return to human and cosmic music which we cannot find in his
extant work, so it is probable that in the original plan of Musica the first
four books were based on Nicomachus and the last three on Ptolemy.
Therefore, it is a good guess that if Boethius had finished the work on music,
he was likely to follow Ptolemy and then he would have returned to human
and cosmic music. Since in Boethius’ extant Musica discussions on human
music and cosmic music are few, I have introduced Ptolemy’s thoughts on
human music and cosmic music in order to grasp the applications of music
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in Boethius’ other works (Section II.2.2.3).
As two elementary disciplines, mathematics and logic may seem
independent, but I have nevertheless explored their relationship in Boethius’
works. Most applications of mathematics in logical works are examples to
clarify logical notions, which renders the logic much easier to grasp
(Section II.1); the applications of basic logic to the mathematical works
render Boethius’ Arithmetica and Musica even more tightly argued and
well-organized than their sources (Section II.2.1.2 and Section II.2.2.2).
My research has shown that Boethius considered mathematics and logic
so essential to philosophy that he has applied them throughout his
theological and philosophical treatises. Boethius has written five theological
tractates, among which De fide was probably written first. It can be regarded
as the prologue of De trinitate, Utrum pater, and Contra Eutychen et
Nestorium (Section III.1). The fundamental doctrines of the Catholic faith
that it describes, concerning the Trinity (Section III.1.1) and the nature and
person of Christ (Section III.1.2), serve as the foundation of Boethius’
subsequent inquiries. There is no application of mathematics and basic logic
in De fide, but in the subsequent four treatises, applications of mathematics
and basic logic can be found. In order to preserve the spectrum of Boethius’
arguments as a whole, I have followed the order of his discussions in each
theological tractate and pointed out applications of mathematics and basic
logic where they are used.
The chronological order of Boethius’ theological treatises is related to
his interest in political affairs. In the year 512, a letter from a number of
Eastern bishops to Pope Symmachus set Boethius thinking about
Christology. In Boethius’ opinion, no one had solved or even touched upon
the true distinction between a union formed from two natures and a union
which consists in two natures. Hence he decided to inquire into this issue,
and he wrote the treatise against Eutyches and Nestorius. Boethius begins
his refutations with definitions of Nature and Person, for the inability to
distinguish between these two terms has resulted in the errors of Nestorius
and Eutyches (Section III.2.1). After clearing away the errors of Nestorius
and Eutyches (Section III.2.2.1 and Section III.2.2.2), Boethius sets out the
middle way of the Catholic Faith (Section III.2.3), just as the Eastern
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bishops requested from Pope Symmachus. In the whole treatise, there is no
application of mathematics, apart from the notion of virtues holding a
middle place, which is also found in Arithmetica. There are some
applications of basic logic, most notably the highly significant theory of
definition, and notions taken from his commentaries on Porphyry’s Isagoge,
not least Porphyry’s Tree.
In the year 519, Scythian monks from the East had offered the slogan,
“one of the Trinity suffered in the flesh”, which ignited questions about the
Trinity. Hence Boethius had occasion to discuss doctrines of the Trinity in
De trinitate and Utrum pater. The issue of the Trinity focuses on two
questions. The first one regards the unity in God, and is discussed in De
trinitate (Section III.3.1). Boethius builds his argument on three pillars:
knowledge of otherness or difference; the theory of form; and the two kinds
of number. The first and the last topic are closely related to arithmetic
(Section III.3.1.1 and Section III.3.1.3); and discussions of all three pillars
have notions in common with Boethius’ commentary on Porphyry’s Isagoge
(Section III.3.1.2) and his commentary on Aristotle’s On Interpretation
(Section III.3.1.3). Applying arithmetic and logic, then, Boethius concludes
that men are plural in number by the accidents. Accident and difference are
essential to plurality, but in God there is no accident and no difference, so
God is not plural. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit constitute one God and not
three Gods. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit do not result in a plural number,
because we are dealing with a repetition of unities in a question of concrete
number; this does not produce plurality.
However, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are the same but not identical,
and here the second question concerning the Trinity arises. Boethius’
discussions on the diversity in God make use of the category of relation
(Section III.3.2). He explains that when relation is applied to God, the
essential nature of God is not disturbed in any way, and in God, the Father is
said to be the Father of the Son, for the Father begets the Son; and the Holy
Spirit is said to be related to Father and Son in another way, for the Holy
Spirit is begotten by the Father and the Son. Accordingly, Father, Son, and
Holy Spirit are predicated of the Divinity relatively.
I have discussed Boethius’ treatise Quomodo substantiae last, because
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of its peculiar nature and its close relation to his last work, Consolatio. In
Quomodo substantiae, in order to discuss how substances can be good in
virtue of their existence without being absolute goods, Boethius employs
geometrical methods. First he lays down nine rules as premises (Section
III.4.1); then he uses the methods of synthesis and analysis to demonstrate
the question. By means of synthesis, Boethius reaches the conclusion that
things are good either by participation or by substance. However, by means
of analysis, he rules out that things are good by participation (which means
they are not good themselves) or by substance (which would make them
absolute goods, a blasphemy) (Section III.4.2). Therefore, he arrives at the
problem that things are in no way good, for they are good neither by
participation nor by substance. In order to solve this problem, Boethius
offers a process of mathematics similar to mental abstraction (Section
III.4.3). He removes the presence of the Prime Good from the mind for a
moment, and then the proposition which need be proved is: all things are
good. But how could they possibly be good if they did not derive from the
Prime Good? With the help of synthesis and analysis borrowed from
geometry, and in imitation of the mathematical process of abstraction,
Boethius comes to the conclusion that in the case of the Prime Good, Being
and Goodness are identical, and It is good due to Its existence, irrespective
of all conditions. Unlike the Prime Good, the absolute being of all things is
not good under all circumstances, though they are good in virtue of their
existence. For unless the True Good had produced them, these things could
not actually exist.
From Boethius’ discussions on theological issues, we can see that
Boethius does not proceed as a theologian, as Augustine did. He does not
concern himself with the common understanding of the Christian doctrines;
moreover, Boethius does not use the term theologia in the ordinary sense of
the word. He regards theology as a speculative discipline within philosophy.
Therefore he uses a lot of logic and a bit of mathematical knowledge in his
theological treatises. Boethius shows himself to be a philosopher, which is
also confirmed in his Consolatio.
When facing death, Boethius seeks consolation from Philosophy. I have
divided the Consolatio Philosophiae into two parts (Section IV.1). The first
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three books are closely related, and constitute the first part of the medical
treatment of the patient Boethius, which I labelled Treatment 1; the last two
books concern the second part of the medical treatment, labelled Treatment
2. What is more, the discussions in the first three books consist of material
that was already familiar to Boethius. The explanations for the three
diagnostic reasons of the patient’s illness can be found in his earlier works
but due to the difficulties he is in, he has merely forgotten them. The
discussions in the last two books are related to misconceptions concerning
Providence, which are the root cause of his illness. The solution to these
questions is as new to Boethius as it was to his contemporaries. In the
Consolatio, Lady Philosophy says that the ancient problem of providence
was pursued by Cicero, and that the patient in the Consolatio also inquired
into this question for a long time, but neither of them solved this question —
until now.
Thus, throughout his Consolatio, Boethius makes full use of the basic
logic and mathematics he had explored in earlier works. In the first three
books of the Consolatio, he abandons the pursuit of false happiness with the
help of basic logic, although he merely provides the definition of happiness
without explanation. While applying the theory of definition, Boethius
argues that the definition of man as a rational and mortal animal is still
incomplete (Section IV.2.1). Using musical therapy, he makes clear that God
governs the world in a harmonious way, but he does not explain in what
kind of way (Section IV.2.2.1). To answer the unsolved questions in the first
three books Boethius applies arithmetic (Section IV.2.2.2). We have
established that Boethius applies basic logic, music and arithmetic to
complete Treatment 1 (Section IV.2.3). By means of these tools the patient
of the Consolatio comes to himself and recovers from the numb state he was
in at first.
In Treatment 2, the patient has sufficiently recovered to take the
initiative in the discussion, and himself digs up the root cause of his illness,
which is related to the issue of Providence (Section IV.3.1). By means of
basic logic and geometrical methods of analysis and synthesis, Boethius
explores difficult questions on providence and fate (Section IV.3.2.1.a),
providence and chance (Section IV.3.2.1.b), and providence and free will
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(Section IV.3.2.2) and finally solves them. The tools of philosophy empower
the patient of the Consolatio to go back to his fatherland (Section IV.4),
which is divine wisdom.
From the beginning of the Middle Ages, Boethius is considered as one
of the leading thinkers. This is mainly due to his mission of preserving
classical culture and thoughts for the Roman world. He carried out his
mission by exploring basic ancient logic and mathematics and by showing
how these tools can be decisive for theology, philosophy and personal
happiness alike.335
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Dit proefschrift is een studie van het werk van Boethius (480-525 n.Chr.)
vanuit het gezichtspunt van basale logica en wiskunde en hun toepassingen.
Vanuit dit gezichtspunt verschijnt Boethius als de auteur van een
samenhangend oeuvre, niet als de logicus, de theoloog, de literator, of de
wegbereider voor de Middeleeuwen zoals zijn werk in het verleden vaak is
opgesplitst vanuit verschillende academische disciplines. Een eerste
resultaat van deze benadering is een antwoord op de vraag naar de
originaliteit van Boethius. Veel inhoudelijke aspecten van zijn werk zijn niet
nieuw, maar de organisatie en de heldere articulatie van begrippen en
argumenten zijn dat wel. Juist daarop berust zijn betekenis voor zijn tijd, en
voor de eeuwen na hem.
Boethius nam de taak op zich om de Griekse cultuur en Grieks
gedachtengoed door te geven aan de Romeinse cultuur, in het Latijn. Het
Griekse cultuurgoed was in zijn tijd vooral voorhanden in de vorm van de 7
vrije kunsten: logica, grammatica, rhetorica (later trivium genoemd);
getallenleer, muziek, meetkunde, en astronomie (door Boethius quadrivium
gedoopt). Met name de logica en de vakken van het quadrivium waren
ondervertegenwoordigd in het Romeinse curriculum, terwijl Boethius juist
deze vakken als fundamenteel beschouwde voor de filosofie. Wiskunde is
voor Boethius noodzakelijk voor de reiniging van de ziel, en het begin van
de studie van de fysische werkelijkheid. Logica is zowel instrument van de
filosofie als een integraal onderdeel ervan. Vandaar het plan van Boethius
om juist in deze vakken Latijnse inleidingen en commentaren te bieden.
Van de wiskundige werken van Boethius zijn alleen zijn inleidingen op
de getallenleer en, gedeeltelijk, de muziek overgeleverd. Tot deze teksten is
mijn discussie van het quadrivium dan ook beperkt. Binnen deze terreinen
worden de theorie van gelijkheid, éénheid, getal en goddelijkheid het meest
gebruikt in andere werken, alsmede het onderscheid tussen uitvoerende
musici en componisten, en de verdeling van muziek in instrumenteel,
menselijk (harmonie van ziel en lichaam), en kosmisch (harmonie van de
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kosmos). Helaas zijn de op Ptolemaeus gebaseerde laatste delen van
Boethius’ De musica, waarin de menselijke en kosmische muziek uitgebreid
zouden moeten zijn behandeld, niet overgeleverd. Om toepassingen van
deze theorie in de Consolatio van een passende context te voorzien heb ik
direct geput uit het werk van Ptolemaeus.
De logische werken van Boethius omvatten zijn commentaren op de
logica van Aristoteles, Porphyrius en Cicero, en monografieën over
classificatie, syllogisme en ‘gemeenplaatsen’ (topoi). Met name de theorie
van categorieën, classificatie en definitie, en delen van de argumentatieleer
spelen in alle geschriften van Boethius een rol. In dit proefschrift heb ik mij
geconcentreerd op die aspecten van de basale logica, die de meeste
toepassingen vinden.
Een vergelijking van de inleidende werken op de getallenleer en muziek
met hun bronnen (Nicomachus van Gerasa en de genoemde Ptolemaeus)
toont Boethius’ terughoudendheid ten aanzien van de meer speculatieve
aspecten van de Platoonse getallenleer, ten gunste van de meer wiskundige
aspecten ervan. Wel heeft Boethius een korte analogie tussen
getalsverhoudingen en politieke verhoudingen ingevoegd: een indicatie van
zijn politieke werk in Rome. Boethius gebruikt logische terminologie om
zijn bronnenmateriaal strakker te ordenen dan in het origineel het geval was.
In de inleidende logische werken van Boethius vinden we een lichte neiging
om logische argumenten vooral met wiskundige voorbeelden te illustreren,
of om wiskundige voorbeelden die elders in Aristoteles of Porphyrius zijn te
vinden op meer plaatsen in te zetten.
Meer uitgebreide toepassingen van basale logica en wiskunde vinden
we in de theologische tractaten, die de filosoof Boethius schreef vanwege
zijn bemoeienis met de politieke verwikkelingen tussen Rome en de
Oosterse kerk, die voortkwamen uit onenigheid over de Christologie. In de
meest waarschijnlijke chronologische volgorde, die in ieder geval de ideale
leesvolgorde is, worden De fide, Contra Eutychen et Nestorium, De trinitate,
en Utrum pater behandeld. De fide beschrijft de christelijke orthodoxie ten
tijde van Boethius, zonder vermelding van logica of wiskunde. De Contra
Eutychen slaagt erin door heldere definities van de omstreden termen
‘natuur’ en ‘persoon’ de extreme posities van Eutyches resp. Nestorius te
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weerleggen, en de positie van de Kerk als gulden middenweg te schetsen,
precies zoals Oosterse kerkleiders in hun brief aan Paus Symmachus hadden
gevraagd. Hier is het vooral de basale logica die het werk doet.
De trinitate en Utrum pater behandelen de vraag hoe de éénheid van
God samengaat met de diversiteit van de Drieëenheid. Met het gelijknamige
werk van Augustinus in het achterhoofd, benut Boethius hier op eigen wijze
de getallenleer voor het onderscheid van ‘verschil’ in termen van genus,
species of getal; en het onderscheid tussen abstract en concreet getal. Uit de
logische geschriften benut hij de Boom van Porphyrius uit diens Isagoge, en
argumenten uit de commentaren op Aristoteles ´ De interpretatione. Het
resultaat is dat, volgens Boethius, God niet veelvuldig is omdat Hij geen
accidenten of differentiae kent, en omdat de herhaling van éénheden in het
onderscheid tussen Vader, Zoon, en Heilige Geest in de context van concrete
getallen per definitie geen veelvoud oplevert. Uit Utrum pater blijkt dat de
diversiteit van de Drieëenheid berust op een onderscheid tussen de
onderlinge relaties tussen Vader, Zoon en Geest, zodat de
dienovereenkomstige relatieve predicatie de enkelvoudige essentie van God
niet kan bedreigen.
De Quomodo substantiae is een meer filosofische beschouwing van de
vraag hoe substanties goed kunnen zijn op grond van hun bestaan zonder
zelf absoluut goed te zijn. Naar toon en onderwerp vormt dit werk een
goede overgang naar Boethius’ laatste geschrift, de Consolatio. In Quomodo
substantiae gebruikt Boethius argumentatievormen uit de geometrie, vooral
een specifieke vorm van analyse en synthese, om het probleem te
verhelderen. Middels synthese concludeert Boethius dat iets ofwel door
participatie ofwel van substantie goed moet zijn. Middels analyse laat hij
zien dat beide opties onaanvaardbaar zijn. De oplossing wordt geboden door
een gedachtenexperiment dat Boethius vergelijkt met de mentale abstractie
die in de wiskunde gebruikelijk is. Het resultaat is dat Zijn en Goedheid
alleen in het hoogste Goede samenvallen. Al het andere is goed op grond
van hun bestaan dat immers gegrond is in het hoogste Goede, zonder dat
hun eigen zijn in alle opzichten en omstandigheden goed is.
Boethius’ discussie van theologische kwestie toont hem niet als
theoloog voor wie het begrip van de Christelijke leer het doel is, maar als
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filosoof die de theologie ziet als onderdeel van de theoretische filosofie.
Deze visie legitimeert het gebruik van filosofische, i.c. wiskundige en
logische, middelen.
In de beroemde Consolatio Philosophiae tenslotte figureert de auteur
als patiënt die door het verlies van zijn politieke positie en naderende
executie de wanhoop nabij is. Vrouwe Philosophia biedt hem de filosofie
aan als therapie, en wel in twee achtereenvolgende behandelingen die
verschillend van aard zijn. In het eerste deel (boek I-III) neemt Vrouwe
Philosophia het voortouw en laat haar hulpeloze patiënt zijn vroegere
inzichten in de basale logica weer inzien. Dat helpt hem om een onjuiste
opvatting van geluk te verwerpen, zij het nog zonder een adequate definitie
van geluk te kunnen geven. De patiënt gaat ook inzien dat de standaard
definitie van de mens als rationeel sterfelijk wezen incompleet is. Via
muziektherapie wordt de patiënt duidelijk gemaakt dat God de wereld op
harmonieuze wijze bestuurt, zij het zonder precies uit te werken hoe dit in
zijn werk gaat. Zo passeren thema’s uit Boethius’ voorafgaande werk
opnieuw de revue, en wordt de grote betekenis van basale logica en
wiskunde voor het welbevinden van de mens opnieuw bevestigd.
In het tweede deel van de Consolatio (boek IV-V) is de patiënt dankzij
deze filosofische middelen reeds zover genezen dat hij zelf het initiatief kan
nemen. De vragen die nog open staan worden door de patiënt herleid tot de
fundamentele vraag naar de aard en betekenis van de voorzienigheid.
Opnieuw worden analyse en synthese, en de theorie van definitie, gebruikt
om voorzienigheid te onderscheiden van noodlot resp. toeval, en om de
relatie tussen voorzienigheid en vrije wil te bepalen. Als zo ook deze
fundamentele vraag naar de voorzienigheid een bevredigende oplossing
heeft gevonden wordt duidelijk hoe de filosofie, middels de instrumenten
van de basale logica en de wiskunde, erin slaagt om de aanvankelijk
wanhopige patiënt Boethius terug te leiden naar zijn vaderland, de
goddelijke wijsheid.
Het succes van Boethius’ oeuvre in de Middeleeuwen is de vervulling
geworden van zijn missie om de Griekse cultuur en het Griekse
gedachtengoed door te geven aan de Romeinse wereld. Dit proefschrift heeft
laten zien dat dit oeuvre duidelijk het stempel draagt van Boethius in de
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consequente en overtuigende toepassing van basale logica en wiskunde in
filosofische vragen van allerlei aard: theologisch, kosmologisch, en ethisch.
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